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A b s t r a c t
The new Basel regulatory initiatives and a burgeoning risk management 
literature signify the rise of enterprise risk management (ERM) in the financial 
services sector. However, very little is known of the roles that risk management 
plays in organizations and how it obtains organizational significance. This study, 
utilising case study material from seventy-five in-depth interviews with senior 
managers at two large banking groups, is a first step in exploring ERM in action.
Apart from the field material, the study draws on the normative- 
practitioner literature of risk management, as well as on a long strand of 
organisationally grounded studies of management control.
ERM appears to be an assembly of four risk management ideal types (Risk 
Silo Management, Integrated Risk Management, Risk and Value Management, 
Strategic Risk Management), all of which aspire to be ‘enterprise-wide’, and 
together constituting the ‘risk management mix’ in a given organisation. Three 
distinct types of risk managers emerged in both organisations, displaying 
characteristic aspirations and alliances (risk silo specialists, risk capital 
specialists, senior risk officers).
The case study analysis compared and contrasted the observed two ERM 
assemblies, and emphasised the alternative patterns o f organizational significance 
displayed by the risk management functions. Under the first model (value-based 
ERM) risk management was integral to the formal planning and performance 
measurement process, while remained neutral in the discussions of discretionary 
strategic decisions. Under the second model (strategic ERM) risk management 
was incidental to formal planning and control, however, senior risk officers 
exercised agenda-setting power to influence the discussion of key strategic 
uncertainties.
The study explains the observations in terms of firm-specific factors and 
institutional pressures. The politics of risk control and the presence of different 
calculative cultures in the organisations were tampered by contemporary 
corporate governance imperatives, such as the shareholder-value drive and the 
risk-based internal control imperative.
Word count: 80,770
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C h a p t e r  1 
In t r o d u c t io n
"Would you please tell me which way to go?” said Alice.
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to" said the cat.
Lewis C arro ll
Recent trends in corporate reporting and governance in the UK and 
elsewhere have increased the importance of risk management in business 
enterprises. Carey & Turnbull (2001), for example, depict risk management as an 
‘integral part’ of sound business management1. Others call attention to ‘the rise 
and rise of risk management’ (Hunt, 2001) and to its strategic potential by arguing 
that ‘with their specific skills ... risk managers can more easily identify relevant 
potential risks and can give focussed advice on controlling them to line 
managers'2 as well as to chief executives (Butterworth, 2001).
Accordingly, the emerging notion of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
operates with a rather wide remit. Moving beyond an initial financial risk agenda, 
it concerns itself with strategic and operational issues. Setting an important 
milestone on the road of corporate governance developments, the Treadway 
Commission defined ERM as '... a process, effected by an entity’s board o f 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement o f entity objectives. ’3 This definition calls 
into mind Anthony (1965)’s widely-quoted definition of management control: 
'the process by which managers ensure that resources are obtained and used 
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment o f the organization’s objectives 4. 
With the emphasis placed on the strategic role of ERM (‘applied in strategy 
setting... to provide ... assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives’), ERM is being advocated as a strategic management control system.
1 Nigel Turnbull was chairman o f  the corporate governance committee that in 1998 
recommended that directors o f  listed UK companies should apply a risk management 
framework to the assessment o f  the soundness o f  internal controls.
2 Butterworth (2001), p.22.
3 COSO (2003), p.6.
4 Anthony (1965)
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Still, enterprise risk management remains a rather elusive and under­
specified management control. Its broad definition is an umbrella over diverse 
risk management techniques and arrangements, whose users aspire to create an 
image of consistent and comprehensive application across an organization. 
Normative texts are telling of the diverse practices that all seem to be bundled 
under the heading of enterprise risk management. ERM advocates typically 
outline a set of risk management tasks and envision a ‘framework’ for the 
treatment of these under the auspices of an appointed senior risk officer. This 
requires the prioritisation and the ordering of the various elements into a control 
cycle with recognisable structural and personnel arrangements. Many 
contributions to the development of ERM techniques have been made by 
practitioners in specific industries (notably from oil companies, banks and 
specialist consulting firms) and are proprietary.
ERM has captured growing academic interest (see for example the edited 
collections by Pickford, 2001 and Alexander, 2001, as well as Power, 2003a), but 
for the most part, academic contributions focus on financial risk (Jorion, 1997; 
Dowd, 1998; Danielsson et al., 2001; Medova, 2002). The focus of existing 
research is, on balance, normative. Recommendations for new risk management 
techniques greatly outnumber actual accounts and explanations of the 
implementation of risk management. According to the normative practitioner 
literature, ERM faces a promising future. It is being advocated as a panacea to 
many modern-day managerial problems.
Risk management as a financial subject is rooted in portfolio theory 
(Markovitz, 1952), which directed attention to the inverse relationship between 
risk and return, and to the risk-reducing benefits of portfolio diversification. Risk 
management was originally applied in managing the insurance portfolio of 
business organisations. It was with the invention of new techniques such as credit 
rating models and Value-at-Risk (J.P. Morgan Bank, 1995; Jorion, 1997; Dowd, 
1998) that risk management could be implicated in the day-to-day trading and 
lending activities of financial institutions.
In the mid-nineties, a series of financial disasters, most notably the 
collapse of Barings bank in 1995 and other headline-catching losses such as those 
suffered by Daiwa Bank, directed attention to the problems posed by complex 
financial instruments let out of control (Marshall, 2001). Further, credit crises
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across Europe revealed poor lending policies and/or inadequate credit risk 
assessments among lenders such as Credit Lyonnais, which suffered credit losses 
amounting to $29bn in the 1980s and 1990s. Risk management emerged as a 
financial discipline that offered a means of controlling such risks. Risk 
management, adopted by financial institutions as a means of strengthening 
internal control over their trading and lending activities, soon caught the attention 
of corporate governance policy makers.
By the late nineties, corporate governance advocates in the Anglo-Saxon 
world looked for a cure to weak internal controls. Inadequate control was quoted 
as having led to the demise of the Maxwell empire (Power, 2003a). Lack of 
internal control, lack of management oversight and fraud became seen as the 
ultimate reasons explaining even the large financial trading losses suffered by 
Barings ($1.6bn), Orange County ($1.7bn), and Sumitomo Corp. ($1.7bn) 
(Marshall, 2001).
Thereafter corporate governance advocates prescribed risk management 
for firms, be they financial or non-financial, as a pillar of ‘sound internal control’ 
and serving the interests of shareholders. The Treadway Commission in North 
America was one among a number of bodies that promoted the link between risk 
management and ‘good management.’
Risk management came to be understood as a strategic control system, as 
advocated by the Treadway Commission’s previously quoted definition. In the 
UK it was the Turnbull Committee that directed attention to the strategic potential 
of risk management as a means of ensuring that the objectives of adherents are 
met. Further to the influential Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 1998), risk management 
has become a governance requirement encrypted in the listing rules of the London 
Stock Exchange. Other countries in Europe are likely to follow, with Germany 
already in tow with the Control and Transparency Act (Power, 2003a).
Apart from its influence on corporate governance, risk management has 
influenced regulatory designs. The international bank regulatory body (the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision) as well as a number of national regulatory 
bodies, in financial and non-financial sectors (e.g. the Financial Services 
Authority, the Environmental Agency and the Housing Corporation in the UK, the 
nuclear industry regulator in the US) are implementing new regulatory
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frameworks applying risk management principles. The rise of risk-based 
regulation marks yet another victory for risk management advocates.
However, there are critical voices who sound words of caution about the 
‘risk management of everything’ (Power, 2004) and strongly warn aficionados 
and the riders of the risk management band wagon against the unintended 
consequences of ERM (Hunt, 2004). However, both risk management advocates 
and the discordant critics are weakened by the dearth of empirical accounts, 
descriptions and explanations of actual risk management arrangements and the 
roles risk managers play in organisational life.
This thesis is motivated by the belief that organizationally grounded 
accounts of enterprise risk management are needed to inform the risk 
management discourse. Currently we have little understanding of how enterprise 
risk management works in action. Many questions are unanswered. Given the lack 
of synthesis of the burgeoning normative literature and the dearth of detailed case 
studies, we have little knowledge of what form(s) ERM takes in organisations. 
We are also short of an assessment of the extent to which ERM delivers on 
promises of being a panacea to strategic and internal control problems. What roles 
does the management of risk come to serve within organisations? Is there 
evidence that risk management has effectively moved beyond its original financial 
agenda? How does it relate to existing strategic planning and control systems? Is 
risk management complementary to the existing practices of financial 
management and control or is it in competition with those for managerial attention 
and use?
Risk management is particularly topical in banking -  apart from bankers 
seeing their business as the intermediation of risks, the international regulatory 
framework for risk management in banking is under review (BIS, 2003a). A 
major concern of regulators, rating agencies, investors and of the banks 
themselves is whether a given bank holds sufficient capital in order to withstand 
economic shocks. The Basel Committee (under the auspices of the Bank of 
International Settlements) has been issuing capital regulations since 1989 that 
attribute an increasing role to enterprise risk management in banking 
organizations. The BIS capital regulations challenge the risk management 
functions of banks to devise and implement risk measurement methods that can 
assess and control the risk profile of the organization. The regulatory definition of
9
‘capital adequacy’ (the amount of minimum capital a bank should hold) has been 
gradually changed to reflect the risk profile of the institutions, the rationale being 
that banks with a higher risk profile should hold more capital than their less risky 
peers.
The Basel Committee endorses enterprise risk management as an umbrella 
notion that can accommodate the techniques required for bank capital adequacy 
calculation: ‘. . .integrated firm-wide approaches to risk management should 
continue to be strongly encouraged by the regulatory and supervisory 
community.’5 Authors of articles bearing titles such as 'Will Every Bank 
Eventually Have ERM?’6 assert that ERM is indeed becoming established in the 
banking industry. So much so, that Power (2003a) wonders if ERM might be 
emerging as a 'world model V 'If we were to imagine the creation o f a new 
banking organization, we know that it could not be founded without rapidly 
adopting the mission and principles o f ERM... ’7
Taking a wider look across a number of sectors, Hunt (2003) observes that 
ERM is spreading outside the banking sector: ‘At the beginning o f the 1990s, risk 
management was an important, but essentially peripheral, business activity. (...) 
By the end o f the decade, corporations had institutionalized elaborate frameworks
9 8fo r managing risk, under the heading o f 'enterprise-wide risk management ’. ’
But where do the drivers for the spreading of ERM come from? It can be 
argued that bank regulators are setting incentives for the banking sector to adopt 
‘the mission and principles of ERM’. Similarly, corporate governance trend­
setters (such as the Treadway Commission or the Turnbull Committee) further 
increase ERM’s appeal outside the banking sector by advocating it as a process to 
ensure the successful implementation of strategies, and adoptable by any 
organization. Further, Power (2003a) proposes that the rise of the shareholder 
value imperative, closely related with recent corporate governance trends, also 
paves the road of ERM in financial institutions. However, there is virtually no 
empirical research that would explain actual ERM practices with reference to 
external influences, thus the external origins of ERM still await empirical 
scrutiny.
5 BIS (2003b), p.2.
6 Gilbert (2004)
7 Power (2003), p. 10.
8 Hunt (2003), p. 83.
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The aims of this Thesis are twofold. Based on extensive fieldwork with 
two stock exchange listed large banking organisations, it probes the roles that 
ERM has come to play in them. It also sets out to explain the observed practices 
of ERM with reference to both internal organizational factors and external 
influences.
The choice of listed banking organizations for study allows the researcher 
to consider a host of stakeholder pressures on the observed ERM practices. Thus 
regulatory, shareholder, rating agency as well as internal managerial influences 
will be considered. The focus on banks has a caveat emptor -  risk management 
here (supposedly) addresses the question of bank capital adequacy, which is a 
regulatory requirement not faced by non-financial institutions. However, as the 
observed risk managers will be shown to have wider objectives, and try to become 
involved in strategic planning, performance management and control, the study 
has implications for all risk managers who cast their nets wide and cultivate 
strategic ambitions. What can be learned from these cases is therefore thought to 
have implications for not only banking specialists, but also for the theory and 
practice of enterprise risk management elsewhere, as a corporate governance and 
internal control discipline.
The Thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 offers a literature review 
that pins down the theoretical reference points of the study. The research project 
draws on organisationally grounded studies of calculative practices and 
management control, as well as institutional organisational theory. The first body 
of literature is rather eclectic; it consists of early theoretical studies of 
management control, survey- and field-based contingency research, as well as 
more sociologically informed field studies. This diverse research body offers 
valuable insights about the roles control systems (might) play in organizational 
life. It explains the observable patterns of control system design and use with 
reference to organizational characteristics and the micropolitics of control. The 
institutional organizational literature further probes the external origins of internal 
control practices.
Based on the influence of individual control systems on strategic planning 
and performance measurement, Chapter 3 develops six tests for the examination 
o f the organisational significance of risk management. The differences found in 
the case studies, at this stage, will be explained by the micropolitics of risk
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management. Risk management as a control activity appears to be inherently 
political. For instance, by assessing the risk profile of business units, risk people 
can propose changes to internal capital allocations. This would allow them to 
influence planning and control. Nevertheless, risk people may easily land in the 
middle of a battlefield where different business units with conflicting profit and 
capital interests combat for or against radical changes in the internal definition of 
capital adequacy. Whether or not risk managers can influence strategy making 
and control depends on their political skills and alliances. It will be shown that 
three types o f risk managers are emerging with different ambitions, political skills 
and alliances. This leads to diverse ways in which ERM can contribute to 
strategy and control -  in particular, two markedly different patterns of 
organizational significance will be explicated.
Given that risk management as a control system has not arrived in 
unoccupied territories, Chapter 4 considers ERM as part of a multiple 
organizational control package where it may be in competition with (or 
complementary to) other planning and control systems, such as managerial 
accounting. Chapter 4 examines top management’s use o f  risk management and 
accounting controls over a period of economic boom, bust and recovery at one of 
the case study companies. It addresses how and why certain control systems 
become influential, receive managerial attention and set the organizational 
agenda, while others get sidelined, ignored or marginalised. The chapter applies 
Simons’ (1990, 1991) distinction of interactive vs. diagnostic use of control 
systems and shows risk management functioning in both capacity. The observed 
patterns of risk management use correspond not only to particular organisational 
characteristics (as Simons postulated), but also to institutional pressures. The 
study here builds on institutional organizational theory (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) in that it argues that risk management’s visibility 
and use by top management can partly be attributed to its perceived institutional 
appropriateness - its ability to legitimise the organization.
Chapter 5 develops the argument that the inclusion of risk controls into a 
broader organizational control landscape raises questions which have implications 
for a more general management control literature. Risk management controls 
share a common design feature with many other management control innovations 
-  they are envisioned in accordance with the cybernetic control ideal. Thus they
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aim to set objectives, measure the process and produce feedback to decision 
makers who can take corrective action if needed. However, the management 
control literature recognises that today’s complexities present controllers with 
rather complex control situations. Under such circumstances more complex (non- 
cybemetic) control practices have been anticipated. In particular, the literature 
attributes the rise of complex controls to the increased uncertainties in the 
operating environments of many firms. Such circumstances might reduce the 
ability of control systems to determine and monitor means and ends. The chapter 
will investigate how the risk and return objectives were controlled in the case 
study firms. It will point to the uncertainties that frustrated the cybernetic ideal in 
the risk control practices at the two banks. Specifically, considerable uncertainties 
can surround the calculative practice that is espoused the be the tool of cybernetic 
control, giving rise to non-cybemetic (‘complex’) control patterns. The study here 
suggests that the uncertainties that might frustrate the cybernetic control ideal can 
be found within the firm itself, independently of the perceived uncertainty of the 
operating environment.
Chapter 6 brings together what the previous chapters have revealed about 
the organizational significance of risk management and probes to what extent the 
findings can be generalised. Based on the findings of the study, the organisational 
significance of risk management will be argued to stem from 1) the micropolitics 
of ERM and its relations with planning and control, 2) its institutional 
appropriateness and 3) its role in the control of conflicting risk and return 
objectives. By relating the findings to the normative literature on ERM, it will be 
argued that ERM appears to be an assembly of risk management ideal types, 
constituting what could be a ‘risk management mix’ that varied across the 
organisations. By linking the observed patterns of organisational significance (and 
the differences in the two risk management mixes) to organisational 
characteristics as well as wider institutional pressures, the chapter traces out the 
implications for the further development of enterprise risk management. The 
cases might be indicative of the emergence of alternatives in the development of 
enterprise risk management. Before moving on to the second chapter, a 
description of the research method is warranted.
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1.1. R e s e a r c h  m e th o d
The study was conducted over a period of three years. The first institution, 
Fraser Bank9 was visited between December 2001 and June 2003, while the 
researcher first made contact with BWT in February 2002 and visited them last in 
September 2004. The longer engagement with BWT can be explained by the fact 
that at the time of the study its financial situation fluctuated: it underwent the 
most severe crisis of its 150-year old history. While in the five years prior to the 
study the bank had quadrupled its market value, in the first year of the research 
project it saw its market value dwindle. Eventually (by late 2003) it managed to 
convince investors that it has drawn a line under its disastrous financial 
performance. The researcher stayed in the field until, amidst the signs of recovery 
and stabilisation, she became convinced that her observations about the risk 
management function were not driven entirely by the fleeting economic crisis but 
were likely to have picked up the more lasting patterns within which BWT 
operated. Frasers, on the other hand showed no such economic fluctuations, 
although at the start of the study a sense of urgency and crisis was present there 
too. However, instead of a real financial crisis, this was the result of a top 
management initiative to overhaul much of organizational life at Frasers 
(including the risk management function) as part of the introduction of a new 
managerial ethos, Value-based Management (VBM). Along with (or despite) the 
VBM implementation Frasers continued to show a steady, rather even growth 
over the period of the research, which was in line with the previous ten-year trend. 
Appendix 1 and 2 give a timeline that indicates the research period against the 
backdrop of the key organisational developments that occurred in the time 
window of the research project.
The case studies are based on seventy-five in-depth interviews with 
senior finance, lending, strategy, controlling (management accounting) and risk 
staff. Appendix 3 shows the list of interviews. Additional informal exchanges
9 The identitiy o f  the banks is concealed as much as possible, in accordance with their wishes.
It is believed that far from compromising the richness o f  the data collected, giving the banks 
assurance o f  confidentiality actually enhanced the depth and scope o f  access granted by them. 
Other field researchers have also acknowledged the benefits from granting confidentiality to 
their case study companies (see for example Carter and Crowther, 2000; Dambrin et al., 2004).
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took place, especially at BWT, where the researcher was provided with an office 
in the central risk management department during her visits. Here the possibility 
of participating in informal meetings (lunchtime get-togethers and chats at the 
coffee machine) was also given. Within the boundaries of confidentiality, the 
banks provided historical and other documentary evidence (annual reports, 
presentations, internal reports) as well. Being a relatively new department at 
BWT, and undergoing a reorganisation at Frasers, the risk people in both banks 
were curious to find out how top management and other staff functions perceived 
their activities and they showed a great interest in the study. All in all, the 
opportunity to get acquainted with a small, but significant aspect of life at the 
banks was there.10
The organizational significance of risk controls can only be grasped by 
appreciating the interactions and possible tensions between risk management and 
other organizational control systems. This requires the researcher to get close to 
the field. In a paper that gives accounting scholars many helpful suggestions as to 
how to realise ‘the richness of field research’, Ahrens and Dent argue that ‘rich 
descriptions o f accounting should draw out the tensions which develop around its 
use in organizations and the interpretive differences that give rise to them. 
Concentrating on those tensions offers a practical route into the difficult process 
o f making sense o f the particular functionings o f accounting in the field. ’11
While all interviews at Frasers were prepared at headquarters, at 
BWT the researcher had the opportunity to observe risk management both at the 
centre and also at one of the business units, Division X. Division X was a 
multinational financial services organisation itself, which (among other factors) 
was held responsible for the financial crisis BWT suffered. Interviews at both 
organisations and further historic data (from annual reports and the financial 
press) allowed the researcher to track divisional control, the way Divisional X had 
been controlled by BWT, from the time of its acquisition until the recovery 
period. The role of risk management and accounting controls in divisional control 
could be explicated from this, giving rise to Chapter 4. Chapter 4 draws out the
10 This sentence paraphrases Mouritsen (1999)’s assessment o f  his field study set-up, which, I 
believe, in many respect, resembles mine.
11 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p. 12.
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tensions between accounting and risk controls and the interpretive differences that 
gave rise to these.
It is notable that BWT was more open to the research project than 
Frasers, allowing the researcher greater access. In BWT a larger number of 
organisational actors agreed to discuss risk management and control issues. This 
has inevitably introduced an asymmetry into the study, giving rise to an 
‘overflow’ of BWT information. Much of the extra material concerned the (past, 
present and future) position of Division X, giving rise to the stand-alone chapter 
on the role of risk management in divisional control.
Apart from Chapter 4, all the chapters that present empirics are 
narrated through juxtaposing the two banks. Chapter 3 compares and contrasts the 
apparent strategic significance of the risk management functions in the two banks, 
and complements this with a comparative analysis of the ambitions and alliances 
of the risk officer groups found. Chapter 5 compares and contrasts patterns of 
dealing with conflicting risk and return objectives at the two banks, as events 
unfolded. Finally, Chapter 6, summarising previous findings and adding 
observations about the calculative cultures of the banks as well as their wider 
institutional contexts, compares and contrasts ‘the risk management mix’ at 
Frasers and BWT.
The use of contrasting observations from multiple cases is not alien 
to field-based accounting research (Ahrens, 1996). The choice of the two banks, 
however, was not based on ‘theoretical sampling’, an a priori assessment of 
which organizations would provide a rich source of data (Baxter and Chua, 1998). 
Neither was a pre-constructed comparative framework in place. Instead, the 
research project relied on 'the opportunism o f field researchers’ (Baxter and
19Chua, 1998), and access was indeed opportunistic. Nevertheless, the two banks 
showed remarkable similarities: they have got a similar market capitalisation
12 The initial plan was to study two oil companies, based on some interesting anecdotal 
evidence o f  the role o f  risk management in major oil companies. However, in early 2002 I 
came across with a senior executive o f  BWT. It was her who suggested I could do a case study 
in BWT, given the then concerns with risk management and control. After having secured 
access at BWT I looked for another bank. The fact that BWT had agreed to the study made the 
idea o f  a comparative case study attractive to Fraser Bank, famed for its reputation for market 
leadership in the risk management area. They welcomed the opportunity to be ‘benchmarked’ 
against BWT, particularly at a time when the risk function at Fraser Bank was undergoing a 
reorganisation. I then settled on a sample o f  two, hoping that the comparative case adds breadth 
(as opposed to a single case study), without compromising on depth.
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(size), a similar spread of activities, international strategic ambitions and a global 
reach. It also turned out that their risk management organisations, aspirations and 
expectations regarding risk control, and the language they used for risk were 
comparable too. At a closer look, however, interesting contrasts emerged between 
the banks. In particular, the personal convictions of senior risk officers, the 
control styles and the apparent long term strategies differed significantly. 
Drawing out similarities and contrasts between ‘matched pairs’ (Ahrens and Dent, 
1998) helps the researcher to move systematically from field material through 
interpretation to explanation. Although the bancassurance situation was unique to 
BWT, it did give rise to the opportunity to investigate the role of risk management 
in the divisional control over the insurance unit, leading to a stand-alone chapter 
(Chapter 4) that is in effect a ‘case within a case’.
The story that is the result of the patterning of the field material 
gradually took shape over the research and writing period. The researcher 
examined and re-examined observations and gathered more field material at each 
stage of the field work, to ensure, as far as possible, ‘ that the patterns adequately 
represent the observed world and are not merely a product o f [the researcher’s] 
imagination’ (Ahrens and Dent, 1998).13 The point of departure from the field 
came when (similarly to Dent’s experience (Dent, 1991)) it became clear that 
interviewees’ views were predictable, given a knowledge of their function 
(accounting, strategy, risk management etc.). By participating in international 
practitioner events the researcher further checked upon her major results and 
found that the roles and perceived influence of risk officers from other financial 
organisations appeared to echo the lessons learned from the initial cases.14 Most 
usefully the researcher participated in the Risk Europe conference including the 
specialist pre-conference workshop on risk management in the insurance industry, 
which took place in April 2004. The events were attended by senior delegates
13 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p. 9.
14 However, the study must be cautious in its claim to generality. This is because o f  the 
‘situatedness’ o f  the initial two stories. The ‘inescapable truth’ is that ‘the reality conveyed, 
however carefully researched, is only one o f  a possible number o f  explanations.’ (Ahrens and 
Dent, 1998: 10). Therefore alternative explanations could have been found for the same cases 
by a different researcher, with a different background. In the course o f  the theorizing process 
many previous attempts at explanation were discarded, revised and modified. This crafting o f 
the account led to an explanation that created the best fit between data and theory, among the 
various alternatives that were tried. Extending the explanatory framework o f  the study to other 
cases is not likely to produce such a fit. The ‘situatedness’ o f  the other cases would have to be 
accommodated as well by further adjusting and refining the explanations.
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from Europe’s major financial institutions. The organisations whose chief risk 
officers the researcher had discussions with included Swiss Re, Aegon UK, 
Allianz Comhill and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS). An hour-long interview 
was later arranged with each of the CROs of the last three organisations in 
London, two of which were allowed to be recorded.
Given that all but four interviews were recorded, field material 
primarily consisted of extensive interview notes and transcriptions. Secondly, 
documents gathered in the field, such as annual reports, presentations and internal 
reports as well as press cuttings, broadened the data set.
Interpretations and pattern making were guided by theoretical 
constructs, some of which had to be discarded, some survived and some had to be 
developed. Chapter 3 drew on organizationally grounded studies of management 
controls to ensemble six tests for assessing and comparing the organizational 
significance of risk management in the two banks. Chapter 4 applied one of these 
tests, namely Simons’ (1990, 1991) notion of interactive vs. diagnostic use of 
management controls, in order to describe the role of risk and accounting controls 
in the divisional control over BWT’s troubled business unit. The same chapter 
used the new institutionalist concept of ‘institutional appropriateness’ as an 
explanatory construct, arguing that management controls’ rise into vogue and 
their fall out of top management’s favour depends, in part, on their perceived 
ability to legitimise the organisation in the eyes of influential external 
stakeholders. Moving on, Chapter 5 dealt with the complex control patterns that 
rose in the wake of the simultaneous application of risk and traditional accounting 
controls at the two banks. Applying the distinction between practitioners’ 
espoused vs. in-use-theories (Argyris, 1976), the chapter sought to come up with 
an explanation for the actual practices found. Finally, Chapter 6 set out to 
synthesise the previous findings with the normative-practitioner literature on 
ERM. The construct of the ‘risk management mix’ was created to establish the 
case for ERM as an assembly of risk management archetypes, which occurred in 
distinct combinations at the two banks. In order to explain the observed ‘risk 
management mixes’, they were related to the ‘calculative cultures’ of the 
organisations (a recent construct developed by Power, 2004) and two major 
institutional pressures: 1. the shareholder value imperative and 2. the rise of the 
risk-based internal control thinking in Anglo-Saxon corporate governance.
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The major analytical task was the theoretical appreciation of the 
field study patterns. According to Ahrens and Dent (1998), field research does not 
yield a unique story, neither does it give rise to unique theoretical interpretations. 
A certain amount of subjectivity is the privilege of the field researcher. It is not 
granted to survey-based researchers who are armed with sophisticated statistical 
packages. However, this interpretive freedom poses the challenge for the 
researcher to choose (or develop) theoretical constructs with care, otherwise the 
empirics can easily appear to be disjoint from theory. The laboriously carved field 
accounts can easily end up saying nothing new, annoying the reader as trivial and 
banal. As Ahrens and Dent (1998) constructively put it, 'the major analytical task 
at this point is, thus, to develop a theoretical appreciation o f the field study 
patterns that will be valuable to the reader: one that extends the reader’s prior 
theoretical knowledge, or leads to more complex appreciation o f theory.'15
As for ‘what theory is not, theorizing is’, Weick’s (1995) view is 
instructive. Theory is a continuum rather than dichotomy, and theorising is the 
process of approximation, the road to what eventually become established as 
‘theories’. The process of theorising consists of abstracting and selecting factors 
that are deemed as explanatory (while omitting and discarding others are equally 
important steps), relating them to each other, explaining, and synthesizing. These 
activities spin out data (or ‘rich accounts’ in Ahrens and Dent, 1998), lists of 
variables, diagrams and hypotheses, each advancing closer to ‘full-fledged 
theories.’ This study attempts to summarise the empirics in tables, arranged 
according to a number of variables (that resulted from previous theories or 
emerged from the field), thus, represent approximations. The extent to which 
these represent theory is difficult to judge if theory is understood as a continuum.
DiMaggio’s (1995) influential response to Weick (1995) helpfully 
distinguishes three types of theories. First, ‘theory as covering laws’ is concerned 
with explaining variance rather than regularities, and the determination of 
variables that best fit the data (statistically), with little regard for the how and 
why. By definition, such theory can only be the result of large sample studies. 
Field researchers must aim for two other types of theories. ‘Theory as narrative’ 
requires that hypotheses be accompanied by plausible accounts of how the actions
15 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p. 30.
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of humans could produce the associations predicted and observed. ‘Theory as 
covering laws’ and ‘theory as narrative’ are therefore complementary, allowing 
this conception to co-exist comfortably with Weick’s understanding of theories 
constituting a continuum, residing in different (though advanced) stages of 
approximation. Finally, ‘theory as enlightenment’ suggests that theory can be 
complex and rich in paradox, clearing away conventional notions to make room 
for artful and exciting insights. Thus theory can result from exploring the 
boundaries of accepted or unquestioned theories, as well as from critically 
exploring new phenomena that turn out to have unanticipated consequences.
This study primarily aims to produce ‘theory as narrative’ by 
accounting for how actions produced the patterns observed (between firm 
characteristics, the micropolitics of control, sources of external legitimacy and the 
organisational significance and uses of risk management). Secondly, the 
theorizing process has resulted in ‘theory as enlightenment’ -  in the form of 
conclusions and explanations that surprised both the researcher and the 
participants of the study. The ‘paradox of getting the politics of risk management 
right’ (Chapter 6) and the ‘senior risk officer as the Eminence Gris’ (Chapter 6) 
are for example two insights that were tested on the participants concerned. These 
interpretations had a surprise effect at the banks and got positive response from 
readers (‘this is very interesting’; ‘impressive’; ‘you see things in a way we do 
not’ were the responses received in e-mails and on the phone from participants 
who read drafts of the empirical chapters).
The process of pattern making, explaining and theorizing was far 
from being linear and systematic. As Ahrens and Dent (1998) note, ‘field work is 
a constantly evolving dynamic between observation and pattern making’ and 
‘theorizing is the product o f conscientious, self-critical analysis in which 
unsatisfactory theories have been discarded.,16
A major challenge of the writing stage was the question of how to 
produce a ‘credible and trustworthy story’ (Baxter and Chua, 1998). The writing 
strategy aimed for what Baxter and Chua call ‘short stories’ -  the narration of a
• 17series of events. The narrated events were clustered around analytical themes,
16 Ahrens and Dent, 1998, p. 28 and 24, respectively
17 Baxter and Chua distinguish four common ‘genres’ in fieldwork writing: field report (a 
depersonalized account with little use o f quotes from informants); short stories (narrating a
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such as the ‘organizational significance’ of risk management, the control of risk- 
retum objectives, each giving rise to distinct chapters. Within the chapters the 
events were presented roughly in chronological order, however, there was a 
primary selection of events that were deemed to be key for telling the stories 
concerned.
The extensive use of verbatim quotes from the field is deemed 
necessary to give credibility to the study. Baxter and Chua (1998) argue that ‘field 
research needs to resonate with the many sources o f  data and voices from the 
field . The reader needs to hear the other, not only the authorial voice. ,l8 
However, one has to be careful not to treat verbatim quotes as self-evident.
Therein lies another challenge of the writing and interpretation stage. 
The researcher needs to distinguish informants’ literal, unedited statements from 
the researcher’s own opinion (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). As Ahrens and Dent 
(1998) elaborate: 'scenes and quotations generally serve as illustrations, rather 
than as evidence. [...] It is the story that makes those quotations and scenes 
significant to the reader. ',9 But field research will not yield a unique story -  it 
yields data that can be analysed in different ways. Therefore, Ahrens and Dent 
(1998) argue that the researcher needs to be open to different interpretations of the
90field material. This calls for sensitivity to ‘multiple theoretical metaphors.’ The 
danger of this, however, is ‘theoretical tourism’, and the possibility of the 
eventual fragmentation of the theoretical frame.
This study therefore (similarly to other field-based research projects) 
has to make a number of difficult trade-offs. Failing to cut the right balance can 
lead to a number of weaknesses. First, the opportunistic selection of a small 
number of cases limits any claims to generality. The studied banks are believed to 
be typical of large, international financial services organisations. However, they 
are atypical in the context of the banking sector as a whole, even in their own 
countries of origin. They stand out with their high profile, significant market share 
(in almost all business areas where they had ventured), and reputation of having 
‘leading edge’ practices. In particular, they both appear to be ‘advanced’ adopters
series o f  events with the extensive use o f  verbatim quotes from the field); short histories (o f
management accounting change); and autobiographies (that reflect on experience in the field).
18 Baxter and Chua (1998), p. 82.
19 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p. 32.
20 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p. 32.
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of risk management techniques as outlined by the regulators, thus having reached 
a stage of compliance that most banks can only aspire for (BIS, 2003b). Therefore 
the issue of external validity (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998) arises -  ‘instead o f 
speculating directly about the larger population * , the ambition of the study is to 
use field research results to develop a theory (or to illuminate further existing 
ones).
Moreover, the story told is likely to be just one possible 
interpretation, raising the issue of reliability. Atkinson and Shaffir (1998) pose the 
question, ''how is it that field researchers sometimes offer different 
characterisations o f the same or presumably similar institutions, organisations,
99or communities?* This criticism points to the importance of presenting data in 
sufficient depth so that links from data to theory can be traced. It also highlights 
the importance of distinguishing the researcher’s own opinions from those of the 
informants (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). However, interview quotes (once deemed to 
be illustrative of the story) can be seen as very helpful in advancing the narrative. 
The high reliance on interviews was the result of the very binding confidentiality 
agreements that limited the use of internal documents (and external reports on the 
banks) in the narrative.
As people in organisations interpret problems differently, one has to 
cut a fine balance between representing a variety of voices yet distilling a story 
out of the cacophony. The dangers of doing this are multiple.
First, the researcher might pay partial attention to a particular 
informant or point of view. In the case of this study the level of seniority gave 
different levels of overview to the participants. Triangulating between the 
recollections of people with different backgrounds, motives and access to 
information was warranted, but the possibility of doing so was highly dependent 
on the actual access that was granted to the researcher. It has been noted that 
BWT gave more open access than Fraser Bank, resulting in a higher degree of 
richness in the BWT material.
The other danger of dealing with multiple voices is that 
contradictions, ambiguities and loose ends might remain (and indeed, remained) 
at the end of the interview stages. Some of these were later resolved (in
21 Atkinson and Shaffir (1998), p. 62.
22 Atkinson and Shaffir (1998), p. 62.
22
subsequent interviews), others just remained unsettled to the puzzlement (and 
frustration) of the researcher. These puzzles were helpful in giving rise to whole 
chapters (e.g. Chapter 5 originated from the puzzle of the mismatch between the 
practitioners’ espoused theories and apparently in-use practices). However, their 
ultimate resolution (in the form of a story) relies, to a great extent, on the 
researcher’s theoretical background, thus cannot be claimed to be unique.
Finally, there is always the danger that the constructed stories appear 
to be too tidy. There is a trade-off between one sleek version of a story and the 
fragmentation that occurs when complexities, ambiguities and loose ends are 
emphasised. It is only hoped that in this study the links between data presentation 
and explanations are not only sufficiently strong, but also sufficiently varied too. 
But overall, the stories presented here remain open to criticism for having 
underplayed some of the loose ends and complexities, out of the researcher’s lack 
of further information or her effort to make sense and to reduce complexity.
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C h a p t e r  2
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT IN ACTION -  THE 
RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
‘If knowledge can create problem s, it is not 
through ignorance that we can solve them .'
Isaac Asimov
Studying enterprise risk management in its organizational settings presents 
a number of challenges to the academic researcher. First, risk management has a 
variety of applications in different sectors: it is present in the running of nuclear 
power stations, oil companies, as well as banks and insurance companies. 
Depending on its area of application, risk management comes with different 
definitions, practices and calculative techniques. This study seeks to explore 
enterprise risk management practices in financial institutions; hence risk 
management will be understood here in the context of the financial services 
industry.
The diversity of research frameworks presents another challenge to 
students of risk management -  the need to appreciate the contributions made from 
various angles, and possibly, to work on the interface of multiple disciplines. 
Over the last three decades a substantial sociological research agenda has been 
established that concerns itself with risk management both at the organizational 
level, in complex socio-technical systems, and at societal level. These studies 
have found important linkages between risk management and a number of 
disciplines.
Despite the contextual specifics of risk management, some common 
themes in risk research prevail and are significant. In particular, research into 
man-made disasters, the failures of complex socio-technical systems (Turner, 
1976, Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) highlighted patterns of risk emergence that are 
widely observable across organizations, independently of their sector 
characteristics. Turner’s seminal study established that at the root of risk failures
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there are a number of commonly detectable organizational processes . For this 
reason, there are good reasons for researchers to adopt an organizational 
perspective to the study of risk management (Short and Clarke, 1992).
There is also a rapidly expanding normative-technical treatment of the 
subject of risk management in the finance literature. In particular, two highly 
developed disciplines stand out: insurance and portfolio theory. The former 
produced methods of quantifying risk in monetary terms (Bernstein, 1996), while 
the latter highlights the calculable trade-offs between risk and reward (Crouhy et 
al., 2000). Actuarial science and portfolio theory make the subject of risk liable to 
financial management and control. Finance theory provides many of the 
techniques that underlie risk management in financial (and an increasing number 
of non-financial) organisations (Jorion, 1997). The practical applications of the 
financial theory of risk are numerous -  insurers use it to determine premiums, 
bankers use it to differentiate between borrowers and to calculate capital 
adequacy, fund managers use it to determine asset allocation and project 
managers use it to gauge the risk aspect of investment decisions.
In response to the first challenge (the need to clarify and narrow one’s 
research focus on a specific application of risk management) the researcher chose 
to study enterprise risk management in the financial services sector.
Taking on the second challenge of the multitude of disciplines that bear 
relevance on risk studies, a technical-normative literature of risk management in 
financial institutions can be identified, but it also needs to be complemented by 
others. It is suggested that yet another sphere of studies, the literature of 
management accounting and control, can usefully contribute to the study of 
enterprise risk management. Given that the suggested applications of ERM in
23 Based on the analysis o f  three disaster case studies Turner brought together a number o f  
organizational factors that might well provoke a disaster. He argues that in the context o f  large, 
complex sites organizational members recognise and plan for certain hazards, but will neglect 
others. Turner highlighted the role o f  rigid, culturally conditioned beliefs that tilt the accurate 
perception o f  the possibility o f  disaster and also affect decision making. Events going 
unnoticed or misunderstood because o f  erroneous assumptions create the set for a disaster in 
the waiting (risk incubation). A large array o f  possible information and communication 
difficulties compounds the problem o f risk incubation, resulting in effective violations o f  
precautions. These often pass unnoticed because o f  pressures o f  work, or a ‘cultural lag’ and a 
reluctance to fear the worst outcome, or simply because recognising them and taking action 
would call for the investment o f  time, money and energy which would be difficult to justify 
within the organization. Chronicles o f  recent man-made disasters such as the Challenger launch 
decision (Vaughan, 1997) and the Kursk submarine disaster (Moore, 2002) testify for the 
validity and timelessness o f  Turner’s insights.
financial institutions belong to the realm of financial decision making and 
management control, it is somewhat puzzling that accounting researchers have so 
far given little attention to the subject. However, there is considerable scope for 
discussion on the connections between the literature of accounting and the subject 
of enterprise risk management. In particular, studies of accounting as a social and 
institutional phenomenon offer insights into the workings and impact of 
calculative techniques. These studies from the accounting literature have amassed 
a wide array of sociological and organizational perspectives. This literature can 
therefore offer a number of reference points that guide one in building a multi­
disciplinary framework for the study of risk management.
This chapter is a literature review that aims to demarcate existing works in 
the accounting genre that can be brought to bear relevance on researching risk 
management in its organizational settings. The chapter points to three common 
areas of interest that characterise both accounting research (be it organizational or 
social) and the study of risk management in financial organizations.
The first common area of interest is the roles and organizational significance 
of calculative practices. Risk management in the financial services industry has 
developed as a calculative practice addressing the issue of capital adequacy and 
the allocation of capital to business units. Risk managers also aspire to be more 
involved in performance management, control and strategic discussions. 
Accounting practitioners have similar aspirations. Twenty years ago accounting 
was viewed mostly as a technical subject and little was known of ‘the 
organizational processes (...) through which the technical achieves its potential’ 
(Hopwood, 1983, p.291). Recognising this, a number of important manifestos 
called for an organizational, rather than a singularly technical approach to 
accounting research (Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood, 1983). The organizational 
view of accounting promised to illuminate the problematic aspects of calculative 
practices. By studying the roles that calculative practices play and the 
consequences (intended and unintended) they have, researchers investigated 
whether or not (and how) calculative practices achieve and maintain a position of 
organizational significance. These studies can be called upon in the course of 
exploring and scrutinising the roles and organizational significance of risk 
management.
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The second area of common concern for researchers of accounting and 
risk management is the study of management control systems. Recent advances in 
corporate governance and bank regulation have given emphasis to the 
management control aspect of risk management. Risk management blueprints 
resemble the traditional managerial accounting control cycle of target setting, 
measurement, monitoring and corrective action. The origins of this control ideal 
can be traced back to cybernetics. Management accounting and control 
researchers have long been sceptical about the applicability and usefulness of the 
described traditional (cybernetic) control ideal. There is an interest in more 
complex control practices, which do not adhere to the cybernetic control pattern. 
Otley (1994) for example proposed the dichotomy of traditional (cybernetic) and 
complex controls, highlighting a blind spot of the latter in the management 
accounting literature. Complex controls still await theorising and empirical 
scrutiny.
Risk management differs from other traditional control systems in that its 
orientation is containing risk, rather than maximising return. Indeed, the two are 
often conflicting objectives in financial institutions. If organizational control is to 
encompass both risk control and profit control, it might become a matter of 
controlling conflicting objectives. Thus introducing risk management systems 
may add complexity to the existing control landscape of banks. Studying risk 
management from a management control theory perspective can potentially 
enhance our understanding of what might be more complex organizational control 
practices.
Thirdly, a common concern to accounting and risk management research 
is the study of calculative practices as social phenomena. Hopwood (1983) argued 
that accounting ‘can never be seen in purely organizational terms.’24 The 
‘external origins o f internal accounts’ have generated much interest in the last 
two decades (Hopwood and Miller, 1994). A similar interest resulted in a couple 
of accounts of enterprise risk management that trace its roots to regulatory and 
corporate governance trends, outside the host organizations (Power, 2004; Hunt 
2004). With various stakeholder agendas surrounding it, risk management 
practices are not isolated local phenomena - their origins and impact are to be
24 Hopwood (1983), p.302.
25 Hopwood (1983), p. 301.
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traced outside the organizational boundaries. Amidst provocative claims about the 
‘institutionalisation’ (Hunt, 2004) of enterprise risk management and its apparent 
status as a ‘world model’ (Power, 2004) risk management must be understood as 
much a social as an organizational phenomenon. However, the external origins of 
risk management practices are still largely unexplored. Among others, 
contingency research and new institutionalist studies have addressed the external 
origins of accounting. The insights these studies offer help us further understand 
how the organizational significance of enterprise risk management is (or is not as 
the case may be) obtained.
In sum, the proposed theoretical framework brings together three literature 
strands, as summarised in Table 1.
Perspectives Technical O rganizational S o c ia l
Focus on The tools and techniques o f  
calculative practices
rhe roles and organizational 
significance o f  calculative 
practices
The external origins o f  
internal accounts;
The appropriateness o f  
calculative practices
Literatures Normative practitioner texts 
on ERM
Organizationally grounded 
studies o f  accounting 
exploring
* the roles o f  accounting in 
organizations and
* the management control 




Table 1. Theoretical framework
First, a burgeoning normative and practitioner literature shows us the 
technical aspects of risk management as a calculative practice. There exists a 
significant body of literature that could be labelled as the ‘consulting research 
genre’, as defined by Lukka and Granlund (2002). Its typical features are a strong 
concern with practical problems and applications, supportive empirical evidence 
of the case study-type (descriptions of ‘best practices’), and a ‘prescriptive and 
propagating style overall.,26 Authors of this genre are not necessarily consultants 
per se, they can be academics, regulatory guideline writers and practitioners in 
non-consulting organisations. It is their intention (rather than professional 
identity) that classifies them as authors in this genre. They sell ideas (concerning
26 Lukka and Granlund (2002), p. 168.
28
risk management in this case) to the readers. The source of the ideas is often a risk 
management implementation process that the author had participated in.
Second, organizationally grounded studies of accounting shed light on the 
workings of accounting and other calculative practices. The current Thesis aims to 
contribute to this literature, through the examination of risk management 
practices. Lukka and Granlund (2002) classify this genre as ‘basic research.’ The 
intention is a rigorous analysis of the nature, functioning, effects and diffusion of 
calculative practices. It is a methodologically diverse corpus, and our focus will 
be on case study-based and conceptual studies, given that the Thesis itself will 
combine these approaches.27
Third, social studies of accounting illuminate the origins of calculative 
practices. Based on Lukka and Granlund (2002), such studies could be classified 
to be both ‘basic research’ (e.g. contingency studies that explicate the link 
between external conceptual factors and internal practices), as well as a third 
research genre -  ‘critical research.’ As critical studies create an explicit link 
between accounting and the promotion of social change (Lukka and Granlund, 
2002), sociological theories play a key role in this genre. The Thesis draws on 
institutional organizational theory in its attempts at suggesting links between risk 
management and wider institutional concerns. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the primary focus of the Thesis is to contribute to ‘basic research’ 
in the management control area, specifically on risk management. The Thesis 
does not provide a rigorous analysis of the link between risk management and (the 
promotion of) social change. It merely suggests tentative links, given the apparent 
influence of external regulatory, corporate governance and performance pressures 
on the risk management practices observed. These tentative links will be cast in 
the language of institutional organisational theory, hence a review of how 
institutional studies explicate such links is warranted.
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, an introduction to the 
aspirations, tools and techniques of enterprise risk management is offered. From a 
technical perspective, based on regulatory and normative practitioner texts (the
27 The typical objective o f  conceptual research is to clarify the concepts o f  a new control (or 
calculative) practice and to map structural similarities and differences with regard to practices 
that have already prevailed. Case studies describe why and how companies have experimented 
with, or adopted the researched practice. Based on interview methods and participant 
observations, these studies aim to gain in-depth views on the practices o f  single (or a small 
number of) firms (Lukka and Granlund, 2002).
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‘genre of consulting research’ in risk management), the chapter sketches out four 
themes that characterise the genre. These themes will inform the analysis of the 
case studies of ERM in action.
Secondly, the chapter attempts to review a body of accounting research 
that helps us conceptualise the ‘organizational significance’ of calculative 
practices. Drawing on organisationally grounded studies of management 
accounting, the chapter will review what we have learned from this subset of 
‘basic research’ (Lukka and Granlund, 2002) about the role, uses and impact of 
calculative practices in organizations. This will be the basis of a theoretical 
framework that allows the study to investigate the organizational roles and uses of 
ERM in action.
Thirdly, the offering of the management control perspective will be 
outlined. Consisting mainly of conceptual studies, this research body gives us a 
looking glass through which risk management, as we know it from normative 
texts, will appear to be a traditional cybernetic control system, with a potential to 
transform the internal control landscape of organizations. Whether it does, and 
how, will be scrutinised in the study later.
Finally, the chapter broadens the focus to consider ‘the external origins’ of 
management control systems. Following a brief overview of contingency and new 
institutionalist approaches, the chapter postulates that the key insights of both are 
relevant to the study. Accordingly, it is argued that the rise and fall of control 
systems depend not only upon their fit with the demands of the organization and 
the environment that surround them, but also upon their institutional 
appropriateness and their capability of legitimising the organization.
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2 .1 . M a k in g  s e n s e  o f  e n t e r p r is e  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  -  
F o u r  t h e m e s
According to the Treadway Commission’s recent authoritative definition, 
ERM is '... a process, effected by an entity’s board o f directors, management and 
other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be within 
its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement o f
7 0
entity objectives. ’
Still, enterprise risk management remains a rather elusive and under­
specified concept. Its broad definition is an umbrella for diverse risk management 
techniques and arrangements, so long as they create the image of consistent and 
comprehensive application. Normative texts are telling of the diverse practices 
that all seem to be bundled under the fashionable heading of enterprise risk 
management (henceforth also ERM). For example, Lam (2000) is illustrative -  his 
list of ‘ERM components’ range from risk analytics and risk appetite setting 
through risk pricing and risk transfer to the management of stakeholder 
perceptions (be they regulatory, analyst or rating agency perceptions). Just like 
Lam (2000), ERM advocates typically outline a set of risk management tasks and 
envision a ‘framework’ for the treatment of these under the auspices of an 
appointed senior risk officer. This requires the prioritisation and the ordering of 
the various elements into a control cycle with recognisable structural and 
personnel arrangements.
Having studied a number of normative and technical texts, it appears that 
four themes have emerged in the literature that help us make sense of enterprise 
risk management: 1. risk quantification, 2. risk aggregation, 3. risk-based 
performance measurement, 4. the management of non-quantifiable risks. To these 
themes we turn next.
28 COSO (2003), p.6.
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2 .1 .1 . Th e m e  I :  Ris k  Q u a n t if ic a t io n
Normative texts assert that over the past decade there have been 
significant advances in the risk measurement capabilities of financial institutions 
(Garside & Nakada, 1999; Marrison, 2002). Indeed, one recognisable strand in the 
development of risk management is the subjecting of more and more types of risk 
to quantification, measurement and control. In this vein, a number of specific 
techniques have evolved to measure market risk, credit risk and quantifiable (i.e. 
recurring) operational risks. Most textbooks focus on describing these techniques 
(see for example Marrison, 2002; Alexander, 2001).
Risk quantification gives rise to what the most common perception of risk 
management in financial institutions is: the measurement and control of market,
• * • • • 9Q  •credit and operational risks in ‘silos’, across the institution. The techniques used 
in risk quantification have influenced the current reforms to the Basel Accord 
(Basel II) and local supervisory regimes. This is because financial regulatory 
bodies increasingly require banks to hold capital reserves corresponding to their 
measured risk profile.
At the core of risk measurement activities lies the collection of data to 
construct loss distributions for each risk type. The reason why risk managers aim 
for establishing a loss distribution for each risk category is that such 
representations of historic (in some applications: simulated) losses allow 
estimations to be made on the ‘tail of these distributions’ -  in other words, the 
consideration of ‘unanticipated loss’ events. The amount of loss that would be 
suffered under such dire conditions is called Value-at-Risk. It represents the level 
of ‘maximum probable loss’ against which a bank wishes to cushion by setting 
aside adequate capital.
The confidence level, according to which Value-at-Risk can be 
determined, could be arbitrary. In case of one-day loss distributions, a 95% VaR
29 The follow ing commonly quoted definitions apply for the main risk categories (Drzik et al., 
2004). M arket risk  arises from changes in the value o f  financial assets and liabilities (c.f. 
trading book) due to volatility in market prices (interest rates, currencies, equities, 
commodities). Credit risk arises from changes in the value o f  assets (c.f. banking book) and 
off-balance sheet exposures due to volatility in default rates or credit qualities. Bancassurance 
firms and insurers add the additional category o f  insurance risk, which arises from volatility o f  
insurance claims around the expected level o f  claims. Operational risk has long been defined 
as a residual category, one that captures all o f the risks not covered in the first three categories. 
The regulatory definition o f operational risk is more specific (BIS, 2003a). For a discussion for 
the ‘invention’ o f  operational risk, see Power (2003b).
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is a loss that is expected to be exceeded only in 5 out of every hundred trading 
days; a 99.9% VaR is a loss that is expected to be exceeded only once in thousand 
trading days (in effect, four years). Further VaR analyses result from changing the 
horizon of the loss data -  in general, a long data stream of daily returns is rarely 
available, not even in the most liquid market risk areas. In truth, frequent loss data 
collection would require banks to invest heavily in information storing and 
processing capabilities, which is not affordable to all. Experts tend to agree that it 
is the sheer lack of loss data that poses the greatest challenge for statistics-based 
risk quantification. Due to problems with liquidity and data availability, credit and 
operational losses are often measured over longer horizons (if at all).
Thus a wide range of VaR analyses can be conducted, resulting in 
numbers that are not directly comparable -  due to the wide range of assumptions 
that underlie statistics-based risk estimates. Even the regulators recommend 
different confidence levels for different risk types. For example, in 1996, the BIS 
set the requirement for calculating market risk VaR based on ten-day-losses at a 
95% confidence level. Thus the market risk minimum capital requirement should 
cover a ten-day loss amount that is expected to be exceeded only five times in 
thousand trading days (four years). Based on further regulatory standards, risk 
managers may assess not only market, but credit and operational risk as well, and 
give recommendations for the corresponding minimum regulatory capital amount 
for each risk category.30
2.1.2. Th e m e  II: R i s k  A g g r e g a t io n
A recent and important addition to the strand of risk-quantification is the 
development of a common denominator measure for market, credit and 
operational risks, enabling firms to aggregate their quantifiable risks into a total 
risk estimate.
The emerging common denominator of quantifiable risks is called 
Economic Capital. Similarly to Value-at-Risk, it is also a proxy for the amount of 
loss a bank could suffer under fairly dire circumstances. While VaR can be
30 Value-at-Risk is currently prescribed by the BIS to be used in the determination o f market 
risk capital only. The evolving Basel II framework will recognise credit risk VaR and 
operational risk VaR as a basis for capital adequacy calculations in case o f  banks with 
‘advanced’ measurement capabilities. Other banks will have to use a set o f  scale indicators and 
multipliers (as opposed to the statistics-based VaR method) for the determination o f  their 
minimum capital levels in the risk silos.
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restated according to different economic scenarios (different confidence levels), 
Economic Capital is defined with only one scenario in mind. This scenario is 
related to the bank’s external credit rating. Economic Capital is the measure of the 
maximum probable loss that the bank must appear to be able to withstand in order 
to justify its target credit rating. Thus Economic Capital is not only a measure of a 
possible (though highly unlikely) loss, but it also contains an imperative and a 
promise. The imperative is the expectation of rating agencies of a minimum 
capital amount that a bank needs to set aside, over and above its regulatory 
minimum, in order to justify its target credit rating. The promise is that by 
reserving capital in this manner, a bank can live up to expectations about its 
capital level coming from both the regulators and the rating agencies.
Given that rating agency opinions concern different banks to different 
extent, Economic Capital (or its promise) appeals primarily to banks that wish to 
maintain a high credit rating. For example, firms rated AA by S&P have 
historically defaulted with a 0.03% probability over a one-year horizon. If a bank 
aims for a AA credit rating, then the corresponding capital level (Economic 
Capital) is the amount required to keep the firm solvent over a one-year period 
with 99.97% confidence (Garside & Nakada, 1999). Given the higher confidence 
level applied, the ‘economic’ capital amount is to be higher than the regulatory 
minimum.
Economic Capital, as a measurement tool is, in effect, a restatement of 
value-at-risk amounts using a set of parameters that corresponds to a solvency 
standard (rather than to the regulatory rules). It can be calculated on market, credit 
and (measurable) operational risks, with the help of judgment where data is not 
sufficient or cannot be simulated (especially in case of operational risk).
Furthermore, Economic Capital is recognised by the new Basel II 
framework as a promising tool for financial institutions to allocate capital 
internally, across the business units. This is because the ability of the Economic 
Capital technique to aggregate risk (measured in risk silos) in a given subsidiary. 
While internal capital allocation is a regulatory requirement, doing so via 
Economic Capital models is not. The Basel Committee sets its use out merely as 
an option for *the most sophisticated banks' (BIS, 2003a). According to the new 
capital adequacy accord, at a minimum, banks are required to have a credible and 
clearly defined capital allocation methodology. For the most sophisticated banks,
34
this is likely to take the form of an internal economic capital allocation model, 
defining an institution to be adequately capitalised based on a reasonable 
soundness definition, such as target insolvency probability.
Thus Economic Capital, as the common denominator for the measurable 
risk types, creates a consistent and comprehensive framework, or at least the 
appearance of it, in which risks can be compared and aggregated, enterprise-wide. 
Further, risk limits can be set according to the solvency standards (by second- 
guessing rating agency expectations), expressed in the form of Economic Capital. 
Thus Economic Capital, if applied, can become the new language of risk limit 
setting (risk control) too.
2.1 .3 . Th e m e  I I I :  R is k - b a s e d  P e r f o r m a n c e  M a n  a g e m e n t
Risk quantification and risk aggregation are both motivated by capital 
adequacy concerns. While Value-at-Risk metrics measure risk with reference to 
varying standards (e.g. corresponding to the minimum regulatory requirement or 
any other decision-relevant scenarios), Economic Capital is the common 
denominator risk measure with reference to a single solvency standard set by an 
external rating agency.
Economic Capital, in a given bank, is applied with an agreed set of 
assumptions and confidence level that requires a particular way of looking at the 
loss distributions in the different risk silos. Agreeing upon these assumptions and 
confidence levels is unlikely to be purely a technical matter. There are at least two 
reasons for this. First, as Economic Capital corresponds to the target credit rating 
of the bank, those who determine it must understand (if not second-guess) the 
impact of capital on the bank’s credit rating. However, historic analyses of bank 
capital levels and credit ratings show enough inconsistency and anomaly to reveal 
that considerable amount of other factors (and judgement) tilt this relationship.31 
Therefore, setting Economic Capital is likely to require judgment as well as 
analysis. Secondly, Economic Capital can be calculated not only for the whole 
bank, but for its business units as well. As indicated in the previous section, the 
BIS already advocates the use of this methodology for internal capital allocations.
31 This result was showed to me at Fraser Bank. It comes from proprietary research conducted 
at the bank (possibly by consultants). A similar analysis (with the same conclusion) was 
produced at BWT too.
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Economic Capital allocations are supposed to reflect the risk profile of business 
units, requiring riskier ventures to carry more capital, and leaving less risky 
ventures relatively capital-light.
Recent works in the risk management literature advocate the idea of using 
these risk-based internal capital allocations for performance measurement and 
control. The possibility of introducing risk-based performance measurement in 
banks has emerged as a result of developments in risk quantification and risk 
aggregation. It also appears to coincide with the rise of the shareholder value 
concept in corporate rhetoric (Arnold & Davies, 2000; Hunt, 2003).
Although the concept of shareholder value (or as it was previously 
referred to, residual income) dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, its 
wide-spread incorporation into management thinking has only recently gained 
momentum. This is largely to do with the renewed efforts of business schools and 
consulting firms that are advocating shareholder value and Value Based 
Management (the revival of the residual income concept is often associated with 
Stem et al.,1995). The principle is simple enough: firms create shareholder value 
by earning returns in excess of the cost of capital.
Against the backdrop of the rise of the shareholder value imperative, it is 
not surprising that a similar shift took place in the stakeholder concerns 
surrounding financial institutions. Here too, the emphasis has moved from growth 
to shareholder value creation. As Molyneux (2000) observes, ‘The strategic 
priority in banking has shifted away from growth and size alone towards a
*1 j  _
greater emphasis on profitability, performance and value creation. ’ The 
application of VBM in large financial institutions is advocated as virtually 
limitless: it may entail implementation at the level of business units, products and 
even transactions (Hall, 2002; Marrison, 2002; Jameson, 2001; Haubenstock & 
Morisano, 2000).
There is now a burgeoning practitioner literature also suggesting that 
value-based management has taken its own route in banking. Risk aggregation has 
led to new definitions of capital charges that differ from those used in the original 
value-based management literature (Stem et al., 1995; Arnold & Davies, 2000). 
The point of departure in this new quest for ‘value’, banking style, is the
32 Molyneux (2000), p.218.
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calculation of capital charges based on the risk profile of business units (or 
products / transactions), expressed either as the minimum regulatory capital, or, 
increasingly, Economic Capital allocations.
Theoretically, there are two broad approaches to risk-based performance 
measurement in banks. The ratio approach relates risk-adjusted profit to 
economic (risk) capital. The second, shareholder value added approach calculates 
the residual income left after subtracting a charge on economic (risk) capital from 
profit.
Pushing these performance measurements down to business units, 
products and even transactions gave rise to ambitious claims as to what risk 
management can do in order to enhance shareholder value. Risk pricing, risk 
transfer, portfolio risk management (as in Lam, 2000) are the most frequently 
advocated possibilities in the literature.
The joint consideration of risk and profitability in a common framework is 
an application of value based management that is specific to the financial services 
sector. At the same time, it represents an application of risk management that is 
equally specific.
2.1 .4 . Th e m e I V : M a n a g in g N o n -Q u a n t if ia b l e R is k s
We have seen how the ascent of the shareholder value concept, coupled 
with developments in the quantification and aggregation of risk in financial 
institutions, paved the way for risk-based performance measurement. This section 
focuses on the impact of another powerful notion, also heralded by corporate 
governance advocates, that of risk-based internal control. In the wake of this, a 
new theme has emerged in the risk management literature: the management of 
non-quantifiable risks.
The reports from the Treadway Commission (COSO, 2004) and the 
Turnbull Committee (ICAEW, 1999), which are important milestones of Anglo- 
Saxon corporate governance, advocate ERM as a framework for capturing risks 
that are material from the point of view of the achievement of the strategic 
objectives of the enterprise. Apart from the measurable risk silos, this conception 
of ERM encompasses risks that cannot be readily quantified or aggregated. These 
non-quantifiable risks include, for example, the risks of strategic failure, 
environmental risks, reputational risks and operational risks that materialise only
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rarely. Recent developments in corporate governance have emphasized the 
importance of monitoring and managing these risks.
As a result, there have been calls for the risk management framework to be 
gradually expanded to incorporate non-quantifiable risks in addition to those that 
can be quantified (Lam, 2000; COSO, 2004). However, by attempting to render 
non-quantifiable risks to control, risk managers have to venture outside the 
boundaries of risk quantification, risk aggregation, regulatory capital 
determination and internal capital allocation.
However, it is an open question if by doing so risk managers would 
become an influential voice in financial institutions. Currently we have no 
empirical evidence if risk management practices actually offer a ‘strategic view’ 
by reaching beyond the realm of measurable risks at all.
2.1 .5 . S u m m a r y
In sum, this section has outlined four topical themes in the ERM literature. 
Firstly, risk quantification is relevant due to the imminent changes in the 
international bank regulatory framework that will relate the notion of capital 
adequacy to the quantified risk profile of the banks. There are considerable 
technical and data challenges that make the subject fully accessible only to a 
select few. The statistical nature of risk quantification gives it a glow of analytical 
mystique. However, risk quantification is no longer the sole concern of risk 
management textbooks and commentators. With the invention of the Economic 
Capital concept, risk quantification was followed by the theme of risk 
aggregation. Economic Capital can be defined in a firm so that it passes for a 
common denominator for statistical risk measurements. Economic Capital can 
therefore be aggregated (at least in theory) at the level of the whole institution, or 
at lower levels, in individual subsidiaries. Despite the technical challenges risk 
aggregation poses, Economic Capital has a status of ‘best practice’ with 
considerable institutional support behind it. It also emerged at the time of the rise 
of the shareholder value tide, resulting in a third powerful theme in the literature: 
risk-based performance measurement. The first three themes concern risks that 
are measurable. However, corporate governance guidance-setters (such as the 
Treadway Commission and the Turnbull Committee) emphasise the need to 
manage all material risks that can prevent the achievement of entity objectives, be
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those measurable risks or not. Accordingly, a fourth theme widens the remit of 
risk management to encompass the management o f non-quantifiable risks as well, 
endorsing ERM with the status of a strategic management control system.
Taken together, the various normative elements make ERM resemble an 
assembly of practices, which is a noted characteristic of other management 
accounting innovations, such as Activity Analysis (Gosselin, 1997) and the 
Balanced Scorecard (Speckbacher et al., 2003). From this perspective, although 
ERM is unique in the particularities of its technology and its focus, its scope and 
development might follow patterns common to other control innovations. Chapter 
6 will conceptually and empirically investigate the idea of ERM as an assembly of 
normative practices.
The four themes drawn from the literature suggest many possibilities for 
the empirical manifestations of risk management in action. Will it be a highly 
quantitative practice, shrouded in analytical mystique, the playground of a select 
few? Or will it become part of the strategic control practice of the organisation 
and a concern to all, with risk calculations feeding routinely into performance 
appraisals? In brief, in what way will ERM impact organizational life (if at all)? 
The next two sections explore what accounting research has to offer in order to 
conceptualise the organisational significance and impact of ERM.
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2 .2 . T h e  o r g a n is a t io n a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  c a l c u l a t iv e
PRACTICES
In 1983 Hopwood posed the question: ‘Just how (...) does accounting 
achieve and maintain a position o f organizational significance?’33 In order to 
answer the same question about enterprise risk management, we need to 
conceptualise ‘organisational significance’. Accounting researchers have 
identified a number of facets to organizational significance.
Accounting practices are supposed to reflect the economic reality of the 
organization in which they are used. However, researchers have argued time and 
again that calculative practices are not merely reflective, but also constitutive of 
economic life. For example, Hopwood (1983) stresses that accounting ‘has the 
power to shape and influence organizational life on its own accord. (...) Whilst in 
part reflecting many another parameters o f organizational life, accounting also 
has played a more active role in constructing the organizational world in which it 
is now embedded, shaping views o f both the constraints on organized action and 
the ends it seeks to serve.,34 That is, accounting creates particular visibilities to 
certain issues (while not for others), directs attention, and influences 
organizational actors and actions. As Miller (1994) put it: ‘ The calculative devices 
o f accountancy have shaped and formed possibilities fo r  action in many 
organizations,’35 Thus calculative practices derive organizational significance not 
only from mirroring economic activities, but also from being constitutive of them.
Calculative practices have been argued to be constitutive of various 
aspects of organizational life: 1. goal setting and decision making, 2. 
organizational action, change and adaptation, 3. strategy making and control, and 
4. organizational power.
2.2.1 G o a l  s e t t in g  a n d  d e c i s i o n  m a k in g  
Organizational theory has produced two very different perspectives on 
action: the deliberate, otherwise also called rational or model-based view and a 
contrasting alternative, the emergent, partially-irrational or process-based
33 Hopwood (1983), p. 291.
34 Hopwood (1983), p. 301.
35 Miller (1994), p. 2.
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perspective (terminology from Mintzberg, 1989; Dent, 1986; Boland, 1979, 
respectively). Similarly, depending on which perspective on action is applicable, 
one can demarcate two approaches to goal setting and decision making: deliberate 
and emergent.
The first school of thought expresses a belief in the rationality of 
organizational actors and their ability to analyse information, choose a desirable 
objective (or a set of consistent objectives) and to implement adequate actions. 
Goal setting, the formulation of organizational goals, is thus viewed as a rational 
process, and goals arise out of deliberation and careful analysis. It is a hierarchical 
process, starting with a statement of the goals o f  the organization, escalating 
down into defining lower level goals for the organization (Thompson, 1967). This 
deliberate (rational) approach to goal setting is akin to the formulation of 
‘deliberate strategies’ (Mintzberg, 1989). Similarly, this perspective on action 
gave rise to the traditional rational models of decision making. These describe a 
routine, by which information is collected, analysed, alternatives are outlined and 
evaluated, and finally one alternative is selected. The linear decision making 
process assumes that adequate information systems can be engineered to fulfil its 
information need (Kimberley, 1984).
The second approach is the result of many theories that critique the rational 
school and claim that in many organizational settings action, goal setting, strategy 
formulation and decision making simply do not fit the rational model. Individuals 
often lack the information processing abilities that are required for fully rational 
action -rationality is bounded (Cyert and March, 1963). Preferences, 
opportunities and constraints may be held to be continually redefined through 
experience -  rationality is fluid (Dent, 1987). Goals may not be pre-ordained, on 
the contrary: understandings of purpose can be the result of action, not the source 
of it (Weick, 1979). Or as March (1976) suggests: ‘Human choice behaviour is at 
least as much a process for discovering goals as for acting on them.,36 In these 
settings organizations may engage in conflicting actions, and decisions reached in 
one part of the organization may become constraints for another part. Solutions 
may compete for finding problems to be attached to (March and Olsen, 1976) -  
the organization may resemble a ‘garbage can’ of competing interests, goals and
36 March (1976), p. 72.
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actions. The goals discovered through action are thus not a result of a deliberate, 
hierarchical process, but rather stem from lateral interactions, as organizational 
actors interact with each other and their environment, and gradually make sense 
of their experience. Goals can thus emerge, akin to Mintzberg’s ‘emergent 
strategies’ (Mintzberg, 1989). Hence decision making in organizations does not 
necessarily fit the linear process model (Mintzberg et al. 1976). Dent (1990) gives 
a comprehensive overview of organizationally grounded research that 
characterizes decision making 'as a messy, disorderly, disjointed activity around 
which multiple units and sub-groups with often conflicting interests contend.’37 
Accounting theory has embraced both the rational and the process-based 
perspectives on decision making and argues that accounting can play an active 
part in (and be constitutive of) both. The dichotomy was expanded by the 
inclusion of Thompson & Tuden (1959)’s model of organizational decision 
making (Figure 1). Based on this model, Burchell et al. (1980) in a landmark 
paper postulated four ways in which accounting can be constitutive of 
organizational decision making. This was a very influential conceptualisation of 
the roles that accounting (and calculative practices) might plausibly play in 
organizational settings.
low
Uncertainty o f  
cause and effect
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Figure 1: Styles of decision making 
Source: Burchell et al. (1980)
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The presumption of the model is that rational decision making (akin to 
deliberate goal formulation) requires low levels of the uncertainties that surround 
the decision in question. In particular, the decision maker faces two types of 
uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty (disagreement) over the objectives for 
organizational action. Second, there is uncertainty over the patterns of causation 
that determine the consequences of action. The latter is briefly referred to as the 
uncertainty of cause and effect. In the presence of low uncertainty of both the 
objectives and the causes and effects of action, decisions can be assumed to be 
made by deploying a calculative or analytical practice -  by computation. Based 
on differing levels of uncertainty over objectives and cause and effect, the model 
distinguishes three other styles of decision making: First by judgement- when 
objectives are clear but the effects of the action are not, therefore computations 
are tempered with judgement. Burchell et al. (1980) assume that decision makers 
turn the information systems at their disposal into *learning machines' in order to 
inform judgement. Secondly, decisions can be made by compromise -  this is 
likely when objectives are contested and different interest groups and coalitions in 
the organization further different goals and claim knowledge of the consequences 
of the actions they propose. They use the available information systems as 
‘ammunition machines’ - to support their agendas, but selectively. Finally, 
decisions can be arrived at by intuition -  when uncertainties are looming so high 
that the decision maker resorts to gut feel. Burchell et al. (1980) argue that under 
these conditions decision makers might use information systems to create a 
justification for their intuition once the decision has been made, thereby 
rationalising the choice of action that follows.
While decision making by computation is akin to the rational decision 
making, the other decision making modes allow rationality to be tampered with 
judgement or intuition, and even be compromised by organizational politics. 
Burchell et al. (1980) offered a refinement to the rational vs. processual 
dichotomy that indeed left a lasting mark on management accounting research. 
Ezzamel and Boum (1990) for example applied the model to frame their study of 
the roles of accounting information systems in an organization experiencing 
financial crisis. More recently, Abemethy and Brownell (1999) investigated how 
accounting is used as a Teaming machine’ in the formulation and implementation 
of strategic change.
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This study will call on Burchell et al. (1980) to frame the discussion of the 
roles of enterprise risk management. In the case studies we shall meet risk people 
who make various claims to handle risk by computation. Indeed, the practitioner 
literature suggests that developments in risk quantification allow risk people to 
measure risks while the Economic Capital concept promises a common 
denominator for the aggregation of risks. However, the case analysis presented in 
chapters to follow will find that many organizational actors consider risk to 
belong to the realms of inspiration, lobbying or learning. Chapter 3 shows how 
internal capital allocations lead risk people onto a politically dangerous terrain 
where they can get mired by the micropolitics of decision making by lobbying. 
Further, with senior risk officers claiming access to non-quantifiable risk issues 
that clearly lie outside the scope of computational decision making, even risk 
people are divided in their reliance on, and use of, quantified risk methodologies 
(Chapter 6).
Burchell et al. (1980) will also inform Chapter 5. The model demonstrates 
circumstances under which the traditional notion of decision making (by 
computation) breaks down. Similarly, Chapter 5 will theorise about conditions 
under which the traditional cybernetic ideal of management control breaks down, 
and more complex control practices are warranted.
Another implication of Burchell et al. (1980) will be relevant to the case 
study analysis. Although in organisational settings we may well find decisions 
being tampered with politics, judgment, and intuition, and risk control being 
complex, the ideals of (what amounts to) computation and cybernetic control 
might still have a hold over practitioners. This is because practitioner and 
regulatory texts suppose risk decisions (as well as many other accounting 
decisions) to be made by calculation, and risk control (as well as management 
accounting) to follow the cybernetic ideal.
2.2.2. O r g a n iz a  t jo n a l  a  c t io n , c h a n g e  a n d  a d a p t a  t io n
Apart from influencing decision making, accounting calculations have been 
shown to be constitutive of organizational action, change and adaptation. 
Swieringa and Weick (1987) argued for example that accounting techniques are 
powerful because they can initiate and sustain forceful action. Facilitating
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organizational change and adaptation is an important facet of the organizational 
significance of calculative practices.
The focus on the action-generating rather than decision-making roles of 
accounting gave rise to an interest among accounting researchers in the design of 
information systems. Information system design was seen as significant, because 
it affects the ability of organizations to adapt to environmental changes.
One line of thought is expressed by Brunsson (1982). Information systems 
that filter away uncertainty and inconsistency are considered to be able to 
motivate people, secure commitments and ultimately, facilitate action. A similar 
argument was previously put forward by Cyert and March (1963) who noted that 
accounting and other control systems absorb uncertainty through standard 
operating procedures permitting work to go on in the face of ambiguity. Dent
(1986) adds that such systems ‘ typically focus on relatively small data sets, are 
integrated and have minimal redundancy, ’
A different line of thought about the role of information systems was 
originated by Hedberg and Jonsson (1978). They found it alarming that rational 
design efforts might have created accounting information systems that tend to 
evoke a sense of security by filtering away significant amounts of uncertainty and 
change signals. They argued that accounting systems tend to stabilize 
organizations by establishing standardized responses to problems. In stable 
environments such information systems might conserve mental energy and make 
the behaviour of organizations more consistent over time. However, in changing 
environments, when uncertainty rises, these systems may cause simplistic 
diagnoses and organizational inertia that threaten the survival of the firm. 
Organizations in changing environments, the argument went, need information 
systems that destabilize. Information systems that pick up a variety of evaluations 
of the status quo, doubt existing beliefs and generate questions were thought to 
have the potential to shatter organizational inertia. As for their presumed design 
characteristics, they ‘embody competing data sets, are less integrated and exhibit 
extensive redundancy. ,39
Thus the debate about information system design resulted in two additional 
viewpoints on the organizational significance of calculative practices. There is an
38 D ent (1 9 8 6 ) , p. 151
39 Dent (1986), p. 151-152
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argument that information systems can decrease uncertainty and enable day-to- 
day organizational action, but potentially can impede long term organizational 
change and adaptation. The other argument is that information systems can 
increase uncertainty and facilitate organizational adaptation, possibly by means of 
creating unsettling devil’s advocate systems (Janis, 1982)40.
Following this theoretical debate, a number of field-based studies have 
explored the role of accounting in organizational action and change. Analysing 
three case studies, Hopwood (1987) highlights 'the particular visibilities created 
by accounting systems and the means by which they (...) shifted perceptions o f  
organizational functioning, mediated the recognition ofproblems and the options 
available for their resolution, and infused the patterns o f language, meaning and 
significance within the organization. ’41 The field studies suggest that the 
constitutive role of accounting systems is rooted in their ability to ‘give rise to an 
influential language,42 which can change the way organizational participants see 
and perceive their economic reality. Similarly, Dent (1991) highlighted the 
significance of language creation in the emergence of a new organizational 
culture in a post-privatisation railway company, a culture based on accounting 
rather than engineering. Ahrens (1997) further explored the constitutive role of 
‘accounting talk’ in contrasting the management accounting practices of British 
and German brewers.
These studies suggest that the organizational significance of calculative 
practices is rooted in their ability to create a language in which organizational 
participants perceive and think about their economic reality. Powerful calculative 
languages frame debates and decision making, and can facilitate or impede 
organizational change.
An important milestone of the organizational significance of risk 
management is therefore the nature and use of its language. Perhaps risk 
communications can reduce perceived uncertainty when organisational action
40 The debate is not entirely polarised around these two viewpoints. Hedberg and Jonsson (1978) arrive 
at the middle-ground between the two. They propose that by encompassing the design characteristics o f  both 
uncertainty decreasing and uncertainty increasing systems, one could design ‘semi-confusing information 
systems’ that would allow organisations to switch between the two major behaviour modes that are necessary 
for organisational survival: stabilization (maintenance) and change (adaptation).
41 Hopwood (1987), p. 228.
42 Ibid. p.229.
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requires it. At other times, they might increase perceived uncertainty fostering 
discussions and debate and ultimately change. Indeed, the normative literature 
asserts that it is in the very nature of risk management that it raises uncertainty by 
making risk visible to organizational actors. Subsequently, by quantifying and 
aggregating, risk people can order and prioritise risks, making them appear 
actionable and controllable.
The case study analysis will show actors who intend to mobilise ERM in 
its uncertainty increasing role, by playing the devil’s advocate, in order to curtail 
risk-taking action when the tide of risk appears to turn back on the organization. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will also find another use of risk management. It is to reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the strategy of individual business units into measurable 
risk capital need. By doing so risk people and their allies can advance risk-based 
performance measures, which may facilitate decision making and organizational 
action. Either way, the case analysis will emphasise the role of a formal language 
that is specific to risk people and gives them an independent voice.
2.2 .3 . S t r a t e g y  m a k in g  a n d  c o n t r o l
Similarly to the understanding of organizational action and goal setting, 
there are (at least) two popular perspectives on strategy making in the literature. 
The deliberate strategy perspective draws a line between strategy formulation and 
implementation. Here accounting practices derive organizational significance 
from their presumed ability to guide strategic control, the implementation of 
strategic objectives (Anthony, 1965). The emergent strategy perspective 
(Mintzberg, 1989) refuses to draw a distinctive line between strategy formulation 
and implementation, but still maintains that calculative practices are significant. 
They can be constitutive of the strategy making process (Simons, 1990, 1991). 
The field studies reviewed in this section encompass both deliberate and emergent 
perspectives and show how calculative practices can be constitutive of strategy 
making and control.
Burgelman’s field study of the internal corporate venturing process in a 
diversified major firm (Burgelman, 1983, 1985) found that the strategy-making 
process encompassed two fundamentally different processes. Apart from a more 
familiar top-management-driven planning process, the study revealed a second 
process, which was driven by autonomous strategic activities at the operational
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and middle managerial levels of the organisation. Burgelman argues that strategy 
making may become a process overlaid on the entire organisation encompassing 
both top-down and bottom-up initiatives. If middle-level managers succeed in 
conceptualizing the strategic implications of entrepreneurial activity at the 
operational level and top management gives its consent, then operational-level 
initiatives may blossom into new corporate strategies. This largely depends on the 
capacity of middle-level managers to conceptualize the strategic implications of 
operational-level assessments. Thus the information systems and the calculative 
practices deployed at grass-roots level are significant. By selecting and presenting 
relevant information in a language top management listens to and understands, 
calculative practices may become constitutive of the emergence of new strategies.
Simons (1990, 1991) further argues that accounting and other control 
systems (also based on calculative practices) may be designed and used with a 
dual objective: first, to help the implementation of a particular strategy, and 
second, to foster and (to some extent) control the emergence of new, grass-roots 
strategies. The evidence from his study in the US health care products industry 
shows how information systems can be used in different ways. Those that are 
used ‘interactively’ focus on key strategic uncertainties and get personal attention 
from top management. They are an integral part of the management control 
process and shape the organisational agenda. Interactively used calculative 
practices lie at the heart of strategic control and are constitutive of strategy 
formulation (via emergence from grass-root initiatives). Other control practices 
that are used ‘diagnostically’ only receive top management attention when 
outcomes fall outside predetermined control limits.
It is an unresolved empirical question whether enterprise risk management 
practices get used interactively or diagnostically by top management. Some risk 
management practices might move beyond the technical to be heard by top 
management and actively drawn upon in the shaping of strategic decisions and 
actions. They could be an integral part of the management process (i.e. strategic 
planning, performance measurement and discretionary decision making). Such 
risk management functions could be strategic in the sense that they receive top 
management attention and shape the organisational agenda. However, there is also 
a possibility of risk communications becoming unwelcome, isolated, and by and 
large unheard by top management and other functional units. Under these
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conditions, risk management would probably fulfil a purely diagnostic ‘monitor 
and alarm’ function. However, there is also a possibility for it to lose even the 
control function and for risk reporting to become a mere ‘box-ticking’ compliance 
function responding to a regulatory requirement.
The case study analysis will consider the interactive or diagnostic use of 
risk management among the indicators of the organizational significance of ERM. 
Further, Chapter 4 will demonstrate that given multiple control systems, the 
interactive and diagnostic use of individual controls can alternate over time. 
Simons (1990) would suggest that this is due to the varying usefulness of the 
controls to top management under changing strategic circumstances. It will be 
further argued that an important feature of control systems that draw top 
management’s close attention appears to be their perceived institutional 
appropriateness. This can also vary over time, shaping the dynamics of control 
system use and the rise and fall of individual control practices.
2.2.4. O r g a n iz a t io n a l  p o w e r
When multidivisional organizations are viewed as ‘shifting political 
coalitions competing for organizational resources, ’43 calculative practices that are 
implicated in resource allocation can endorse power to certain organizational units 
while disempowering others. As Bariff and Galbraith (1978) argued: ‘the design 
and operation o f an organization’s information system (...) will affect the 
distribution o f intraorganizationalpower.*44
Calculative practices have been shown to be constitutive of power, the 
ability of certain organizational actors to get others to act in line with their 
intentions. According to Markus and Pfeffer (1983), the importance of calculative 
practices derives from the fact that they are used in the allocation of resources45. 
In particular, it is in multidivisional organizations where calculative practices play 
a role in resource allocation: ‘...decisions about the allocation o f resources, 
formerly made across organizations through the operations o f markets are now
43 Bariff and Galbraith (1978), p. 15
44 Ibid. p. 15.
45 Salancik & Pfeffer (1974) showed how power accrues to those who provide resources 
critical to the organization. On the other hand, subunits in organizations use power to influence 
decisions concerning the allocation o f resources -th e resource allocation process resembles ‘ 
decision making by compromise’ (Thompson and Tuden, 1959), in which administrative 
mechanisms such as accounting are mobilised as ammunition machines (Burchell et al., 1980).
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made within organizations using administrative mechanisms. (...) Whether or not 
this internal allocation is more efficient than market mechanisms, the fact that the 
multidivisional structure is easily the most popular among the largest 
organizations (...) indicates the pervasiveness o f internal resource allocation and 
the accompanying financial reporting and control systems. 46
The most basic source of power is formal authority through structural 
arrangements. Influential actors thus gain parity with influential other actors. 
Apart from formal authority, calculative practices at the hand of actors can 
provide them with power in a number of ways.
First, as Ridgway (1956) has noted, what is measured, gets attention, and 
what is not measured, tends to be ignored. Similarly, Dombusch and Scott (1975) 
argue that evaluating and rewarding are key dimensions of formal authority in 
organizations. Thus calculative practices, which render an increasing number of 
aspects of performance to measurement and control, are significant47.
Second, Pfeffer (1981) noted that an important source of power is the 
ability to determine which information is to be used in evaluating various 
alternatives. As calculative practices filter and present information to decision 
makers, they influence the decision making process by framing and, evidently, 
biasing the perceptions of decision makers (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Finally, it is the ability of calculative practices to initiate action that is a 
further source of power. When the action leads to enhanced performance the 
power of the action initiator is enhanced (Markus and Pfeffer, 1983). Drawing on 
empirical evidence from Crozier (1964), Hickson et al. (1971) postulated that 
problem solving is indeed an important source of power. In particular, 
organizational subunits, which have the capacity to control and reduce critical 
uncertainties for others, are expected to gain power.
46 Markus and Pfeffer (1983), p. 205-206.
47 Miller and O’Leary (1987) pointed out that the information that calculative practices pass 
along to the top levels o f  management is not merely a servant o f  coercive power. Plausible 
measures (like variances o f  actual cost from planned standards) backed by sufficient 
institutional support can give visibility to performance. In particular, standard costing in the 
early decades o f  the twentieth century ‘served to render visible the inefficiencies o f the 
individual person within the enterprise’ (Miller & O ’Leary, 1987, pp. 241.) It is argued that 
standard costing instils an ethic and provides the basis for a crucial kind o f  self-discipline, as 
the deviations o f  the individuals from a norm, with all their possible causes and consequences, 
become available for investigation and remedial action (Miller & 0 ’Leary, 1987, pp.262.). In 
this way individuals are made governable, they display what Foucault called governmentality. 
Thus calculative measures, benchmarked against norms and standards, become ‘the gentlest 
and yet most pervasive forms o f power’ (Porter, 1995, pp.45.).
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In sum, calculative practices can empower users by giving them the ability 
to measure organizational performance, control information and the agendas of 
decision makers, initiate actions, and provide solutions to key uncertainties.
There are at least three reasons why practices of risk management might 
require much political sensitivity. First, the regulatory intent that risk 
measurements should guide capital allocations in multi-divisional banking 
organizations places risk managers potentially in the middle of a political arena. 
As business unit interest groups wrestle over capital allocations, risk calculations 
may get used as ‘ammunition’ serving certain interests or may get contested and 
discredited by others. Secondly, by adding risk considerations, risk management 
can (to some extent) redefine strategic planning and performance measurement, 
endorsing risk people with a form of control that extends beyond the safeguarding 
of risk limits. Some commentators already envision the possibility of risk 
management inflicting highly defensive (Power, 2004) and overly risk-averse 
behaviours on managers (Hunt, 2004). Finally, as senior risk officers receive 
much institutional backing for organising top-management level committees and 
decision forums, they might acquire and exercise a significant amount of agenda- 
setting power.
Whether risk management practices actually endorse users with power is 
an empirical question. The case study analysis will show both powerful and 
powerless risk people (even within the same organization) and will explain the 
uneven distribution of power among different risk officers with reference to the 
diverse roles they play in their organizations. Furthermore, Chapter 6 will 
conclude that the alternative patterns of ERM use (that are emerging from the 
study) endorse users with power from different sources: agenda-setting power in 
one case, and contribution to performance measurement in the other.
2.2.5 . S u m m a r y
Enterprise risk management has not arrived in unoccupied territories at 
most large financial institutions. Given that the traditional business of banking is 
risk taking, it can be assumed that ERM systems seek to complement or replace 
previously existing formal and informal control mechanisms. The organizational 
significance of risk controls can only be grasped by appreciating the interactions 
and possible tensions between risk management and other organizational control
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systems. Starting out from the reference points in the literature reviewed in this 
section, six tests are proposed for the assessment of the organizational 
significance of ERM in action.
The first test probes if the risk management function has formal status 
through structural arrangements that would give it visibility and parity with other 
organizational actors. Given that influential calculative languages frame debates 
and decision making, and can facilitate or impede organizational change, an 
important second milestone of the organizational significance of risk management 
is the nature and use of its language. This second test considers if risk people 
have an independent voice that is specific to themselves, and if they can translate 
risk analytics into a language that other organizational actors understand. The 
influence of ERM on strategy making, performance measurement (control) and 
key strategic decisions will be queried by the next three tests. This will enable us 
to assess to what extent ERM can facilitate organizational action, change and 
adaptation. However, exercising influence on some decisions does not necessarily 
mean that ERM is repeatedly and regularly consulted by decision makers. To 
probe this further, an additional test is proposed based on Simons’ (1990, 1991) 
distinction between salient and frequently used interactive and less influential and 
latent diagnostic control systems.
Applying the proposed six tests of organizational significance, Chapter 3 
will probe to what extent the risk management departments at the case study firms 
have been successful in achieving a strategic role. Chapter 6 will return to these 
reference points in order to frame the argument that there are alternative ways in 
which ERM can achieve organizational significance.
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2.3. C y b e r n e t i c  v e r s u s  c o m p l e x  c o n t r o l s  -  A m a n a g e m e n t
CONTROL THEORY PERSPECTIVE
Applying a management control perspective to risk management research 
can be both constructive and troubling. On one hand, it can be relatively easily 
established that risk management designs follow a common management control 
blueprint -  that of cybernetic control. On the other hand, the inclusion of risk 
controls into a broader organizational control landscape has some potentially far- 
reaching implications. As risk and return are often conflicting objectives 
(particularly so in financial services), the suggestions of risk controls can easily 
be at odds with other control systems.
Indeed, the literature recognises that multiple, competing and even 
conflicting objectives may well be present within the same organization. This can 
give rise to the simultaneous application of several control systems, each 
conceived in the cybernetic way, making the exercise of cybernetic control over 
individual control objectives problematic. Under such circumstances more 
complex control practices are called for.
However, the literature regrettably lacks a theory of such ‘complex’ 
controls. There is also a shortage of empirical evidence on the control of 
conflicting objectives in organizations. Chapter 5 will attempt to address both of 
these challenges. The current section merely tries to establish the case that a 
management control theory perspective to the study of risk management is 
applicable.
2.3.1 R i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  a s  c y b e r n e t ic  c o n t r o l
Popular definitions of management control such as those proposed by 
Anthony (1965) and Lowe (1971) are rooted in control system theory and 
describe what one could refer to as the ‘traditional’ or the ‘cybernetic’ ideal of 
control (Lilienfeld, 1978; Hofstede, 1978). In particular, Anthony ‘s widely 
quoted definition of management control ( ‘the process by which managers ensure 
that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment o f the organization’s objectives *) has been broadened by others 
to spell out the elements of control. An example is Lowe (1971) who identifies
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‘information seeking and gathering, accountability and feedback designed to 
ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes’ and achieves its overall objectives. 
Together these two popular definitions describe the cybernetic control ideal: ‘a 
process which uses the negative feedback loop represented by: setting goals, 
measuring achievement, comparing achievement to goals, feeding back 
information about unwanted variances into the process to be controlled, and 
correcting the process.,48 In order to be applicable, the cybernetic control ideal 
presupposes that a number of conditions are met: there is a clearly defined 
standard or objective, actual accomplishment is measurable, and variance 
information can be used to intervene. Furthermore, there are demands on 
organizational arrangements: a division of labour between the controller (‘staff) 
and the controlled (Tine management’), a shared understanding of the objectives, 
as well as motivation to act according to the control model, and effective 
communication. Taken together, these conditions ensure the presence of 
‘cybernetic validity’49 (Beer, 1981). Hofstede (1978) offers a concise set of 
criteria for cybernetic validity: 1. presence of standards, 2. measurable 
accomplishment, 3. usable feedback.
A somewhat dated survey, but nevertheless remarkable for its wide 
historical sweep, Giglioni and Bedeian (1974)’s review of over hundred titles 
concludes that management control theory between 1900 and 1972 reflected 
entirely the cybernetic paradigm. More than a decade later, Ezzamel and Dent
(1987) assert a similar argument: ‘cybernetic concepts form the basis for many o f  
the more traditional management controls, for example, the principle o f 
management by exception, or in a more specific context, budgetary control and 
variance analysis.,so These practices are well documented in text books and 
policy manuals.
It can be argued that risk management is yet another control system 
innovation conceived in accordance with the cybernetic control paradigm. In 
particular, the cybernetic notion of control is present in the way risk management 
is prescribed for financial institutions in the normative practitioner literature.
48 Hofstede (1978), p.451.
49 Beer (1981), p. 17 defines cybernetic validity in control systems terms as follows: a process 
that ‘must have a feedback loop in which a standard, a sensor, a discriminator and an effector 
are present.’
50 Ezzamel and Dent (1987), p.92.
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The regulatory framework, underlying more than ten years of international 
bank capital regulation, gives risk managers a specialist task: determining the 
amount of capital (‘adequate capital’) that the bank should set aside so that it 
could buffer and absorb unanticipated losses. To this end, the regulators challenge 
the risk management functions of banks to devise and implement ‘adequate’ risk 
measurement methods. Risk measurements are expected to feed into the process 
of defining what capital levels different banks ought to hold.
Three elements of the regulators’ proposed risk management framework 
stand out, which together establish three conditions of cybernetic validity for risk 
control: 1. objective, 2. measurability and 3. feedback. Firstly, the regulators 
provide risk management with the task of deriving clear and stable objectives in 
the form of ‘hierarchical limit systems.’51 Paraphrasing Thompson (1967), a 
hierarchical process is expected, starting with a statement of the overall risk limit 
o f the organization, escalating down to lower level risk limits for the 
organization. Secondly, the regulators require risk managers to make the 
controlled process (the risk profile of the bank) measurable. The Basel Committee 
strongly recommends firms to develop risk metrics and ‘means o f aggregating (to 
the degree possible) their risks.' Finally, the regulators emphasize the reporting 
and feedback aspect of cybernetic controls: the risk management framework 
prescribed includes ‘the preparation o f risk reports fo r senior management. ,53
Integrated risk management has pioneered a common denominator for all 
quantifiable risk types -  economic capital. From a controlling viewpoint, two 
questions can now be addressed. First, does the actual capital at the bank’s
disposal correspond to what is found necessary by the bottom-up risk and capital
assessment process? In other words, is the available capital in line with the capital 
need corresponding to the risk appetite and target credit rating of the bank 
(expressed as the aggregate economic capital)? In theory, if available capital falls 
short of the assessment of total economic capital, then the bank should consider 
raising more capital or finding ways of reducing risk and thus, capital need 
(possibly by selling risky assets). In the opposite case of capital abundance the 
bank could think about taking on more risk, or giving capital back to its
51 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1.
52 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1-2.
53 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1.
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shareholders. The second question is, in order to avoid wild fluctuations in the 
actual capital held by the bank, what should be the overall limit for the risk profile 
of the bank (and individual limits for divisions or risk types)? By setting 
economic capital limits, the controllers aspire to contain the bank’s risk capital 
need within the bounds of its available capital.
It appears that the quantification of risk is not only an element of the current 
regulatory (and practitioner) notion of risk control, but it also reinforces a 
cybernetic conception of control over the total risk profile of banks.
2 .3 .2  F r o m  c y b e r n e t ic  to  c o m p l e x  c o n t r o l s
Apart from establishing the cybernetic control ideal in risk management, the 
economic capital measures have the potential to overcome a major obstacle of risk 
control: they might bridge the potential communications gap between the risk 
function and the rest of the organization. Economic capital is expressed in 
monetary terms and dubbed ‘capital’ -  it should sound familiar to those more 
comfortable with balance sheets than loss distributions. In effect, economic 
capital is a translation of arcane risk analytics into the language of accounting. 
Integrated risk management aspires to make risk visible to other people in the 
bank who take it -  in a language compatible with accounting.
However, in the banking world most attempts at increasing operating profit 
(e.g. an increase in lending volume, a move to higher-margin credit market 
niches) tend to increase risk. Thus risk and return are often conflicting objectives. 
Visualising risk, in the way economic capital does, can make latent conflicts 
between risk and return become clearly evident. This can challenge the conditions 
of possibility of the simultaneous exercise of cybernetic control over the risk 
profile and the profitability of the bank.
Indeed, from a control theory perspective, multiple, competing and even 
conflicting objectives may well be present within the same organization. This can 
give rise to the simultaneous application of several control systems, each 
conceived in the cybernetic way, making the exercise of cybernetic control over 
individual control objectives problematic. Under such circumstances more 
complex control practices are called for (Hofstede, 1978; Otley, 1994).
At this stage, the notion of complex control still appears very broad and 
general. Thus there is a need for theory development in order to explain complex
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control phenomena that arise in empirical settings such as the control of 
conflicting risk and return objectives in financial services firms. Chapter 5 will 
take on this challenge.
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2 .4 . T h e  e x t e r n a l  o r ig in s  o f  in t e r n a l  a c c o u n t s
Apart from assessing the organizational roles and significance of ERM in 
action, the study will also probe what forces (external and internal) shape its 
development. By identifying powerful external influences it is possible to derive 
conclusions that might be applicable beyond the confines of the companies 
observed, and implications for the wider development of enterprise risk 
management.
Accounting research has borrowed two approaches from organizational 
theory that proved to be particularly successful in explaining the external origins 
of internal accounts. These are the contingency paradigm and organizational 
institutional theory.
2.4 .1  Th e  c o n t in g e n c y  a p p r o a c h
The contingency approach54, as applied in management accounting 
research, is concerned with the contextual drivers of the design and use of control 
systems (e.g. the degree of environmental uncertainty, the given structure, 
technology or the strategy of the firm). This approach takes a functionalist, 
rational view on control system design, which it considers as a means of 
adaptation to the calls of the organization’s context. Successful adaptation (i.e. a 
good organization-context fit) is expected to result in superior financial 
performance. A major ambition of contingency researchers is to specify the 
contingency factors that matter. Among them are firm characteristics such as size, 
age and the type of technology applied. However, a great deal of attention has 
been paid to external variables such as the degree of environmental uncertainty, 
hostility (Khandwalla, 1977) and the role of the national culture (Hofstede, 1983). 
Based on an investigation of firm performance, contingency researchers hope to 
explain and even predict if and when a fit between a firm’s control system and the 
context is achieved.
Survey-based contingency researchers tend to capture only a snapshot of 
management control systems, and the dynamics of control systems eludes them. 
Control systems rise and fall, organisations adopt and abort them. It has been
54 Chenhall (2003) gives an up-to-date and comprehensive overview o f  three decades o f  
contingency studies in accounting.
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argued that a lack of appreciation of the often fleeting, temporary nature of 
control systems characterizes much research belonging to the contingency 
paradigm. In addition, a failure to account for the existence and workings of 
multiple control systems is also recognised as an important weakness. Survey- 
based research projects looking for an association or good ‘fit’ between a certain 
control system and one or more contextual variables are prone to suffer from a 
lack of consideration of other control mechanisms. A control system chosen for 
study may be overlapping with, or complemented by another control system 
present in the organization. If this is true, then studying the former in isolation 
from the latter would lead to misleading results. Studying multiple control 
systems requires an understanding of the possible relationships between different 
control mechanisms, which could be both complementary and substitution effects.
These weaknesses of survey-based empirical research is somewhat 
countered by field (or case study) -based researchers who examine multiple 
control systems over a longer period of time. They explain the observed control 
packages as a means of adapting to highly uncertain environments or new 
technologies (Schreuder, 1987; Dent, 1987; Simons, 1990, 1991; Chapman, 
1998). Field-based contingency studies have the advantage over their survey- 
based counterparts in their ability to account for multiple control systems. Such 
field studies tend to find that control systems do not work in isolation. Dent 
(1987) and Chapman (1998) for example recognised how informal lateral controls 
complemented formal accounting controls in firms operating under conditions of 
high uncertainty. Leaving aside informal controls, Simons (1990, 1991) studied 
the characteristics of all formal control systems in his case study companies and 
argued that in successful firms top managers chose one specific control system to 
monitor key strategic uncertainties while the role of other formal controls was to 
complement these.
By and large, field-based contingency studies tend to focus on the 
complementarities of multiple controls, and the politics of control trade-offs is not 
salient in these stories. They tend to associate the workings of multiple control 
systems with an organization’s efforts to cope with uncertainty. However, control 
system packages may well turn into a hotbed of rivalry between overlapping 
control systems where substitution (as well as complementary) effects come into 
play. In the context of examining multiple control systems, the apparent lack of
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focus on the politics of control in contingent control research (be it survey or field 
-  based) is an important weakness.
Contingency research helps the case study analysis by pinpointing factors 
that can explain the observed patterns in ERM practices. It yields a list of 
variables that could be considered and applied to the cases during the theorising 
process. Some of these variables did not fit later patterns, while others proved to 
be explanatory. For example, Chapter 4 finds that environmental hostility was 
influential in helping the rise of risk controls. Chapter 5 proposes a number of 
uncertainty variables arising in control situations for the explanation of the 
complex control modes observed there. Finally, Chapter 6 adds the calculative 
culture of the organisations as an additional factor that sheds more light on ERM 
use.
2.4.2 Th e  n e w  i n s t it u t io n a l is t  a p p r o  a c h
An alternative theoretical perspective on the external origins of internal 
accounts is institutional organizational theory (also known as ‘new 
institutionalism’). It has been borrowed from organizational sociology (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). The institutional perspective shares 
contingency researchers’ concern with organizational adaptation to external 
environments. However, it differs from it in at least two important aspects. First, 
institutional theorists consider adaptation both as outcome and process while most 
contingency researchers consider adaptation as an outcome only.55 Second, in 
institutional theory the concept of organization-environment fit is not based on 
any definitions of economic success and efficiency, but merely on organizational 
survival. From an institutional perspective, successful adaptation as an outcome 
is not conceptualised as ‘good fit’ that is predicted to result in efficiency, but as 
conformity to societal norms of acceptable practice, which often bears no 
efficiency implications whatsoever. In other words, adaptation as an outcome is 
compliance with the institutionalised rules and expectations that are expressed by 
external constituents (e.g. regulators, shareholders, rating agencies, suppliers,
55 Note that field-based contingency researchers try to overcome this limitation by observing 
how organization-context fit (contingency theory’s definition o f  organizational adaptation) is 
achieved.
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customers etc.) upon whose support the organization in question is dependent, and 
is desirable, even if the effort put into compliance reduces the firm’s operational 
or financial efficiency. Institutional theorists express an interest in adaptation as a 
process too. Adaptation, as a process, may range from simple symbolic displays 
through elaborate rituals of ‘doing the right thing’ to a genuine tailoring of the 
structure and the systems of the organization to perceived definitions of 
institutional appropriateness. Such processes of adaptation are understood as 
profoundly political and reflecting the relative power of the interests and actors 
who enact them (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988). Investigating management control 
systems and their relationship with their context from this perspective places the 
researcher outside the boundaries of the contingency paradigm. Such 
investigations of the politics of the adaptation process (the politics of the 
institutionalisation of management control systems, if you will) require the 
exploration of how the rules, norms and myths (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) in the 
firm’s institutional environment are constructed, and how in the organization they 
are interpreted, by whom, and through what kind of processes they are adhered to. 
Management accounting and control research presents a growing number of 
studies conducted in this vein (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Ansari & Euske, 
1987; Covalevski et al., 1993; Euske & Riccaboni, 1999).
The idea of firms seeking institutional appropriateness has a strong 
explanatory appeal to the study of ‘external origins’. Fligstein (1991)’s historical 
study agues that successful executives develop conceptions of control that do not 
only come to dominate their industries but also define appropriate standards of 
behaviour. Assuming that survival hinges largely upon organisations’ conformity 
with institutionalised rules and norms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), it can be argued 
that the rise and fall of particular management control systems depend upon their 
success of being seen appropriate and legitimate. Thus control systems can 
become institutionalised myths and advocates of new control ideas can be 
expected to seek legitimacy and institutional appropriateness.
In the context of multiple controls systems, institutional appropriateness 
might be a powerful explanatory factor that can set aside dominant control 
systems from the ones that are temporarily or forever crowded out. For example, 
in a historical study of control system selection in an Italian bank, Euske and
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Riccaboni (1999) explain the adoption of new accounting and control tools with 
reference to the requirements of the institutional environment of the firm.
The adoption of risk management systems by financial services firms 
raises questions of institutional appropriateness because, as the normative 
practitioner literature suggests, the particular ERM practices of firms are 
scrutinised by external actors, such as regulators, credit rating agencies and 
shareholders. In this vein, Chapter 4 will argue that apart from the immediate 
demands of a hostile investor environment, more subtle institutional pressures 
were also at work in the dynamics of control system selection during the course of 
the observed rivalry between risk and accounting controls. Further, Chapter 6 will 
trace out the corporate governance trends that appear to give rise to alternative 
patterns in the development of ERM practices in financial institutions.
The new institutionalist approach will only be a secondary, 
complementary framework for the arguments of this study. This is because 
institutional theorists tend to underplay intraorganizational factors, those that 
contingency (and other organizationally grounded) researchers so painstakingly 
try to map. It also struggles to accommodate the micropolitics of the observed 
organizational processes. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) confirm that their 
colleagues have paid little attention to how incumbents maintain their dominant 
positions or respond to threats, especially during periods of crisis and instability. 
Accordingly, this study aims to bring out the micro-processes and politics that 
might have shaped the banks’ efforts to adopt institutionally appropriate risk 
control systems.
Given this choice of emphasis, the Thesis does not provide a rigorous 
analysis of the link between risk management and the wider social and 
institutional concerns, actors and struggles that surround it. The suggested links 
will be rather tentative, based on interviewees’ accounts of the apparent influence 
of external regulatory, corporate governance and performance pressures on the 
risk management practices observed. These tentative links will be cast in the 
language of institutional organisational theory. In particular, the symbolic aspect 
of risk management will be highlighted applying the notion of institutional 
appropriateness. By combining a strong concern with providing an 
organizationally grounded account of the observed risk management practices and 
a less pronounced, but inevitable concern with the symbolic aspects of risk
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management practices, the above described framework can be labelled as 
‘organizational-symbolic’ (Dutton, 1997).56
56 Dutton (1997) applies four perspectives on her research interest (strategic agenda building). 
Organizational-instrumental, emphasising functionalist, attention-directing aspects. This is 
similar to the functionalist concerns captured by the ‘consulting research genre’ (Lukka nd 
Granlund, 2002). Second, the organizational-symbolic perspective, importantly, explicates the 
features o f  the observed practice that are symbolic in the sense that they carry meaning for 
members inside and outside the organization. This perspective overlaps both with the 
organisationally grounded and the new institutional research. The individual-instrumental 
perspective focuses on the career outcomes for the individuals concerned with the observed 
practice. Finally, the individual-symbolic perspective aims to pick up possible stigmatizing 
effects.
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2.5. Su m m a r y
A burgeoning literature of ‘consulting research genre’ (Lukka and 
Granlund, 2002) testify to the rise of enterprise risk management. This normative- 
practitioner literature allows us to distinguish four prominent themes that help us 
to make sense of the diverse practices that are gathering under the umbrella of 
ERM: risk quantification, risk aggregation, risk-based performance measurement 
and the management of non-quantifiable risks. However, there is a gap in the 
literature regarding the roles that these risk management practices play in 
organizations: how they obtain organizational significance (if at all) and what 
impact they have. Furthermore, an understanding of the ‘external origins’ of ERM 
is needed.
Accounting research, which has sought to answer similar questions, 
provides a number of theoretical reference points and useful insights. This chapter 
pointed to three common areas of interest that characterise both accounting 
research and the study of risk management in financial organizations.
As it can be expected that risk management would operate differently and 
have different roles across organisations, the first common area of interest was the 
roles and organizational significance of calculative practices. The insights from 
organizational studies of accounting help us to unravel the many facets of 
organizational significance that can be attributed to calculative control practices: 
goal setting and decision making; organizational action, change and adaptation; 
strategy making and control, and organizational power. Based on these, a number 
of tests were proposed for the assessment of the organizational significance of 
ERM in action, paving the way for the case study analysis in Chapter 3.
The second area of common concern for researchers of accounting and risk 
management is the study of management control systems. Applying a 
management control perspective to risk management research is both constructive 
and troubling. On one hand, it can be relatively easily established that risk 
management designs follow a common management control blueprint -  that of 
cybernetic control. On the other hand, the inclusion of risk controls into a broader 
organizational control landscape has some potentially far-reaching implications. 
As risk and return are often conflicting objectives (particularly so in financial 
services), the suggestions of risk controls can easily be at odds with other control
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systems. Thus introducing risk management systems adds complexity to the 
existing control landscape of financial institutions. Given that the management 
control literature regrettably lacks a theory of such ‘complex’ controls, studying 
risk management can potentially enhance our understanding of complex 
organizational control practices. These considerations introduce Chapter 5, which 
will address complex controls both from a theoretical and a field-based 
perspective.
Thirdly, a common concern to accounting and risk management research 
is the ‘external origins of internal accounts’. Contingency and new institutional 
perspectives were discussed. Management controls can be seen as tools of 
adaptation to changing environments (as contingency researchers argue) or as the 
source of institutional legitimacy (as new institutionalist studies argue). However, 
both the contingency approach and the new institutionalist perspective underplay 
the grass-roots level processes of organizational control. The ways organizational 
members advance certain control systems are not central to these accounts, in 
which the competing agendas and the rival definitions of success and failure often 
go unobserved. Aspiring to bring out the drama and politics of enterprise risk 
management, Chapters 4 and 6 will combine the explanatory appeal of 
organizationally grounded contingency theory and new institutionalism with the 
richness of a field-based perspective. The resulting organizational-symbolic 
perspective focuses on the organizational aspects of risk management, while the 
links to wider societal agendas will merely be tentative.
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C h a p t e r  3
T h e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  r is k
MANAGEMENT
Opinion has a significance proportioned  
to  the sources that sustain it.
Benjamin Cardozo
The previous chapter gave a selective academic literature review. It pinned 
down a number of theoretical reference points, which are to frame the arguments 
advanced in this study. In particular, organisationally grounded studies of 
calculative practices and management control, as well as institutional 
organisational theory inform the research. Organizational studies of management 
control (e.g. Hopwood, 1983; Simons, 1987; Dent, 1991; Ahrens, 1997; 
Chapman, 1998) offer valuable insights about the roles control systems play in 
organizational life, and explain control system design and use with reference to 
organizational characteristics and the micropolitics of control.
Drawing on the researcher’s field work, this chapter is a first step in 
exploring the roles risk specialists play in the management of two large banks. 
The differences found in the case studies, at this stage, will be explained by the 
micropolitics of risk management. The chapter argues that risk management as a 
control activity is inherently political. For instance, by assessing the risk profile of 
business units, risk people can propose changes to internal capital allocations. 
This would allow them to influence planning and control. Nevertheless, risk 
people may easily land in the middle of a battlefield where different business 
units with conflicting profit and capital interests combat for or against radical 
changes in the internal definition of capital adequacy. Whether or not risk 
managers can influence strategy making and control depends on their political 
skills and alliances. It will be shown that three types o f risk managers are 
emerging with different ambitions, political skills and alliances. This opens the 
door for diverse possibilities in which ERM may contribute to strategy and 
control. In particular, two markedly different patterns of organizational 
significance will be explicated.
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The chapter is organized as follows. The first section summons up the 
theoretical reference points relating to the organizational significance of 
calculative practices. In particular, the six tests developed in Chapter 2 will be 
recalled. Their applicability will be further illustrated with reference to Dent 
(1991), a classic study on how a newly introduced control function acquired an 
influential organizational role in a privatised railway company. Then the case 
descriptions will be presented, followed by discussion and conclusion.
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3 .1 . T e st in g  t h e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  a  c o n t r o l
FUNCTION
A common theme was pursued in the two case studies. A new 
organizational function (risk management) appeared, it claimed visibility and a 
number of roles in organizational life, while interacted with other long-existing 
organizational groups. This theme is not alien to accounting and management 
control research. In particular, Dent (1991) describes a newly appointed group of 
‘business managers’ (management accountants) who gradually redefined the ways 
in which their organization, a privatised railway company, was internally 
understood and managed.
Chapter 2 put forward a number of indicators of the organizational 
significance of calculative and control practices. This chapter applies these tests in 
probing to what extent a particular functional group, risk management, has 
obtained strategic significance:
1. Formal status through structural arrangements: Has the function created 
formal reporting lines? Has it got a senior representative at top management 
level? Has it achieved parity with influential organizational functions?
2. New language: Has the function created a new or complementary 
interpretation of the organizational reality? Has it got a distinct vocabulary and 
methodology?
3. Redefinition of planning: Has the function changed (or contributed to a 
significant change in) the planning process?
4. Redefinition of performance measurement: Has die function changed (or 
contributed to a significant change in) the way performance is measured and 
rewarded in the organization?
5. Influence on key strategic decisions: Is the function involved in the 
discussion of top management-level strategic choices (e.g. acquisitions, 
financing)?
However, exercising influence on some decisions does not necessarily 
mean that the function in question is repeatedly and regularly consulted by 
decision makers. To probe this further, an additional test is proposed based on 
Simons’ distinction between salient and frequently used (interactive) versus latent 
(diagnostic) systems (Simons, 1990, 1991):
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6. Interactive use: Does the function provide regular information about some 
of the key strategic uncertainties that receive personal attention from top 
management?
Dent’s (1991) analysis confirms the applicability of the proposed tests for 
the purpose of describing the rise of a control function to organizational 
significance. The study is framed as a change process that led to the 
transformation of a railway organization’s culture among the senior management 
elite from the old ‘railway’ culture (operations orientation) to a more desired 
‘business’ ethos (bottom-line orientation). The chain of events he observed 
amounted to an evolutionary change process in the course of which the business 
managers ‘gained influence and gradually converted others to their image o f the
cn
business railway’ .
The study depicts the strategic potential and cultural influence of the 
observed management accounting function through a number of stages that 
correspond well to the above suggested tests of organizational significance. A 
crisis situation led to the introduction of a formal business management 
(managerial accounting) function. Structural and reporting arrangements gave 
the new function status and parity with existing operations managers. By 
translating dialogue on operational and engineering concerns into the new 
language of the ‘bottom-line’, the business managers provided ‘new accounting
58 .representations o f the railway as a series o f profit and loss accounts' This 
allowed them to redefine planning and performance measurement by placing both 
into the accounting framework. Resistance ensued and the business managers had 
to fight to consolidate the new organizational reality. Battling over key strategic 
decisions, they found institutional support from the top of the organization. The 
business managers staged one victorious contest after the other against their rival 
engineering colleagues. Eventually, a new organizational culture took shape that 
gradually crowded out the old engineering staff and management practices. An 
accounting ethos took root, and its guardians (the business managers) assumed a 
leading influence on the strategy and control aspects of the organization’s life. 
The graduations that signified the ‘emergence o f a new organizational reality ’
(Dent, 1991) can also be viewed as milestones on a road to organisational
57 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p.21
58 Ahrens and Dent (1998), p.21
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significance. The case suggests that it was the combined effect of acquiring 
formal status, proliferating a new language, redefining planning and performance 
measurement as well as d hoc influence on important discretionary decisions that 
pointed to the strategic significance of the new business management function, 
and more importantly, to the emergence of a new business culture.
Overall, this chapter will probe to what extent the new risk management 
departments have been successful in achieving a supposedly strategic role in the 
two observed banks. The analysis does not assume that strategic significance is a 
unique outcome that would follow from the above described sequence of events. 
The graduations described may not necessarily be sequential, some of them might 
be independent from the rest. Therefore it is assumed that different patterns of 
strategic significance might exist. Following the case descriptions (Section 3.2 
and 3.3), the Discussion section will apply the proposed six tests of organizational 
significance.
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.2. C a se  1 - F r a s e r  B a n k
3.2.1. B a c k g r o u n d
Frasers’ impressive all-marble-all-glass headquarters towering in the heart 
of the City of London cast a permanent shade on an impossibly narrow street that 
has been home to many banks since medieval times. Only the location suggests 
that Frasers is one of the oldest banks in the UK -  the building is a tribute to 
modem architecture and the giant world clock in its reception area speaks of the 
global aspirations of the bank. Despite priding itself on an international presence, 
the bank has a strong domestic focus. For example it has recently acquired a 
financial services company in order to further strengthen its position in the UK 
market. The step was criticised by the financial press: Frasers was feared to be 
weighed down under the burden of integration costs and unrealised synergies. At 
the time of the start of the case study research the bank was in the middle of an 
ongoing group-wide efficiency review, and the structural overhaul of many of its 
central functions including marketing, IT, back-office services and risk 
management.
3.2.2 . Th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  r is k  m a n  a g e m e n t
Frasers turned to modem risk management techniques in the wake of a 
significant loss that it had suffered (first time in its 300-year history) during the 
early 90s UK credit crisis. It was the first European bank that adopted a default 
probability-based credit assessment methodology and a Value-at-Risk based 
approach for its total loan portfolio and market risks. Having consulted some of 
the American banks that pioneered modem risk measurement methods, the 
techniques were implemented by a leading overseas risk consultancy and by the 
investment banking arm of the Group. From early on, strategic planners at Frasers 
recognised the potential of risk measurements in creating what was seen as an 
economic view of profits.
3.2 .3 . E c o n o m ic  c a p it a l  a n d  t h e  p l a n n in g  p r o c e s s  ■
Having talked to Strategy people at Frasers, it appeared that the 
calculation of Economic Capital figures was an embedded part of the annual 
planning process. In the course of preparing medium term strategic alternatives
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and the relevant pro-forma profit and loss statements, the business units calculated 
the amount of Economic Capital each alternative would need. Economic Capital 
was seen as the basis of calculation of the capital charge that was necessary for 
arriving at the ‘economic (value added) profit’ offered by different strategic 
alternatives. Then it was up to the Strategy function to review the alternatives for 
individual business units and (in consultation with them) to select the appropriate 
mix of business unit strategies, looking for the set of strategies that would 
optimise the overall performance of the Group. In these discussions the bottom- 
line figure (Economic Profit) reflected a pro-forma net profit less a charge on the 
allocated Economic Capital. The appropriateness of the capital charge figures had 
been reviewed and approved by the Economic Capital team, initially located 
within the planning department. The objective was to express the risk profile of 
the business units in the light of different strategic alternatives and to require them 
to earn an economic profit over and above the capital charge warranted by their 
risk profile. So risk considerations fed into the planning process in the form of 
Economic Capital charges and these formed a constraint on the profit-maximising 
objective functions of the business units.
However, by the time the selected and proposed strategic alternatives 
reached the Executive Board, the Economic Capital charges were aggregated with 
other operating expenses and thus turned invisible. Board members only saw the 
pro-forma P&L statements relating to the strategic alternatives put forward by the 
Strategy team for review and sign-off. As far as Board members could see it, the 
Economic Capital charges were not made explicit: they were absorbed into the 
‘operating expenses’ cost category. The explicit representations of risk in the 
Board-level strategic plan were estimates for loan provisions (another accounting 
cost category) and separate calculations for the regulatory capital requirements for 
the loan portfolio. Economic Capital, with all its claimed potential to grasp the 
risk profile of the business units, did not get visibility in these discussions.
But this was less of a concern to the risk people. In the mid-90s an 
anomaly appeared around the economic capital allocations: the method in use did 
not allocate out to the business units all economic capital that the bank as a whole 
needed. Continuing business growth required continuing total economic capital 
growth, however, the methodology in place did not have the appropriate scaling 
factor for increasing business unit capital allocations sufficiently -  hence an
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increasing amount of economic capital was left unallocated at the centre. There 
were sentiments in the Economic Capital team that some business units took on 
disproportionately high risk without having been charged for it. Risk people 
considered it a mere technical problem. Armed with a fresh finance degree from a 
renowned business school, in 1999-2000 the leader of the Economic Capital team 
consulted his previous professors, recruited three more finance graduates and set 
out to find a corporate finance solution.
3.2.4. C h a n g in g  e c o n o m ic  c a p it a l  a l l o c a t io n s
In less than a year’s time the Economic Capital team came up with a new 
economic capital approach that was promoted as ‘a leading edge’ methodology 
both internally and outside Frasers at several conferences. Having tested it in a 
couple of small business units, the Head of Economic Capital asked for support 
from the large business units. He found resistance. One of the largest business 
units claimed that the new model suggested unacceptably high capital allocations 
to them. They called the technical credibility of the new method into doubt: the 
risk manager was challenged to provide evidence that there was another major 
bank that had successfully applied a similar methodology -  an impossible task 
given the uniqueness of the approach59. The technical ingenuity of the innovation 
turned out to be a double-edged sword: not only the business units, but the risk 
manager’s own superiors would have preferred to see a precedent for its 
successful application. At the time the Economic Capital team was based in the 
planning function. They reported to the Head of Corporate Planning, and not to 
the Risk Director. Placed outside the risk function, isolated from understanding 
ears, the leader of the Economic Capital team was not able to secure backing from 
the top of the organisation. In a situation where one of the most powerful business 
units was opposing the change, the Economic Capital team leader was in a 
politically weak position, no matter how convincingly he argued his case for
59 Most banks use statistics-based (VaR-type), data-intensive approaches to Economic Capital 
that make arguably unrealistic assumptions o f the statistical distribution o f  loss events. The 
problem is that only market losses follow a relatively ‘well behaved’ distribution, while credit 
losses present serious exceptions that ‘mess up’ the statistical assumptions, and operational risk 
-g iven  its broad nature and the lack o f data- defies distributional representation. The 
alternative method dispensed with VaR wherever possible in order to avoid its deficiencies. 
Instead, it was based on corporate finance principles, it viewed risk through betas and focused 
on the assessment o f  the cost o f financial distress in case o f  ‘worst-case scenario’ events.
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technical ‘leading edge.’ What initially appeared to be a difference in technical 
opinions soon came to be rumoured as the risk manager’s “crusade” or “personal 
vendetta” (depending on which side one tended to agree with) against the large 
business unit that had decided to stand its ground firmly against any radical 
changes in existing capital allocations. After two years of futile attempts at 
‘selling the methodology internally, ’60 the Head of Economic Capital and all the 
technical people of his team left the bank.
However, there remained continuing and growing capital allocation 
anomalies, which eventually drew the attention of top management.61 Worries 
were voiced about the likely disapproval of regulators and investment analysts of 
a continuing trend:
'We feared  at som e point the market w as going to turn around an d  say to 
us: “You are not a llocating out [x bn], that's really o d d . Why is that?" That's w hat 
w e thought the worst scenario is going to b e.'
A new manager was appointed at the end of 2001 to review and improve 
the old Economic Capital methodology. (Appendix 1 shows a chronological 
ordering of the appointments and departures described here, as well as an 
indication of the sequence of interviews.) A complete reorganisation of the risk 
management function served as a backdrop to the rebirth of the Economic Capital 
team. A new Group Risk Director was appointed as of the beginning of 2002. He 
separated the management of the different risk categories (credit, market, 
operational etc.) into a sub-department and set up another sub-department that 
was responsible for Group-level risk reporting and calculations for capital 
allocation. The latter hosted the new Economic Capital team that now had support 
not only from the sub-departmental Director, but also from the Group Risk 
Director. Significantly, the latter was a member of the executive board.
Notwithstanding the respect he had for the technical skills of his 
predecessor, the new Head of Economic Capital took a less revolutionary
60 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
61 The 2002 annual report showed that 8% o f the group’s average economic capital was held at 
the group centre, unallocated to business units. Another analysis showed the allocation o f  
average economic capital to risk types. Again, the same 8% remains unallocated to risks, it was 
shown as held at the centre. (Detailed Reference to Annual Report is omitted due to 
confidentiality agreement.)
62 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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approach to the issue of change. He appreciated the political sensitivities of his 
task right from the beginning:
‘Everyone said, yes, let’s g e t  it [Econom ic Capital] m ore a ccu ra te . But 
they w a n ted  to minimise their portion of the m ore a c c u r a te  pie. So there w as a  
tension.'63
He decided not to abandon the existing method, but rather to improve it. 
He was prepared to compromise on technique in order to devise a politically 
acceptable change in capital allocations. Armed with a PhD in nuclear physics 
and a former career and good relations with the large business unit that resisted 
the previous change attempt, he was both technically and politically fit for the 
task. He called for setting up a senior cross-functional team to guide the 
Economic Capital project, and this steering group had the representatives of the 
powerful business units as well as the Group Risk Director and the Group Finance 
Director on it. At the time of making contact with him in the autumn of 2002 he 
was preparing the sign-off request for a new Economic Capital method that was 
built on what might have been the closest to a group-wide consensus. The new 
approach resembled the ‘industry average,64 as far as the methodology was 
concerned. It did not suggest radical capital allocation changes for any particular 
division. Nevertheless it solved the anomalies caused by the previous method by 
increasing capital allocations across the board. It was signed-off in November 
2002 with unanimous support.
3.2.5. M an a  g in g  t h e  r is k  s ilo s
As part of the reorganisation of the risk function, in 2001 a Director of 
Risk Reporting was appointed too. He was responsible for channelling all risk 
information (with the exception of the Economic Capital figures) from the 
business units through his team at the corporate centre up to the Board. In 
particular, he was responsible for communicating the aggregate market, credit and 
operational risk profile of the Group. At the beginning of the year he was full of 
plans as to how to introduce information about ''intrinsic risks in businesses’ and 
‘matters o f group-level significance’ into the formal board-level risk reports.
63 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
64 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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In the summer we met again and he expressed much disappointment and 
frustration. He noted that by the time his risk report reached the Executive Board, 
its content was filtered through so many committees that the Board faced only a 
‘sterilised, not very exciting’ report as one of many items to sweep through on a 
busy agenda. Complaining about a ‘ toothless risk function ’, he noted that there 
were also problems with the bottom-up information flows: business unit risk 
managers shielded risk information from the centre forcing him to resolve himself 
to a role of ‘constantly being out on fishing expeditions' for information. Another 
element of the ‘toothless-ness’ was that risk reporting did not channel into 
important strategic decisions, for example there was no contribution from the risk 
function to the due diligence of the recently acquired mortgage lending company. 
Risk people’s lack of influence on this strategic decision was also noted by the 
Head of Economic Capital who gloomily added:
'If there h ad  b een  o n e  [a formal risk analysis], probably it w ould not h ave  
b een  im portant [to the decision making process].'65
Comparing the role of the risk managers (ideally) to that of a ‘medieval 
jester’, the Director of Risk Reporting gave voice to aspirations to challenge 
existing beliefs:
'Risk by definition (like audit) sits outside the culture of an organisation as a  
w hole, it has to. And the more important it b e c o m e s  to a  business that everybody  
sings in tune the less s p a c e  is given for any kind of business vo ice . And it b e c o m e s  
very difficult for a  risk m an ager  (at any level from talking to a  trader to talking to 
the Chairman of the bank) to ch a llen ge. The skill is ch allenging  without causing  
o ffe n c e .’ 66
However, he concluded that his position did not allow him to challenge 
others and to influence key strategic decisions. He left the company at the end of 
the year.
Having talked to planners in Group Strategy, it appeared that strategy 
people see the value added by risk people only in terms of their input to the 
planning process: the prescription and co-ordination of the calculation of the 
appropriate Economic Capital charges across the Group. Accordingly, the strategy 
people supported the introduction of the improved Economic Capital technique by
65 Head o f Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
66 Quotes from Director o f  Risk Reporting, Fraser Bank
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helping to ‘ draw question marks all over the old methodology,67 and promoting 
the new approach as credible.
Operating on the borderline between the risk and strategy function there 
was a manager within Group Strategy, who was responsible for liaising with the 
risk people. Given that the two functional groups were located on adjacent floors 
at headquarters, he could personally make contact, and cultivated both formal and 
informal interactions. He explained about the uneasy symbiosis in which strategy 
and risk people lived:
‘Most of the p eo p le  doing strategy don 't understand risk. Most of the risk 
p eo p le  d o n ’t understand strategy. (...) P eop le  w ho d o  strategy know they h ave  
to work out e co n o m ic  profit and  they know they h a v e  to work out how  m uch risk 
is involved, but they are not very interested in it. They are m ore interested in 
in com e an d  w hat is going to h a p p en  to the market p la c e . They don 't w ant to 
g e t  involved with risk all the time. The risk p e o p le  sp en d  all this time on calcu lating  
how  m uch risk they h a v e  go t an d  they d o n ’t look at the b igger picture. Getting  
both sides to talk to e a c h  other is the hard part.’68
Apart from supporting the new Economic Capital project with all the 
influence he could muster, this manager was also responsible for setting the 
agenda for the executive board meetings. He was concerned with translating risk 
analytics into a language Board members could understand, and this language was 
framed in the terminology of value-based management (encompassing notions of 
strategy and accounting, but no specialist ‘risk talk’). Hence the rather condensed 
('sterilised') format in which he expected risk information to be presented.
It appeared that the risk managers had indeed set off on a ‘long and 
winding road’ towards organizational significance at Frasers. Some had dropped 
out and have been replaced by others. Communicating information from the 
different risk silos (Risk Reporting) had failed to grab top-level attention. By 
redefining economic capital charges the risk function (Economic Capital team) 
seemed to have the potential to influence the strategic planning process. Indeed, 
calculating the relevant risk capital charges for different strategic alternatives was 
an integral part of the planning process that was considered to be of great value by 
strategy people. However, at the time of this study this influence was invisible to 
the Board, whose attention was guided by more conventional accounting
67 Assistant Director, Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
68 Assistant Director 2, Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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representations of the bottom line and the risk implications of strategic 
alternatives.
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3.3. C a se  2 - BWT
3.3.1 . Ba c k g r o u n d
BWT Group was created as a result of a merger between two domestic 
banks: one was then in trouble, the other one was the healthier and stronger 
rescuer. The Group focuses on private, retail and investment banking and has 
grown to be one of the largest domestic banks in Switzerland. The international 
presence and expansion of its private and investment banking operations ensured 
that BWT Group earned a reputation as a major player in the global financial 
services industry. A vision of global expansion underpinned a growth strategy that 
resulted in the group acquiring a 150-year old Swiss insurance company 
(‘Division X’), which is itself an international business with a presence in 16 
countries. The acquisition of Division X aimed at reducing overall business risk 
through diversifying into the insurance business that was new to the bank. At the 
same time the move promised to realize the potential of integrating banking and 
insurance services - the concept of ‘bancassurance’ was a popular idea that the 
financial services sector had been toying with since the 80s. The acquisition was 
hailed by analysts and commentators at the time.
Not long after the 1990s equity-market merry-go-round came to a halt and 
the stock-market indices of the world started a downward spiralling plunge, BWT 
Group found itself yet again in the heat of media attention. However, this time the 
commentators cast clouds over the soundness of the financial health of the bank. 
Accordingly, the next year saw heavy write-offs in the Group accounts due to 
equity revaluations and a weakening of the group’s capital base. In particular, 
concerns were raised about Division X’s capital position. Only a capital injection 
from the Group saved the insurance company from the embarrassment of 
breaching regulatory capital ratio requirements.
The acquisition of Division X came to be viewed as a major and costly 
strategic mistake. Like many European insurance companies at the time, Division 
X was heavily exposed to the falling stock markets and instead of diversifying the 
business risk BWT Group carried, the acquisition resulted in the Group’s 
increased exposure to the equity markets. A second capital injection into Division 
X was announced a few days before the researcher’s first arrival in Zurich in 
October 2002. (The case study was prepared about the commercial banking arm
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of BWT Group - this (non-investment banking) part of the Group will henceforth 
be referred to as ‘BWT’.) The researcher entered the field with some awe due to 
the apparent economic difficulties of the bank.
“There is a busy square in the centre o f Zurich that knots several o f the 
city’s tram lines together. It also hosts two arresting office buildings, one o f them 
is a classical palazzo - the headquarters o f BWT Group. Installed in a cafe with a 
view on the floodlit building gleaming in the wet darkness o f  the October evening, 
on the eve o f my arrival I  prepare a brief summary o f the latest news surrounding 
BWT’s situation. The picture that emerges from the fragments offered by the 
financial press is gloomy. In fact it seems to be a passable illustration o f a risk 
manager’s nightmare: risks have been materialising in all risk categories. The 
bank has not only been suffering from market risk that hit hard its insurance 
business. Credit risk manifests itself in the bank’s granularity to a bankrupt 
[Swiss airline] and a prominent Swiss businessman’s troubled financial empire. 
As for operational risk, the Group faces problems such as the recent clashes with 
financial regulators in the US and Japan, the reported weakness o f internal 
controls, the uncertainties and grievances that followed two major 
reorganisations in the last Jive years and the frequent criticism o f the Group’s 
corporate governance model. Further, a perceived major shift in insurance risk 
has become a concern to all insurers, and the bank’s insurance business also 
faces the problem o f rising insurance claims. Finally, strategic risks are to be 
considered as critics draw question marks over the soundness o f the 
bancassurance strategy and the competitiveness o f BW T’s private banking 
business. Some even suggest that a weakening balance sheet made the Group a 
natural candidate fo r  take-over. These are indeed challenging times for the risk 
management function. ”69
3.3.2 . Th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  r is k  m a n a  g e m e n t
The risk management function at BWT was called Strategic Risk 
Management. The Chief Risk Officer explained the reason for the choice of the 
name of his function as follows:
‘O ne of the things w e  h a v e  b een  struggling with over the last co u p le  of 
years is how  best to integrate m eaningful high-level risk information into the
69 Summary based on research diary notes, 6 October 2002
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strategic planning process. ... The reason why the risk m a n a g e m e n t function is 
called  ‘S trateg ic’ is that the purpose should really b e  top-level c o v e r a g e .’ 70
These were troubled times for BWT and he saw his task in creating a risk 
management function that communicates risk information of strategic significance 
to the Board.
After the completion of a PhD on risk-based internal audit, he joined the 
investment banking arm of BWT Group where he rose through a series of 
derivative trading and treasury management jobs to become the right hand of the 
CEO of the investment bank. When the latter was appointed Group Chief Risk 
Officer, he became his deputy and was also asked to introduce and head a new 
risk management function within BWT, the clearing banking arm of the group. 
These two appointments followed the announcement of an embarrassingly large 
loss that BWT Group suffered during the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Despite 
the fact that it was not the only financial institution that gravely burnt itself at the 
time, the loss was internally viewed as a serious risk management failure, and led 
to a group-wide initiative of reviewing and amending existing risk management 
systems. Based on a blueprint developed by the investment bank, the two senior 
group-level risk officers briskly set out to introduce a new risk management 
function in BWT with a toolkit that was consistent across the Group.
Though BWT sees itself as an 'innovative, flexible ,7/ organization, there 
was hardly anybody who did not have an ironic comment on the frequent 
structural changes that have taken place since the merger that was the birth of 
BWT Group (e.g. ‘Don’t ask - we are in the middle o f an almost daily
77reorganization, he-he... ’ ). Strategic Risk Management was set up in late 2001. It 
was one of six departments in what was called the CFO (finance) Division of the 
bank. The Chief Risk Officer reported to the Chief Financial Officer of BWT as 
well as directly to the Group Chief Risk Officer. This, and the fact that he also 
had a group-level function (second-in-command to the Group CRO), gave him 
parity with the Chief Financial Officer of BWT, and with the heads of the banking 
and insurance business units.
70 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
71 Director, CFO Division, BWT
72 Head o f  Operational Risk Controlling, BWT
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Though structurally not directly linked to the BWT Executive Board, the risk 
function secured visibility and status in front of the board by calling to life and 
setting the agenda of a monthly Risk Management Committee. Strategic Risk 
Management was not on its own staging this board-level risk forum: it was in 
conjunction with the Credit Management function (which was also part of the 
CFO division). Not unusual for a large lending institution, Credit Management 
was far the largest department in the corporate centre pulling together lending 
information from an army of 1,430 staff located mostly in the branches. The risk 
function, with its 30 or so Zurich-based staff, secured a joint visibility with a 
long-existing and powerful function:
'We say w e  w ant to discuss em p lo y ee  benefit sch em es in Switzerland or w e  w ant 
to discuss issues of banking secrecy  or w hatever w e  think is of im portance to 
those guys.'73
The claim that the risk function orchestrated board-level risk discussions that 
were distinctly strategic in their nature, appeared to be in a sharp contrast to the 
risk people’s plight at Frasers who did not have such an opportunity.
Since its introduction in late 2001, the evolution of Strategic Risk 
Management at BWT has been following two recognisable streams. First, the 
assessment and control of risks is undertaken by three sub-departments (Market 
Risk Controlling, Credit Risk Controlling and Operational Risk Controlling). At 
the time of the first field trip (October 2002) all of them were engaged in the 
development of new risk measurement techniques -  these were meant to replace 
or complement the existing toolkit. Secondly, based on the risk measurements 
provided by the three risk management silos, the Economic Risk Capital sub­
department determines the amount of capital to be allocated to each risk category 
and the aggregate amount of Economic Risk Capital that BWT and each of its 
subsidiaries ought to hold. Strategic Risk Management has secured Board-level 
visibility to the results of both of these activities.
At first sight it appeared that the risk management function had the ears of 
the Board at BWT. Does this mean they had quickly risen to a strategic role? The 
next sections will show that ‘visibility’ means different things for the Chief Risk 
Officer, for the risk people responsible for the definition of economic capital and 
for those in control of the risk silos. Also, having gained Board-level visibility
73 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
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does not mean that risk management is coupled to organisational action, and 
BWT’s risk function has encountered various technical and organizational 
difficulties, which have stalled some of their initiatives.
3.3.3. E c o n o m i c  r i s k  c a p i t a l  a n d  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s
Apart from the monthly Committee, there was another forum where the 
Chief Risk Officer presented the Executive Board of BWT with formal risk 
reports: it was the final discussion and the sign-off meeting of the strategic 
business plan. As of 2002, the annual business plan explicitly specified the 
proposed capital allocations to each business unit and to the bank as a whole. 
Apart from being asked to sign off the business plan, the Board was also 
requested to formally accept the risk appetite of the bank. Risk appetite was 
expressed as the amount of aggregate ERC.
This development was a significant contrast to the case of Fraser Bank, 
where accounting representations absorbed risk information such as Economic 
Capital. The language of risk in the boardroom of Frasers was accounting (loan 
provisions). It appeared that at BWT the risk function had not only put risk on the 
agenda of the Board, but also introduced a new language for its discussion. In the 
new language of risk, Economic Risk Capital74 was the common denominator to 
describe the risk profile of the organization as a whole or a part of it. 
Theoretically, economic capital figures can be compared across the business units 
of a given bank and they indicate differences in risk-taking capacities. Economic 
capital figures can also be compared with planned profit estimates to indicate the 
amount of minimum profit the business units are required to earn in order to 
deliver economic value. BWT’s ERC was presented to Board members as ‘the 
constraint to strategy’ -  it was a measure which had the potential to generate and 
stir strategic discussions.
74 Fraser Bank’s Economic Capital and BWT’s Economic Risk Capital (ERC) denoted the very 
same risk management concept, which was described under the name o f  Economic Capital in 
Chapter 2. Although the techniques o f calculating Economic Capital at the banks were 
conceptually identical, there were grave differences in the assumptions they used. The 
heterogeneity o f  assumptions underlying economic capital calculations stems from the specific 
situation o f  the different banks, making it impossible to compare the results o f  these risk 
calculations across the industry. To emphasise the lack o f  direct comparability, the study 
retains the specific names o f  the economic capital tool as applied in the banks.
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The researcher requested four interviews at the Strategy and Controlling 
department in order to see what information they got from the risk people and to 
what extent they accepted that ERCs (should) form a constraint on strategies.
Strategy and Controlling was a neighbouring department to Strategic Risk 
Management only in its visual representation in the organisational chart (both 
were in the CFO (finance) division). In reality, they were located in different 
office buildings that were far apart enough to hinder informal communication 
between strategy and risk people. As for formal communications, there was little 
evidence for interaction between them.
The Strategy and Control department dealt with a dual task: firstly, there 
was a team of ‘thinkers’ who evaluated the qualitative aspects of plans and 
performed scenario analysis; secondly, there was a team of ‘controllers’ 
(management accountants) who evaluated the accounting aspects of plans and 
monitored their implementations.
The director heading the ‘thinkers’ team did not see much contribution 
from the risk people:
'The trouble ab ou t the interface b e tw een  risk an d  strategy is that at the  
very high level, there is a  very simple list of risks to look a t from a  strategy  
perspective. ... Then so m eb o d y  g o e s  there to d o  all th ese d eta iled  m odels, the 
ERC thing an d  all that, an d  you h a v e  to think w here you a d d  value. If it is the  
basis for cap ita l allocations, that’s fine but...in the end , generally speaking, risk at 
a  very high level is very simple a n d  straightforward. ’75
This comment reminds one of the planners’ attitude at Frasers -  they 
needed the risk function to perform only the economic capital calculations as an 
input to the planning process, but did not involve the risk people into the strategic 
analyses they undertook for top management.
However, at BWT the ERCs were not an embedded part of the planning 
process (while at Frasers they were). The management accountants, who 
orchestrated the quantitative planning process, expressed doubts whether capital 
charges mattered at all, especially in 2002-2003, when the bank faced financial 
troubles:
75 Director, Head o f Strategy and Projects, BWT
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‘The only th em e now  is to g e t  b a ck  to profitability. Ninety p ercen t of the  
focus is on P&L, net operating profit. ERC is ca lcu la ted , togeth er  with all the ratios, 
[...] but at the m om ent th ese  g e t  a  low w eight in decision  m aking.'76
Given the pressures on the bank to increase its profitability, strategy 
people doubted if managers’ attention should be focused on anything other than 
the conventional accounting profit. In other words, they felt that risk-retum 
considerations needed to be biased by concerns about returns. Viewed from the 
top of the organisation this left the issue of integrating strategic planning and 
capital management an unresolved, open issue. A director from the finance 
division voiced this as follows:
‘W hat w as highlighted this year [2002] is that the link b e tw e e n  risk 
m a n a g em en t an d  strategic business planning is not working: things like the  
constraints of growth, in the form of limited capital, are not in tegrated  in strategy. 
... The actu a l cap ita l constraints of going a h e a d  with a  particular business plan  
are ... not well u nderstood .’77
ERC was developed and promoted actively in the Group, and in particular, 
it was toured around among top management at a time when external stakeholders 
raised concerns about the bank’s capital adequacy. According to the director from 
the finance division, the risk function had been successful in heightening 
management awareness of capital management issues:
‘In the S ep tem b er divisional c o n feren ce  the buzz word w as “getting  
business planning a n d  capital processes working closely to g e th e r .’78 
However, at least two things prevented ERCs from reaching the level of 
integration with planning that they did at Frasers. Firstly, strategy people were not 
convinced ERCs added value to the planning process (the focus of which was 
return to profitability in a turnaround situation), and to discussions about the key 
strategic concerns of top management. From their point of view, risk management 
was not to be an ‘interactive control’ (Simons, 1991). Secondly, the methodology 
of ERC calculations had not fully taken root yet. At Frasers it took years of 
development and negotiation to settle on the technique (and on the results it 
calculated).
76 Director, Strategy and Control, BWT
77 Director, CFO Division, BWT
78 Director, CFO Division, BWT
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3.3.4 . M u l t i p l e  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  c a p i t a l  a d e q u a  c y  
The ERC method at BWT appeared in early 2002. Initially it did not cause 
much discussion and debate, which is not surprising given that (as opposed to 
Frasers’ practice) ERC was not meant to be part of performance measurement -  it 
just aspired to become an element of the planning process. However, towards the 
end of the year the Head of the ERC team proposed to make ERC a control tool to 
oversee the process of keeping the risk profile of Division X at bay -  the 
insurance unit’s excess risk taking had caused many of the Group’s troubles at 
that time. The ERC team had a strong argument: the historic ERC measures had 
picked up the worsening capital and risk trends at Division X well before any 
accounting representations did so. The Head of the ERC team had confidence in 
the technique he proposed. It was a ratio that related the theoretical risk profile 
measure, Economic Risk Capital, to the actual accounting capital. But he was not 
sure if it was to be accepted as a management control tool:
‘You ca n n o t b e a t all problems with only o n e  ratio, there are other KPIs 
[key perform ance indicators] that n e e d  to b e  app lied . But I think this is a  g o o d  
ratio in order to discuss the strategy of [Division X]. ... We e x p e c t  [Division X] to 
o p p o se  to th at.’79
And rightly so. A tentative suggestion at a top management meeting to 
elevate ERC to a controlling role by including it in profitability calculations took 
the risk people into the realm of politics immediately, as observed by a meeting 
participant afterwards:
‘We sat togeth er  at the CFO roundtable [where the CFOs of e a c h  division 
w ere present], an d  the Insurance [unit] particularly w as against using Return on  
Econom ic Risk C apital as a  m easurem ent, certainly as a  perform ance  
indicator.'80
A cross-functional panel was set up to investigate the issue (with 
representatives from Strategy and Controlling, the ERC team and Division X). 
Finally the Chief Risk Officer decided not to advance the proposal of the ERC 
team to the Board in 2002, neither has he done so since. When asked on this in 
late 2002 (and again throughout 2003), neither the Chief Risk Officer, nor the
79 Director, Head o f  Economic Risk Capital, BWT
80 Director, CFO (Finance) Division, BWT
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Director of Group Risk Reporting, nor the Group Chief Risk Officer saw ERC 
ripe enough for such a prominent role. They talked about ''the need to create buy- 
in from the business units ... and to resolve some difficult technical issues. 181
However, an alternative explanation emerged by taking a closer look at the 
micropolitics of capital allocation. As it happened, ERC did not live in 
unoccupied territory at BWT: it co-existed with an old capital measurement and 
allocation methodology. The capital figures produced by the old method were 
called ‘Respectability Capital.’ Its proponents were accounting people and it 
belonged to the realm of the Strategy and Controlling department where it was 
used as a denominator for Return on Equity calculations. In effect, with ERC the 
risk people invaded the territory of planners and accounting controllers.
As its name suggests, Respectability Capital aimed to express the amount 
of capital that the bank ought to hold in order to remain ‘respectable’ in the eyes 
of the regulators, credit rating agencies and investors. Respectability Capital was 
based on accounting calculations: in effect, it was a scaling up of regulatory 
capital. Arriving at Respectability Capital figures for the bank as a whole (and for 
its business units) required an appreciation of the institutional pressures weighing 
on the bank, as well as judgement, even intuition, all of which was condensed into 
a rule of thumb (scaling up accounting capital) that ensured the appearance of 
‘calculations’ taking place. Although ERC figures had been calculated for the 
business units and, to mark the end of the annual planning process, for the bank as 
a whole too, they had not yet gained predominance over the Respectability 
Capital figures. A simple rule of thumb determined the relationship between the 
two different measures of capital adequacy: whichever of the two turns out to be 
higher for a given subsidiary was taken as the ‘adequate’ figure.
ERC seemed to be technically better founded because of the more 
sophisticated statistics-based calculations that underlie it, yet Respectability 
Capital was expected to die hard. There appear to be several reasons, depending 
on which theoretical angle one considers it from. First, during the assessment of 
Respectability Capital explicit consideration is given to what might be regulatory 
and rating agency expectations of capital adequacy that the Group needs to live up 
to. Second, carrying the powerful image of ‘respectability’ in its name,
81 Director o f  Risk Reporting, BWT Group
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Respectability Capital provides a strong sense of capital adequacy, prudence and 
legitimacy through its allusion to institutional appropriateness (the institutionalist 
argument).
Secondly, the accounting people (in particular the management 
accountants in the strategy department) appeared to ‘prefer’ Respectability 
Capital and were not in favour of the possibility that ERC might become a basis 
for control and performance measurement, which would be the case if ERC took 
predominance. This can be interpreted as suggestive of occupational struggles 
between the Controlling (management accounting) function and the risk 
management group. In such struggles the language applied by different 
professional groups become significant and, possibly, serve as sources of power. 
As Dutton (1997) notes, ‘in an organizational context, intentional and 
unintentional usage o f language to frame an issue mobilizes different groups o f  
managers to invest in the issue. These framings, in turn, reflect different 
understandings o f an issue and result in different patterns o f attention 
allocation.'*2 The power of language is that it mobilizes action and it may 
influence who gets involved in an issue’s resolution. In this case risk people 
furthered the notion of Economic Capital, which (at a time of capital adequacy 
concerns) did not fail to draw attention from top management. However, the 
Controlling people were not consulted about the methodology, neither did they 
attend organisational forums where Economic Capital was presented. They 
furthered more traditional notions of capital adequacy, which were based on 
accounting numbers. Into the capital adequacy discussions they brought 
regulatory solvency ratios (in case of Division X), and Respectability Capital (for 
the banking units). Into performance and profitability discussions they brought 
accounting profit measures and return on equity calculations. They too were able 
to get the ears of top management. It appeared as if the two groups were 
competing on the definition of an abstraction (capital adequacy) that would allow 
the generation of practical techniques (for capital adequacy determination and 
control). This accords with Abbott (1988)’s vision of interprofessional 
competition, the stake of which is control of (abstract) knowledge and its 
application. Top management’s application of the ‘higher o f  principle for the
82 Dutton (1997), p.90.
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selection between the competing measures of capital adequacy can be viewed as a 
compromise signalling top management’s reluctance to favour or ignore either 
perspective.
Thirdly, these were troubled times for BWT, the company had continued 
to disappoint investors for a second consecutive year. In 2002 financial analysts 
drew question marks over the financial health of the whole Group. Subsequently 
BWT lost its target AA credit rating. Top management felt the heat of external 
attention as the national banking regulators started to ask for more detailed 
information about the internal management of the bank in the course of the 
quarterly meetings they hold with BWT. As it happened, the ERC method 
indicated a smaller capital need for most business units than what was suggested 
by the old prudent approach. Given the heat of attention paid to the capital 
adequacy of the bank, it would have been very difficult to switch from 
Respectability Capital to a smaller ERC. The rule of taking the higher of the two 
appeared to be a conservative approach that satisfied external regulators (the 
functionalist / contingency view).
Fourthly, ERC was not based purely on computations either. Its 
operational risk capital element was rather judgemental - according to one 
account it was a matter of intuition ( ''best guess ’ ). It is difficult to conduct a 
technical debate between two judgmental (or inspirational) techniques and even 
more difficult to reject one of them in favour of the other (the bounded rationality 
argument).
Despite the fact that ERC had not crowded out the old approach to capital 
adequacy, it had not suffered a defeat. A group-level risk director explained that 
the two capital measures were best to be viewed as complementary:
‘This ‘higher o f’ c o n c e p t  says, well, w e  h ave d o n e  the b est w e  cou ld  with 
our ERC m odel, but there are facts in life that w e  c a n ’t cap tu re. There is a  
respectability cap ita l you n e e d  in order to k eep  your business partners, in private 
banking it is higher than ERC, so that’s w hat w e  a llo ca te . While in [the investm ent 
banking arm of the group] you h a v e  h uge fights..., it w as well received  here [in 
BWT].'84
83 Head o f  Operational Risk Controlling, BWT
84 Director o f Risk Reporting, BWT Group
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Having talked to a director from the finance division, the impression was 
that in BWT ERC has gained a reputation of serving as a ‘plausibility check’ -  
perhaps it even rationalised the Respectability Capital allocations.
This alone may have ensured that ERC was there to stay. Avoiding a battle 
for exclusivity against the notion of Respectability Capital, risk people continued 
promoting ERC as a plausibility check while raising capital awareness in the 
organisation. But this alone would not make ERC an embedded part of the 
planning and control process:
‘ERC is a  plausibility ch eck , if you will. The risk m a n a g em en t function is 
responsible for doing that plausibility ch eck , b u t ... those numbers are not used in 
day-to -d ay  m a n a g em en t. When w e  start bringing it out as a  m a n a g em en t tool, 
as a  p erform ance m easure, there are problem s a n d  issues.'85
Strategy people remained unconvinced that ERC was a credible 
computational tool for capital allocations. Another reading of this is that they may 
have considered the ERC team to encroach on their territory of competence and 
influence. Capital adequacy and performance concerns, voiced by both internal 
and external actors (e.g. regulators and analysts) gave the opportunity to risk 
people to offer new abstractions in these areas. They had to compete with the 
Controlling function for the ears of top management. This intraorganisational 
power struggle was played out in the form of an inteprofessional competition 
(Abbott, 1988). At stakes were the questions of who had control over capital 
management and performance measurement, when and how. Abbott (1988) 
emphasises that it is such jurisdictional disputes that determine the history of the 
professions. It appears that ‘jurisdictional disputes’ can arise even in the micro­
context of a single organization, frustrating (or not as the case may be) a 
functional group’s ambitions to achieve strategic significance. Although at BWT 
risk people had achieved a certain amount of influence in (re)defining the notion 
of capital adequacy, they had not managed to redefine planning and performance 
measurement.
85 Director, CFO (finance) division, BWT
86 ‘Since jurisdiction is the defining relation in professional life, the sequences that I generalize 
are sequences o f  jurisdictional control, describing who had control o f what, when and how. 
Professions develop when jurisdictions become vacant, which may happen because an earlier 
tenant has left them altogether or lost its firm grip on them.’ (Abbott, 1988: 3)
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3 .3 .5 . M a n a  g i n g  t h e  r i s k  s il o s
As for the assessment, monitoring and controlling of the different risk 
types, BWT’s four risk management teams (Market Risk Controlling, Credit Risk 
Controlling, operational Risk Controlling and the Economic Risk Capital team) 
were jointly responsible for producing a monthly risk report that was presented to 
the Executive Board (Risk Management Committee).
The monthly executive risk report was a thick document. Its production 
took a long time and it tended to be a month out-of-date by the time it hit the 
Board agenda. Its content followed a blueprint from the investment banking arm 
of the Group. The report was very data-intensive and it forced the risk people to 
reach out to other departments for data and analysis. Having been a small 
department, they saw their reporting role in the selection, ordering and summary 
of risk information that was collected and analysed elsewhere in the organisation 
where there were more data processing capacities. Subsequently, the ERC team 
added the calculations of Economic Risk Capital to each risk category. Finally, a 
one-page executive summary was added with the ‘key highlights'.
Inside the report there were dozens of charts graphically representing risk 
exposure lists, trends as well as risk limit breaches from all over the bank (no 
subsidiaries or functions are exempt from data provision), arranged neatly under 
the headings of market risk, credit risk and operational risk.
Most risk people seriously doubted whether all this information got read. 
As one of them put it, ‘ We would like it i f  the receivers o f our analysis came back 
to us with questions. But they don 7. ’ Having asked executives from the strategy 
department and the CFO (finance) division, it became apparent that the problem 
was that the key strategic risk concerns of top management were not quantifiable, 
hence the sceptical answer: 'You would not think that the central risk function
o o
should have a big impact on strategy'.
Thus it appeared that the production of risk reports served to satisfy a 
regulatory expectation (the need to produce board-level risk information), 
however, risk reporting was decoupled from actual use. Board discussions 
deviated from the content of the risk report towards more ‘strategic’ issues. 
Strategic discussions were at this time outside the formal reporting coverage of
87 Team member, Market Risk Controlling, BWT
88 Director, CFO (finance) Division, BWT
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risk people and those issues got very little (if any) representation in the monthly 
risk report. Having recognised this, the CRO’s aspiration for the future was to 
solve the problem of providing ‘meaningful high-level risk information’ to the 
Board. Chapter 5 and 6 will further elaborate on the extent to which he managed 
to do so, and on the ensuing implications for the strategic significance of the risk 
function.
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3.4. D isc u s sio n
This section summarises the contrasts and similarities between the risk 
functions and their location, visibility, influence and relations with strategy people 
that were found in the case studies. The analysis is an initial snapshot that was 
taken based on information collected in 2002 and early 2003. The results that are 
discussed here remained valid until the end of the data collection period. Some 
aspects will be further elaborated on in chapters to follow, in order to add a 
longitudinal aspect to the study.
Structurally, risk management was a staff function in both banks. At 
Frasers the new Risk Director was a member of the executive board, while at 
BWT the Chief Risk Officer orchestrated regular risk meetings with top 
management. This allowed them to participate in top management discussions of 
non-technical nature. In this way, the heads of risk management departments 
(henceforth called ‘senior risk officers') may (or may not) have an informal 
influence on key strategic issues.
The formal influence of risk management manifested itself in two ways. 
First, there were risk specialists who deal with the measurement, reporting and 
diagnostic control of the typical risk silos (market, credit, operational). These 
people will be referred to as ‘risk silo specialists' in order to emphasise that their 
function is primarily technical. Secondly, there is a separate team in each bank 
that dealt with the definition of ‘economic’ capital with the purpose to incorporate 
these into strategic planning as capital constraints. They also had ambitions of 
extending this role to performance measurement and control. While at Frasers 
Economic Capital allocations were already part of an iterative planning process 
and bonuses were attached to ‘economic profit’, at BWT both of these remained 
next year’s challenge. This third group of risk managers will be called ‘risk 
capital specialists.'
Both risk silo specialists and risk capital specialists produced input to 
Board reports. Risk silo specialists put together regular risk reports about the risk 
silos. Risk capital specialists produced and (at Frasers only) guided the 
calculations of capital charges for the business planning process. These economic 
capital charges may get explicit visibility in the top management-level discussion
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of strategic plans (as in the case of BWT, at a time of heightened internal and 
external concerns for capital adequacy) or may get absorbed by more 
conventional accounting representations of risk (as in the case of Frasers).
The relationship between the risk people and the strategic planners (who 
use accounting language) sheds further light on the issue whether the strategic and 
control potential of risk management was to be fully realised. Structurally, risk 
and strategy were in different divisions with two different reporting lines and 
directors at Frasers, while in the same division at BWT. Despite this, the 
integration between the two functions was more advanced at Frasers and only 
developing at BWT. From a personnel point of view at Frasers both the risk and 
the strategy departments were in the same building on adjacent floors that enabled 
informal communications, and there was a strategy manager appointed to 
formally liaise between the two functions. At BWT the two functions were so 
distant from one another that location prevented informal communications and 
there was nobody with a formal coordination role.
However, the key to the integration between the risk and the strategy 
functions lay in the relationship between the risk management and planning 
processes. At Frasers top management and the planning people applied value- 
based management and other accounting concepts for internal planning, control 
and performance -  planners needed risk capital specialists to provide capital 
charges to different strategic alternatives. At BWT the focus of strategy and 
management control was on the profit aspect of performance and capital charges 
were not considered relevant for orchestrating a turnaround situation, even though 
capital awareness had increased due to financial hardship.
The relationship between risk management and discretionary decision 
making was obstructed on both sides by the fact that strategy people considered 
key strategic uncertainties to lie outside the realm of risk people and did not 
involve them in the analysis of key strategic alternatives (e.g. acquisition 
decisions). Note that at both banks the senior risk officers were seeking ways to 
expand their currently informal influence on such decisions. In case of BWT there 
was emerging evidence that senior risk officers, having acquired agenda-setting 
power, were able to exercise informal influence on some key strategic decisions. 
(Chapter 5 and 6 will expand on this.)
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It seemed that both risk people and strategic planners intended to shape 
the language and content of board-level discussions of strategic uncertainties as 
they provided input to the strategic plans and the presentation of these to top 
management. However, there was an uneasy symbiosis between the two 
functions. The following table describes the different visibility and influence that 
risk people have gained in the two banks.
Frasers BW T
Context Group-wide efficiency review, 
Refocusing on economic profit
Economic hardship, capital adequacy 
concerns, focus on net profit
Language of Board-level discussions 
of strategic uncertainties
Accounting, ‘strategy’ Accounting, ‘strategy’, 
specialist risk talk (ERC)
Risk management and planning Integrated Not integrated
Risk management and performance 
measurement
Integrated Not integrated
The results suggest that gaining visibility and infiltrating the language of 
board-level discussions with specialist risk-talk are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for risk management to effectively influence strategic planning and 
control. At a time of economic hardship and worries about capital adequacy risk 
management can be called upon for explanations and reassurance, but not 
necessarily for solutions. Risk management was found influential when it was 
actively called upon by strategic planners who integrated economic capital with a 
modem, value-accounting based approach to planning and performance 
measurement. However, this influence may well be invisible to the Board if their 
attention is guided by more powerful strategy people (planners) and more 
conventional accounting representations of both the bottom line and the risk 
implications of strategic alternatives.
These findings help us to assess to what extent the observed risk 
management functions have succeeded in achieving a strategic role in terms of the 
five tests proposed in the first section of the chapter. It can be shown that despite 
similarities in the risk reporting and management techniques used, the two risk 
functions have conquered different heights of organizational significance. The 
following table illustrates this point.
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The risk function a t... Frasers BW T
Formal status Evidenced Evidenced
Language creation Evidenced Evidenced
Redefinition o f  strategic planning Evidenced No evidence
Redefinition o f  performance 
measurement
Evidenced No evidence
Influence on key strategic decisions No evidence Evidenced
Interactive vs. diagnostic control 
system
Diagnostic In som e aspects Interactive 
(e.g. ERC/Respectability Capital 
interactively used during 
capital adequacy crisis), otherwise 
Diagnostic (risk silo management)
Risk reporting was introduced in the wake of a crisis in both banks. The 
appointment of senior risk officers and the establishment of reporting channels to 
the Board gave formal status and visibility to their reports. Both risk functions 
were successful in introducing a new language o f  risk (e.g. value-at-risk, 
economic risk capital), and they regularly produce specialist risk information for 
top management as well as the Board.
At Frasers the notion of economic capital fills in a gap in value-based 
management: it offers a risk-based measure of capital charges. Here risk 
management effectively redefined the planning process and subsequently, 
performance measurement. However, the influence of the risk function stops short 
of key strategic decisions that are in the realm of the more powerful planning 
function. Risk management is not seen by top management as addressing their 
key strategic concerns -  it is used as a diagnostic (monitor and alarm) control 
system, rather than an interactive one.
The language of economic risk at BWT has so far failed to redefine the 
planning and performance measurement processes -  the notion of value-based 
management is not pronounced here as yet. Contrasting to what was found at 
Frasers, the influence of senior risk people on certain major strategic decisions is 
possible, but has been limited to the informal role that the heads of the risk 
function play at top management discussions (where they set the agenda). 
However, the senior risk officers’ aspiration to incorporate ‘meaningful high-level
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risk information’ in formal risk reporting remains a challenge. Nevertheless, due 
to the capital adequacy concerns that for some time overhung BWT’s strategic 
choices, the risk function has recently been frequently called upon to provide 
information about developments in the risk and capital profile of the business 
units. It is fair to say that evidence was found for the interactive use of risk reports 
provided by ‘risk capital specialists’. Such an interactive use of the risk 
management system has indeed increased risk and capital awareness throughout 
die organization. However, Chapter 4 will show that top management’s personal 
attention to this particular aspect of risk management (economic risk capital 
trends) was not sustained. Chapter 6 will further argue that the interactive use of 
risk management subsequently occurred as a result of senior risk officers 
exercising their agenda setting power and influence at board-level meetings that 
they themselves called into life. In the meantime, the reports of risk silo 
specialists have been used diagnostically.
The findings pronounce the functional differentiation that risk 
management has been undergoing at the two banks. It is likely that the emergence 
of three distinctive groups of risk managers (risk silo specialists, risk capital 
specialists and senior risk officers) is a more general phenomenon and that the 
three groups display different strategic and control potential. This raises an 
important implication for those who regulate risk management in the banking 
sector -  the expectations made on the risk management function should consider 
the different capabilities and weaknesses that risk silo specialists, risk capital 
specialists and senior risk officers possess.
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3.5. C o n c l u sio n
It appears that risk management’s road to organizational significance 
took different directions in the two banks. However, three types of risk managers 
have emerged at both organizations. The following table describes their 
characteristic traits that transpire from the case studies. It shows that the 
differentiation of the risk function mirrors the varying aspirations of risk officers 
-  the three emerging groups of risk managers seek to conquer different heights of 
organizational significance. Further, the functional differentiation of risk people is 
indicated by the different technologies (languages) and decision making methods 
(Burchell et al., 1980) they apply.
Risk silo specialists Risk capital specialists Senior risk officers
Focus on Risk types Business units Both
Language used Statistics-based risk 
assessments 
(e.g. value-at-risk)





Not involved Direct involvement in 
economic capital allocations 
Constraining strategic plans
Informally involved
Control aspiration Monitor and alarm control 
over the risk silos
Control of business units via 
performance measurement
Heading these initiatives
Strategic aspiration Diagnostic role: Diagnostic role: Interactive role
Directing attention to Directing attention to (Playing the devil’s
problem areas problem areas advocate at the Board)
Decision making method Computation, judgement Computation, judgement, Computation, judgement,
used intuition, lobbying intuition, lobbying
Political sensitivity 
of their assessments / 
decisions
Low High Depending on whether 
dealing with risk 
analysis or economic 
capital allocations 
(Low or high)
Political support needed CRO CRO, Planners
from Planners Board
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The first group (‘risk silo specialists*) consists of those who are 
engaged in measuring and assessing different risk types. However, their reports 
on adherence to risk limits often fail to grab the attention of top management, 
even where they get a direct access to the Executive Board. This is because the 
risks that concern the Board tend to be of a more elusive, strategic or regulatory 
nature, and hence, for the time being stay outside the reach of risk silo specialists.
However, the production of the quantitative risk estimates is not 
redundant. Another group of risk managers {'risk capital specialists ’), concerned 
with the calculation of economic (risk) capital, find it a necessary input. The 
process of arriving at capital allocations incorporates much judgement, intuition 
and organisational politics. Indeed, an increased political sensitivity to the 
consequences of their decisions (e.g. capital allocation changes) distinguishes risk 
capital specialists from their risk silo peers. In their efforts to align internal 
definitions of capital with external expectations, while steering among the 
profit/capital interests of different business units carefully, risk capital specialists 
may gain support from the planning people who seek to draw the attention of 
business units to currently popular economic (‘value added’) profit 
considerations. The provision of economic capital charges may become an 
integral part of the strategic planning process where the influence of risk people 
would manifest itself through their ability to constrain different strategic 
alternatives. Once economic capital charges become an integral part of the 
planning process, risk capital specialists appear to be just a step away from a 
strategic control role: an influence on planning may lead on to an influence on 
performance measurement, assuming that value-added profits are made a basis for 
accountability. This requires the alignment of planning and control principles 
between top management, strategy and risk people. However, risk capital 
specialists are in a politically very sensitive area. They can easily upset the power 
balance in a group of companies. They also have to be prepared to live in an 
uneasy symbiosis with the strategy people who can support them in their efforts to 
redefine definitions of capital allocations but on the other hand can deny them 
top-level visibility.
This leaves senior risk officers with a dilemma. It is generally believed 
that risk management needs to solve some difficult technical problems related to 
the controlling of risk silos and the calculation of economic capital. However,
99
investing resources in more technical developments would only facilitate the 
production of more and more ‘elegant models’, but would not bring risk people 
necessarily closer to be involved in key strategic decision making. Securing 
access to and visibility by the Board has enabled senior risk officers to exercise 
informal influence on some strategic concerns. However, their influence on major 
strategic decisions has been limited. Their favoured role is that of the devil’s 
advocate (challenging and questioning existing beliefs in order to prepare the 
organization to fend off possible adversities). Chapters 5 and 6 will revisit and 
evaluate senior risk officers’ ambition to solve the problem of incorporating 
‘meaningful high-level risk information’ into formal risk reporting.
So far it appears that whether risk people can conquer the heights of 
strategic significance they aspire for hinges upon a number of challenges specific 
to each group. Risk silo specialists need to make risk limits a timely rather than a 
delayed control tool, reported in a sufficiently concise manner, in order to grab 
top management’s attention and to fulfil a strong diagnostic control role. Risk 
capital specialists need to align external capital expectations with the internal 
profit/capital interests of the bank in order to exercise influence on planning and 
maintain a diagnostic control role over the performance of business units. Senior 
risk officers aspiring for an interactive control role over key strategic uncertainties 
need to forge a stronger relationship with the strategy people (planners and the 
members of the executive board) whom they have to convince that the risk 
management function can contribute to the analysis of risks that resist statistical 
representation. It is unclear whether the task of reporting on key strategic 
uncertainties (that are not necessarily quantifiable) would land with risk silo 
specialists or risk capital specialists - it may even lead to the emergence of yet 
another team with hybrid skills operating on the borderline between the risk and 
the strategy & planning functions. Chapter 6 will elaborate on the role of senior 
risk officers in the discussion of non-quantifiable risks, and on how they mobilise 
information for this purpose.
A parallel can be drawn between the strategic aspirations (and related 
frustrations) of senior risk officers and the ambitions and frustrations of UK 
management accountants created by the rise of Strategic Management Accounting
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(SMA).89 SMA advocates Bromwich and Bhimani (1994) urge that ‘accountants 
should cooperate with others who ‘own ’ other information relevant to strategy. ’ 
However, they note that ‘ other managers may not wish to share this information 
and may doubt whether conventional management accounting approaches can 
portray it correctly.’90 They cite empirical evidence suggestive of the ‘great 
efforts’ needed by all within organizations in order to achieve the requisite 
cooperation between accountants and managers.
To conclude, this chapter has pointed at two diverging patterns of 
organizational significance on the part of the risk management functions 
observed. In one case (demonstrated by Frasers) risk management becomes 
integral to the formal planning and performance measurement process, while 
remains neutral in the discussions of key strategic decisions that emerge outside 
the planning cycle. In the second case (demonstrated by BWT), risk management 
is incidental as far as the formal planning and control cycle is concerned, 
however, senior risk officers may still acquire agenda-setting power to influence 
the discussion of key strategic uncertainties and participate in top management- 
level decision making.
Given that the emergence of the three types of risk officers occurred in 
both cases, the role of individual risk officer groups in the different patterns of 
organizational significance needs to be explicated in chapters to follow. The 
analysis of the strategic significance of ERM will be continued in Chapter 5 by 
investigating the role of risk officers in the control of conflicting risk and return 
objectives. Finally, Chapter 6 will assert that the two patterns that this chapter 
tentatively picked up signify the existence of alternative patterns in the use of 
ERM practices. This will be explained with risk officers responding to different 
corporate governance pressures and different calculative cultures. But beforehand, 
adding an organizational-symbolic dimension (Dutton, 1997) to the study, the 
next chapter will consider some of the external influences that shape the dynamics
89 Strategic Management Accounting is the label given to a specific vision o f  the development 
o f  management accounting. It was particularly popular in the 90s at the time o f  (mainly US but 
also UK) concerns with the relevance o f  accounting in business organizations in the face o f  
fierce economic competition from Japanese companies. SMA advocates believe that one o f  the 
key challenges o f  management accountants is to provide ‘relevant accounting information 
configured in a way in which it can be used for strategy [formulation and decision making].’ 
(Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994:149)
90 Bromwich and Bhimani (1994), p. 148.
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of top management’s use of risk controls. We do this by focusing on the 
micropolitics of divisional control in one of the banks where risk and accounting 
controls interacted with one another.
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C h a p t e r  4
R i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  a s  a  p o l it ic a l  a n d  in s t it u t io n a l
PHENOMENON -  THE CASE OF DIVISIONAL CONTROL IN
B W T
‘Leadership has a harder job  to do than just  
ch oose  sides. It must bring sides together.’
Jesse Jackson
Enterprise risk management has not arrived in unoccupied territories at 
most large financial institutions. Given that the traditional business of banking is 
risk taking, it can be assumed that ERM systems seek to complement or replace 
previously existing formal and informal control mechanisms. Indeed, at Fraser 
Bank the risk management function appears to have complemented the formal 
planning and performance measurement system by resolving capital allocations 
and feeding capital charges into the planning and control process. At BWT, 
however, risk management failed to get integrated with the formal planning and 
control cycle.
The previous chapter suggested that the micropolitics of risk management 
(at least in part) explains this difference. The allocation of risk capital is an 
evidently political process, which was orchestrated by Frasers’ risk capital 
specialists (eventually, after a disastrous initial attempt) with tact and skill. 
However, BWT’s risk capital specialists encountered opposition from the Strategy 
and Controlling department who were the guardians of the planning process, 
operated accounting controls, and emphasised a rival concept (and tool) for the 
determination of capital adequacy. Despite the fact that senior risk officers 
enjoyed similar formal status and parity with senior planning and control staff at 
both banks, at Frasers they were able to build alliances with the planners, at BWT 
they were not.
This chapter takes a closer look at the relationship between accounting and 
risk controls within BWT. It argues that what appears to be a distribution of 
power and influence between two functional groups is subject to a dynamic 
process, ‘the rise and fall of control systems’ within an organization. Further, it
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will be argued that the rivalry (or alliances) between functional groups (risk 
management and accounting) may well be shaped by external factors. That is, the 
apparent organizational significance of risk management and accounting within 
an organization may vary over time according to changing influences from the 
institutional environment.
As it happened, the field research at BWT coincided with a period of 
financial crisis and recovery during which environmental hostility mounted and 
ebbed, institutional pressures became pronounced and fell away. In particular, 
these forces were observed to shape the control of BWT’s troubled business unit, 
Division X. By explicating the role of risk management and accounting controls 
in divisional control over the troubled insurance unit, the chapter finds that risk 
controls rose in prominence during the crisis and fell out of management favour 
subsequently, while accounting controls from headquarters took dominance over 
the business unit. Applying Simons’ (1990, 1991) distinction of interactive vs. 
diagnostic use of control systems, the chapter shows risk management functioning 
in both capacities. The observed patterns of risk management use correspond not 
only to particular organisational characteristics (as Simons postulated), but also to 
institutional pressures. Accordingly, the symbolic and legitimising aspects of 
interactive control use are emphasised. In particular, it will be argued that 
interactive controls send signals not only to members inside the organisation, but 
also carry meanings for influential stakeholders and onlookers outside the 
organisation too. This result adds a longitudinal as well as an organizational- 
symbolic dimension to our understanding of the organizational significance of a 
control function, and in particular, to Simons’ (1990) theory of top management’s 
use of control systems.
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4.1. D iv is io n a l  c o n t r o l  as a  m u l t ip l e  c o n t r o l  p a c k a g e
The chapter traces the workings of a multiple control system that has been 
employed by BWT over the last five years. The focus is on the divisional control 
over a particular business unit, Division X, which was exercised by a package of 
four control systems, two at headquarters’ level, two in the division itself. While 
BWT is a Zurich-based financial services group with global presence, the division 
itself is also a large financial institution: one of Europe’s leading insurance 
companies.
Just before the researcher’s involvement with the company an unexpected 
dramatic shift took place in the insurance unit’s environment and the 
organization’s control practices over this business unit broke down. Having 
caused a serious blow to the financial health of the entire group, the survival of 
the business unit came under threat. Change and adaptation were required from 
both the division and the parent organization. Divisional control came to the 
foreground of top management’s attention and went through a number of changes 
due to the changing relationships between the control systems that contributed to 
it.
Before specifying the divisional control package, a brief note on divisional 
control is warranted. Following Ezzamel and Hart (1987), divisional control is 
taken here not only to include the means by which central management monitors 
and evaluates the performance of company divisions, but it is also viewed as a 
subset of a broader organisational control system. Hence divisional control 
incorporates not only financial controls but other formal (and informal) controls 
as well. In the present case the rise of firm-wide risk management within the 
group added another formal control system to an initially predominantly 
accounting-based divisional control practice. Informal relations came into play 
prominently during the period of crisis and became gradually less frequent in the 
recovery period.
In order to specify the control system package, the study applies Anthony 
(1965)’s distinction between control process and control systems. The control 
process exercised by the control system package consists of the headquarters’ 
activities concerning controlling and governing the division. Control systems are
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defined here as the information sources / functional areas that the control 
activities were mainly based on. Four control systems were found instrumental in 
divisional control: 1. accounting control at headquarters, 2. risk management 
control at headquarters, 3. accounting control in the division, 4. risk management 
control in the division.
The case is based on fifty-four in-depth interviews at BWT and 
Division X conducted over the course of a period of two and a half years. Senior 
finance, lending, strategy, controlling (management accounting) and risk staff, as 
well as two persons from the Group Executive Board were interviewed (up to 
three times) in the study. Within the boundaries of confidentiality, they provided 
historical and other documentary evidence (annual reports, presentations, internal 
reports) as well. Considering the coincidence of the research horizon with one of 
the deepest crises BWT has undergone, access was provided with an unexpected 
openness and generosity.
The following three sections are devoted to the description of the main 
contextual events and the politics of divisional control. The events, that have 
taken place since the acquisition of Division X, fall roughly into three subsequent 
stages: 1. pre-crisis, 2. crisis and 3. recovery. These stages served as a back-drop 
to the observed divisional control practices, but did not fully explain those. Later 
on, a separate analysis of the complementary and substitution effects that were set 
in motion in the multiple control system will be furthered for the explanation of 
the observed control practices.
106
4.2. A c t iv a t in g  a  m u l t ip l e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m
To recoup, BWT Group was a major player in the global financial services 
industry. A vision of global expansion underpinned a growth strategy that resulted 
in the group acquiring a 150-year old insurance company (Division X), which was 
itself an international business with a presence in 16 countries. The acquisition of 
Division X aimed at reducing overall business risk through diversifying into the 
insurance business that was new to the bank. At the same time the move promised 
to realise the potential of integrating banking and insurance services - the concept 
of ‘bancassurance’ was a popular strategic idea that the financial services sector 
had been experimenting with since the 1990s. 91 Structurally, BWT Group was 
managed as a group of two main organizations, the first being the investment 
bank, the second being a combination of the insurance company and a traditional 
universal bank with private, retail and corporate banking services. The study is 
about this latter organization -  BWT. In the management structure Division X 
was a business unit of BWT, and both of them were managed independently from 
the investment banking arm of the Group.
The events that took place since the acquisition of Division X fall roughly 
into three subsequent stages: 1. pre-crisis (1997-2001), 2. crisis (2001-2003) and 
3. recovery (2003-2004).
4.2 .1 . P r e - c r i s i s  (1 9 9 6 -20 0 1 )
The acquisition took commentators by surprise. Nevertheless, an 
optimistic market sentiment about BWT Group’s future had helped the company
91 ‘Bancassurance’ means the integration o f  banking and insurance services at the operations 
level. In an article printed on 15 November 2002 the Financial Times reviewed the 
developments in European banks’ bancassurance strategies: ‘In the 1990s, banks such as 
Lloyds TSB in the UK ( . . . )  bought life assurance companies to help drive revenue growth by 
selling pension products to existing customers. However, plummeting stock markets over the 
past 12 months have forced many banks in the UK and Switzerland to inject capital into their 
life assurance arms. This is to maintain solvency levels required by regulators as well as 
support new business.’ ( ‘Bancassurance: Underselling their best assets’, by Jane Croft, 
Financial Times, 15 November 2002)
92The Economist appeared to be surprised in a 1997 article titled ’[BWT] gets the merger bug’ 
and asked ‘If you only need a glass o f  milk, why buy the cow ?’ The merger was seen as a 
possible forerunner to a new wave o f  acquisitions in the European financial services sector. 
Another 1997 commentary in The Economist pondered the question: ‘A big Swiss bank plans 
to buy a top insurer. Does the future o f banking belong to the financial conglomerate?’
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to quadruple its market capitalisation following the acquisition of Division X, 
over a mere four-year period.
These first three years of realising the ‘bancassurance strategy' were also 
referred to in the annual reports as a 'merger process ’ between the Bank and the 
insurance company. However, integration between the two companies (and the 
other four business units) remained low. Interviewed by a bankers’ magazine 
towards the end of this period, the Group CFO voiced a commitment to a 
decentralised group structure: 'We believe in our structure and the autonomy 
which it grants to the business units. ’
A separate legal entity, based in a town other than the Swiss financial 
centre - BWT Group’s headquarters are in Zurich -, Division X had its separate 
governing offices. In one of their main buildings (Division X had two 
headquarters at the time, one for the life business, the other for non-life business) 
visitors were welcomed by a tall marble panel rooted in front of the entrance 
which proudly featured Division X’s logo and read 'welcome to the global 
headquarters o f [Division X ’s company name]. ’ Even during the next period of 
crisis, when visiting the building, the researcher found nothing in the reception 
area that would have given away the fact that the insurance company was a 
subsidiary of another financial institution. Copies of Division X’s annual reports 
and newsletters were displayed, but there was nothing of BWT Group.
Cultural artefacts aside, some organisational theorists argue that the level 
of divisional integration can also be inferred from the quality of collaboration 
existing amongst the organisational units required to achieve unity of effort 
(Lorsch and Allen, 1973). The bancassurance strategy required such unity of 
effort, but by the time this research project started, it was internally regarded as a 
failure.
'You ca n n o t sell car insurance as part of banking a d v ice . It just d o e sn ’t 
work,'93 BWT’s director of the management accounting function (controlling) 
asserted. He saw the reason for integration problems in three factors. First, there 
was a significant difference in compensation schemes at the operational staff 
level. Second, there was the human resources problem of employing people who 
are capable of selling insurance as well as ‘300 products on the banking side. ’
93 Director, Head o f Controlling, BWT
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Finally, the difference in cultures seemed a very prominent issue: he talked of 
‘tough, aggressive, hard-selling' insurance sales people and ‘back-office type 
insurance bureaucrats ' vs. bankers who play a more ‘advisory role
Several other people commented on the existence of 'two cultures' -  
described further by a director from BWT’s CFO division as follows:
‘C om ing from banking, [Division X] is a  little bit n ega tive , a  little bit slow  
m oving, not as responsive, w hereas the banking side is m ore proactive and  
responsive.’94
There were anecdotes too, one of them told by the strategy director as 
follows:
‘Their [Division X’s] culture is very different d u e  to the different background  
of the p e o p le . For exam p le  their share of a c a d e m ic s  is m uch lower than ours. 
They are less a c a d e m ic , more dow n to earth. Insurance is a  sales thing and  
banking is an advisory thing. Bankers are here to m a n a g e  a  relationship, it is a  
long term thing. I w ent on Friday to a  m eeting of [the CEO] with the insurance 
team . He rece iv ed  a  list of questions an d  com m en ts from them . They w ere like 
‘our w ay  is that w e  h a v e  simple rules, b e  honest, b e  in the office  before 8 
o ’clock ...' -  n ob od y  here talks ab ou t w hen you h a v e  to b e  at the o ffice .'95
On the insurance side people also perceived a cultural gap that manifested 
itself in the difference of the two business models:
'A banker lends m oney a n d  h op es he g e ts  it back. An insurer takes on m on ey  
and  h o p es h e  will never h ave to p ay  it b a c k .’96
This caused a perception within the Division that 
'there are not m any guys there [in BWT] w ho understand our business.’97 
Thus it is concluded here that differentiation, rather than integration 
characterised the structure of the ‘bancassurance’ group. Throughout these years 
Division X delivered strong performance. This gave an assurance to BWT that 
Division X was on the right track. Although the business environment was 
perceived as ‘volatile and challenging'92,, it did not appear hostile. A confidence 
about Division X’s outlook was often expressed; for example the 1998 annual 
report commented optimistically that ‘[Division X] finished the business year on a
94 Director, CFO (Finance) Division, BWT
95 Director, Head o f  Strategy, BWT
96 Head o f Strategy, Division X
97 Head o f  Investment / Risk Management, Division X
98 Annual Report, Division X, 1998
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high note. ’ Further, the environment was favourable, with investors keeping BWT 
Group in high regard, resulting in the company’s spectacular three-year stock 
market performance in which it quadrupled its market valuation.
4.2.2 . C r is is  (2 0 0 1 -20 0 3 )
World stock markets peaked in March 2000. As the 1990s equity-market 
merry-go-round came to a halt, and stock-market indices world-wide started their 
downward spiralling plunge. BWT Group found itself yet again in the heat of 
media attention. However, this time the commentators cast clouds over the 
soundness of the financial health of the bank. The next year saw heavy write-offs 
in the Group accounts due to equity revaluations and a weakening of the Group’s 
capital base. In particular, concerns were raised about Division X ’s capital 
position. Only repeated capital injections from the Group saved the insurance 
business from the embarrassment of breaching regulatory capital ratio 
requirements.
Some even suggested that a weakening balance sheet made the Group a 
natural candidate for take-over. Reports of 'investor scepticism ' and the Chief 
Executive ‘battlingfor survival’99 at shareholders’ meetings show that a dramatic 
shift took place in the environment, which was not only a matter of turbulence, 
but hostility as well.100
The acquisition of Division X came to be viewed in the investor 
community as a major and costly strategic mistake. Like many European 
insurance companies, Division X was heavily exposed to the falling stock markets 
and instead of diversifying the business risk BWT Group carried, the acquisition 
resulted in the Group’s increased exposure to the equity markets. Investor and 
press hostility was expressed in relation to Division X as many commentators put 
the blame for the group’s financial troubles on the insurance division. Many were 
puzzled by the impairment practices common to insurers which caused a time
99 Quotes are taken from the Financial Times. No detailed reference can be given for 
confidentiality reasons.
100 Khandwalla (1977)’s taxonomy o f  environmental variables is deployed here. Among 
others, he distinguishes between turbulence (risky, unpredictable, fluctuating, ambiguous 
environment) and hostility (stressful, dominating, restrictive environment).
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delay between the occurrence of losses and the emergence of the bad news.101 
Disappointed investors claimed that ‘the group’s balance sheet was 'polluted’ by 
the erosion o f the capital cushion in [Division X] ’ and many would have liked to 
see 'the insurance arm spun off. ’ Others sceptically added that this may not be 
possible given that 'Division X  looks increasingly like a poison p ill.,I02
This stressful year of environmental hostility saw the departure of several 
top-level managers on both the banking and the insurance side. New Chief 
Executives were appointed who were under enormous institutional pressure to 
turn around the fortunes of the group. It is notable that it was not the increase in 
environmental turbulence that distinguished the crisis period from the previous 
years. BWT Group had always considered its environment ‘challenging’ and 
‘volatile '103 and this was not the first time it posted losses in the 90s. Recurring 
speculations of take-over threats (hanging over either the insurance unit or the 
entire group) and repeated calls for reassessing the bank’s strategy put the 
pressure of immediate action and change on management. Such an environment 
can therefore be viewed as not only turbulent, but hostile too.
Managers in Division X came under a dual pressure: both from the 
environment and BWT. One of them commented:
‘On the insurance side w e  h a v e  im proved a  lot, w e  are a  m uch better  
co m p a n y  than five years a g o . Nevertheless w e  g e t  punished from the outside for 
our b a d  [investment] results.’’04
On the banking side, Division X’s initial low integration became 
particularly visible. For many, it came to be viewed as part of the problem that led 
to the crisis. The Director from the CFO division observed:
‘[Division X] w as too  in d ep en d en t. It w as not recogn ised  that d esp ite  the  
fa ct that all the group central functions worked well with banking [i.e. the  
banking divisions], it w as not the c a s e  with insurance.',05
This was a time of reconsideration of many of the assumptions that 
underpinned BWT’s management practices and strategy. For example, the 
strategy director reflected on the situation as follows:
101 An example from the FT: ‘Falling equity markets have produced further insurance losses in
the second quarter, even though [Division X ] has now reduced its equity exposure and bought
portfolio protection .’ (Highlights by me)
102 Quotes are taken from the Financial Times
103 These words were recurring in annual reports in the second half o f  the 90s.
104 Head o f  Financial Risk Control
105 Director, CFO (finance) Division, BWT
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‘There w as a  fam ous q u ote  from [the ex-CEO] b efore  [BWT] acquired  
[Division X]. He said: ‘you d o n ’t h a v e  to buy a  c o w  if you w an t a  glass of milk.' 
And then he b ou gh t the co w .
[AM: 'B ancassurance looked to b e  a  g o o d  c o n c e p t  at the beginning of 
the 90s, it ap p ears less so now .’ ]
The issue is how  well you could  h a v e  recogn ised  the strategy risk then. The 
overall m ood in the 90s w as that w e  h a v e  to b e  m odern and  new  things, 
blablabla. N ow the psychology is different. The problem  is how  ca n  you b e  
rational w hen there is such an underlying trend? For m e this is the first time that I 
h a v e  c o m e  to reflect b ack  on such things from such a  position.'106
While the long term future of the bank and the insurance unit were 
discussed by a new management team, speculations about several possible (and 
contradictory) actions in relation to Division X were abundant among managers. 
There was a widespread expectation of control tightening over the business unit 
(or else the sale of it). In the meantime, a correction in the investment strategy and 
a reduction of the market risk profile of the insurance unit took place. The new 
Chief Executive of BWT personally steered and monitored a defensive ‘stop-loss’ 
strategy. Personal (informal) controls over the insurance unit intensified from the 
banking side as BWT’s CEO became directly involved with the insurance 
company’s investment management function.
4.2.3. R e c o v e r y  (2003-2004)
Although a downgrade from an international rating agency was an 
additional blow, investors started to recognise that ‘[BWT] is seeking to draw a 
line under the worst year in its 146-year history. Analysts concluded that the 
troubled banking group had quantified the remaining financial uncertainties 
overhanging the group and its underlying performance was starting to 
recover. ’107 BWT’s next planning cycle took place under the watchful eyes of 
regulators, credit rating agencies, investors and the financial media. Thus the 
pressures mounting on BWT remained high. In this sense the environment stayed 
stressful, dominating and restricting (Khanwalla, 1977) -  it was still hostile.
Director, Head o f  Strategy, BWT
107 Quote taken from the Financial Times
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Ten months into the planning cycle of this stressful year, when asked 
about what was happening in relation to Division X, the strategy director at BWT 
replied:
'We are asking a  lot of questions ab ou t how  to continue, w hat is best 
structure for [Division X], how  ca n  w e  d evise  the best country portfolio for [Division 
X], how  w e  c a n  a c h ie v e  a  co m b in ed  ratio of less than 100%.’,°8 
He was more optimistic than many of his colleagues:
'I think [Division X] is a  fantastic thing b e c a u s e  it is so ea sy  to drive up 
profits. Most of the current losses are d u e  to investm ent results. Impairments stop if 
you red u ce  your equity q u ota  an d  the market stops going  dow n. Then you realise 
gains. Then w e  return to profitability, it will recover n icely.’109
However, the Head of Controlling, who was responsible for short-term 
planning and management accounting (controlling) at BWT, was more cautious in 
his outlook. He described the budgeting process of the year as particularly 
difficult:
'On the insurance side w e  h a v e  a  turnaround situation an d  on the 
banking side everybody is reorganising all the time. (...) At the m om ent [the 
bu d getin g  process] is lose-lose. [Laughs.] Everybody has to lose b u d g et for next 
year. There w as a  h u g e  fight on the cost cutting decision , but not b e tw e e n  on e  
departm ent against the other. It w as b e tw een  the CFO an d  everyb od y else. We 
e n d e d  up with cost cutting across the board. (...) The only th em e now  is to g et  
b ack  to profitability. 90 p ercent of the focus is on P&L, net operating profit.’110
Tightening control over Division X as a management decision emerged as 
controlling people reflected on the cultural differences between the two 
companies:
'Bankers are m ore up to sp e e d  with c h a n g e , if a  decision is taken it gets  
im plem ented  straight aw ay . If you m ake a  decision on the insurance side and  
you g o  there to im plem ent, they start discussing w hether it m akes sen se  or d oes  
not m ake sen se . It is rather hard to im plem ent there an d  to bring them  up to 
som e s p e e d . . . '111
Given the sense of urgency for recovery action to be implemented in the 
insurance unit, the Bank took several measures to curb Division X’s autonomy. 
Lorsch and Allen (1973) point to three major sets of integrative factors:
108 Director, Head o f  Strategy, BWT
109 Director, Head o f  Strategy, BWT
110 Director, Head o f  Controlling, BWT
111 Director, Head o f  Controlling, BWT
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integrative devices (e.g. budgets and other paper systems, committees, task forces, 
direct managerial contact); integrative effort and decision-making processes. As 
will be shown below, all these integrative factors were activated.
Two central control functions were active in proposing new ways of 
control (and integrative devices) over the division: management accounting 
(controlling) and risk management. The accountants devised a new reporting 
template. This asked for information that was compatible with the Bank’s 
reporting practices, but stretched the internal reporting capacities of the business 
unit considerably. Division X controllers recognised it as a hybrid reporting 
format and came to refer to it as ‘the bancassurance view’’.
‘Insurance is a  fundam entally different business m odel than banking and  
so w e  look at things differently. We look at our costs differently, our investm ent 
in com e is in tegrated  m uch more into our tech n ica l results [technical explanation  
g iven]... it is a  very integrated P&L w e  d ea l with. What w e  are thriving for is to 
h a v e  a  g o o d  understanding of our business in the insurance view . When w e  are 
asked to look at a  b a n cassu ran ce view  there is som e m apping that takes p la c e  
to reflect the banking view . It is very difficult to us to m a n a g e  the results on two  
different v iew s.'1,2
Managers outside the accounting function of Division X also commented 
on the changes in divisional reporting practices:
'They [BWT] ask for information now  that has never b e e n  asked  before. 
Information that only the CEOs of [Division X] an d  the country units used to h ave. 
It w as never the id e a  that w e  centrally d e c id e  and  control cost by cost type. We 
always w ere interested in the cost ratio (premiums over cost) only, but now  [BWT] 
are asking for m uch more detail an d  it ca u ses  som e kind of information overload. 
There w as a  com p arative study and  w e  are shown as se c o n d  after [French 
insurer] in the level of detail w e  ask for.’113
As apparent from the above, the accountants were implementing a cost- 
based reporting and control platform.
The risk people had a different agenda which was formulated by a task 
force they set up that worked together with Division X managers. A participant of 
the task force explained:
‘The situation of [Division X] has c h a n g e d  dram atically since the beginning  
of the year. M an agem en t w ho used to work in banking took over control at
1.2 Head o f  Financial Management, Division X
1.3 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
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[Division X]. They found them selves in a  n ew  environm ent an d  did not feel 
com fortable in it. Everything w as ch a llen g ed . In A ugust/Septem ber the task force  
w as set up to assess the risk, the risk c a p a c ity  an d  the m anagerial and  
organizational ch a llen g es at [Division X]. It w as led  by [the CRO of BWT], the CFOs 
of the tw o insurance units114 an d  the H ead of Investm ent M an agem en t. We 
reported to the CEO.'115
The central risk control function came up with an agenda that was outside 
their technical scope (taken in the narrow sense of risk control), it included 
managerial and organisational issues. Risk people furthered a proposal that was 
separate from, and complementary to, the cost concerns of the management 
accounting function. Further, Division X’s risk committees were adjusted to 
include senior representatives from BWT. The central risk function collected and 
reported risk information about Division X among the key highlights of the 
regular board risk reports.
In sum, in the wake of the crisis, a so far latent divisional control system 
package, containing formal accounting and risk practices got activated. The case 
evidence supports the conclusions of other field studies of multiple control 
systems in at least two aspects. First, it highlights the role of informal controls in 
periods of high uncertainty (Dent, 1987, Chapman, 1998). At the time of crisis 
bank executives personally intervened with the affairs of the subsidiary, making 
informal control an important element of controlling the division. Second, there 
also appears evidence in support of Simons (1991)’s proposition: at a time of 
crisis, top managers use more than one formal control system interactively. In this 
case accounting controls and risk controls became activated and supplied bank 
executives with frequent and regular information (obtained from reports, 
committee meetings and phone conversations) about the cost and risk indicators 
of Division X. As a result Division X, a previously semi-autonomous business 
unit, was losing its independence.
Apart from informal (personal) controls, four control mechanisms were 
found instrumental in divisional control: 1. accounting control at BWT, 2. risk 
management control at BWT, 3. accounting control in the division, 4. risk 
management control in the division. The following sections take a closer look at
114 Though one legal entity, Division X was managed in two business units - the Life and the
Non-Life Insurance units
115 Vice President, Economic Risk Capital and Capital Management, BWT
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the workings of this control system package and unravel its complementary 
relations as well as its tensions and rivalries.
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4.3. T h e  p o l it ic s  o f  d iv isio n a l  c o n t r o l
This section examines how, in the wake of the crisis, accounting and risk 
controls were working on tightening the Bank’s grip over the troubled business 
unit. It will be shown that the crisis offered the opportunity to both accounting 
and risk people at Swiss Bank to impose their controlling blueprints on Division 
X. The ensuing politics is explicated and explained with reference to institutional 
organisational theory.
4.3.1. Tig h t e n in g  a c c o u n t in g  c o n t r o l s
Every business unit at BWT sends monthly profit and loss data to the 
central management accounting function (‘Controlling’). Pre-crisis, during the 
years of its semi-autonomy, Division X was an exception. Due to the nature of 
insurance accounting, the insurance unit did not close the accounts monthly, only 
at half-year. It was notable that to a large extent management accounting at 
Division X overlapped with financial accounting:
'In insurance w e  d o  not h ave proper m a n a g em en t acco u n tin g . We only 
h a v e  financial acco u n tin g ... [AM: (Shocked) Oh. So how  d o  you m a n a g e? ]... 
(Laughs) There is a  departm ent ca lled  Financial M a n a g em en t an d  they are in 
ch a rg e  of m a n a g e m e n t a cco u n tin g .’"6
In 2000 BWT Group switched from Swiss GAAP to US GAAP. Division 
X, with its own decentralised international divisions, was affected too. The Head 
of Financial Management at the insurance unit explained:
‘I feel that w e  h a v e  really tigh tened  the controls in our countries. 
Historically, b efore w e  im plem ented  US GAAP, it w as very m uch a  decentralised  
ap p roach . Ever since 2000 w hen w e  did the restatem ent to US GAAP, th a t’s w hen  
the trend started. Now w e  are requiring all the countries to  b e  on the sam e  
a cco u n tin g  standard, before that everyon e  subm itted their loca l statutory 
a cco u n ts  an d  w e  m a d e  the necessary  adjustm ents to th ese  to con so lid ate  
reports accord in g  to Swiss GAAP. N ow  everyon e d o e s  US GAAP. It requires that 
you establish consistent assumptions across countries, though they vary a  bit 
accord in g  to their market environm ent.'"7
116 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
117 Head o f  Financial Management, Division X
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Given that each business unit produced local statutory as well as US 
GAAP accounts, the latter became the common system for internal accounting in 
Division X. Not until the crisis were quarterly or even more frequent reports 
required in a systematic way.
And not until the heavy write-offs went through Division X’s accounts 
was BWT alarmed about the crisis. But then urgent, detailed and frequent 
accounting information was required. Initially, the Head of Controlling at BWT 
expressed frustration with Division X’s accounting controls:
‘When w e  ask [Division X] questions that bankers are used to ask, w e  are 
often surprised that they h a v en ’t g o t any reasonab le answers to them . The 
insurance business is m a n a g e d  differently. We are working on tying them  more in. 
But they are rather slow .’1,8
His counterpart at Division X had a different view:
'Within tw o years, first of all w e  sw itched  to US GAAP, then [BWT] asked  for 
quarterly [reporting], an d  now  they are asking for monthly, so it has b een  an  
enorm ous cultural c h a n g e  for [Division X]. We h a v e  d o n e  a  lot an d  th e countries 
[Division X’s international business units] h a v e  a cco m p lish ed  a  lot. But you really 
n e e d  to understand the im pact of this b e c a u se  you ca n  really drown if you are 
continuously asking for information. We already provide monthly reporting and  
w e  n e e d  to im prove the quality of that. From a  [BWT] p ersp ective they are ab le  
to c lo se  daily, but it is different in an insurance c o m p a n y .'" 9
She accepted head office controllers’ need for more frequent and more 
detailed information. However, delivering the required information presented not 
only technical difficulties, but also the need to overcome the reservations that 
divisional managers held about the relevance of the so called ‘ bancassurance 
view ’ that BWT imposed on them. One of them commented:
'We sp en d  a  lot of time every month on m a n a g em en t reporting, twisting 
numbers into this b a n cassu ran ce view , which is not particularly relevant to us.’120 
The Head of Financial Management at Division X was instrumental in 
resolving such tensions and building a collaborative relationship between the two 
controlling departments:
‘I still d o n ’t understand the [BWT] structure exactly, w ho is responsible for 
w hat, so w e  h a v e  instigated a  workshop so w e  c a n  better understand. B ecau se
118 Head o f  Controlling, BWT
1,9 Head o f  Financial Management, Division X
120 Head o f  Strategy, Division X
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my tea m  w ould g e t  ca lled  from various p e o p le  an d  it c h a n g e s  a n d  I don't know  
w here they are com ing from and why they ask w hat they are asking. If w e  had  a  
better understanding of why they n e e d  som ething it w ould b e  m uch easier to 
explain w hat has h a p p e n e d  or ev en  to a c c e p t  the tight dead lin es that are often  
given to us. If I g e t  a  call from so m eo n e  I h a v e  never worked with before, and  I 
don't know really how  that individual fits into the overall structure, it ca n  b e  
frustrating. So w e  really try to d ev e lo p  a  g o o d  relationship with th ose p e o p le .’121
Later, during the period of recovery, the Head of Controlling at BWT 
expressed much satisfaction with the success of implementing the ‘bancassurance 
view’ as an information gathering and control platform:
'P&L for insurance has b een  fixed an d  p e o p le  there are telling us w hat w e  
are looking for an d  they understand w hat they should d o  for their own  
business.'122
Important to this success were the informal controls that complemented the 
formal accounting systems. First, a personal relationship, based on frequent 
contact between the two heads of the accounting functions was formed and it 
helped to clarify problem areas, as argued by Division X’s Head of Financial 
Management:
'They ow n  us, they n eed  to understand. So w h at I d o n ’t enjoy is w hen they  
say, ‘you n e e d  to provide this by this an d  this tim e’. I s e e  no va lu e in that. I say  
'let's talk a b o u t that, why d o  you n e e d  it?' I think the tea m  that now  d o es  it [the 
Controlling function at BWT] is m uch better than the tea m  b efore the last 
structural c h a n g e . We h a v e  a  m uch better working relation with th em .’123
Though personal contact became less frequent during the recovery period, 
a good work relationship remained. BWT’s Head of Controlling asserted:
‘...[Dot] is the h e a d  of controlling in [Division X] which m akes things 
easier. I used  to b e  on the ph on e with her o n c e  a  w eek  or every se c o n d  w eek  
an d  now  it is probably o n c e  a  m onth or so .’124
Second, staff contact between the two departments was also often personal 
(BWT people habitually asked for information on the phone).
BWT’s controllers dictated the parameters of an accounting control 
system that transformed the divisional control considerably and increased the 
level of integration of Division X. A ‘bancassurance’ view complemented
121 Head o f  Financial Management, Division X
122 Head o f  Controlling, BWT
123 Head o f  Financial Management, Division X
124 Head o f  Controlling, BWT
119
Division X’s own insurance accounting-based control. At the time of crisis the 
‘bancassurance’ reporting framework became an interactive control (Simons, 
1990) - top managers at BWT used it frequently and regularly. Within Division X 
the ‘bancassurance’ platform was initially unwelcome, but the presence of 
informal controls assuaged tensions and complemented the formal controls. 
Though ‘bancassurance’ might have remained unrealised as a strategy, it was 
succeeding both as a control system and an integrative device.
4.3.2 . Tig h t e n in g  r is k  c o n t r o l
According to its original remit risk management is concerned with 
securing compliance with international bank capital regulations -  the function 
defines the minimum regulatory capital that the bank should hold. This is 
believed to serve as a buffer that can absorb fairly unlikely, though not extreme 
losses, should they occur.
Whether or not a financial institution holds sufficient capital in order to 
weather nasty storms is also a major concern of rating agencies, investors and of 
the banks themselves. The minimum regulatory capital is rarely seen as adequate 
to obtain the AAA or AA grades from credit rating agencies, which would secure 
funds at lowest cost. Financial institutions would typically need to hold more 
capital than is stipulated as the regulatory minimum. It is also understood that 
banks with a higher risk profile need more capital than lower risk peers in order to 
secure the same favourable credit rating. But how much more? Recent 
developments in firm-wide risk management address exactly this question by 
measuring risk and quantifying capital need with respect to the risk profile of the 
bank.
Thus the risk management functions in large innovative banks have 
created their own (internal) definition of capital adequacy in the form of 
Economic (Risk) Capital (ERC). Economic (risk) capital is the amount of total 
capital (including the minimum regulatory requirement) that corresponds to the 
overall capital need perceived by the bank (Morrison, 2002). It is typically 
derived from the requirements of a target credit rating that the bank wishes to 
obtain.
BWT’s risk management blueprint was developed by the investment 
banking arm of the group and it was deployed as a ‘comprehensive and consistent
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framework ’ for the management of risk and capital. In this framework ERC 
was the common denominator for risk. The objective was to produce ERC 
measures for each quantifiable risk category (market, credit, operational). These 
were then aggregated not only by risk type, but also by business unit. Finally, the 
total ERC for BWT and the Group was devised as well.
For its own risk management purposes in retail, private and corporate 
banking, BWT started to implement this risk management blueprint in the years 
preceding the financial losses at Division X. By this time Division X had been 
two years into their implementation of the blueprint.
Risk people at Division X took pride in the fact that they had been at the 
forefront of the roll-out of the new risk management framework, and they also 
contributed to it:
'[Division X] started in 1998 and the others started in 1999-2000. The goal 
w as to h a v e  a  com m on  denom inator in terms of risk an d  to h a v e  the sam e  
m ethods for m easuring credit risk, market risk, and  insurance risk. Our contribution 
w as the Insurance ERC. In the insurance business it w as quite a  n ew  c o n c e p t . 
Traditionally the notion of risk in insurance is quite different from that in an  
investm ent bank.’126
In the 1999-2000 annual report, for example, there is a separate section 
devoted to Division X’s risk management framework: '[Division X] is a business 
unit with many years o f experience and success in the insurance business. It has 
developed outstanding skills in managing all the risks associated with selling 
insurance policies.,12?
Initially the two risk control functions were separate, they did not share a 
common framework (due to BWT’s later start to adopt the blue-print), and 
worked as complementary in the overall risk management framework. As the 
implementation of the investment bank’s risk management blueprint progressed, 
risk control practices converged on the two sides. As BWT’s risk reporting 
practices got formalised, the central risk function assumed control over the 
workings of Division X’s risk controls. This became even more pronounced 
during the period of the crisis and the recovery stage.
125 This is a recurring expression in annual reports and internal documents that describe the 
framework.
126 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
127 Annual Report 1999-2000, Division X
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Similarly to the Bank’s accounting controllers, the risk controllers pressed 
for more information too. However, it was a conflict-ridden, difficult and tense 
situation. The Bank’s Chief Risk Officer explained:
'It is dangerous to run an insurance co m p a n y  with p e o p le  w h o  d o n ’t 
understand it. It is ev en  more dangerous to run an insurance co m p a n y  with 
bankers w ho don 't know that they d o n ’t understand it. We h a v e  b e e n  very 
careful that w e  d o n ’t crea te  banking type solutions for the insurance business. 
N obody questions that they understand insurance. What w e  question is that they  
understand th e  markets. [...] You ca n  try to con v in ce  them  [Division X, ab ou t the 
re lev a n ce  of information requested  by the Bank] an d  th a t’s w hat w e  did. When 
w e saw  they did not deliver, p eo p le  g o t frustrated an d  said 'let's stop the 
discussion'. Then w e  c h a n g e d  the p e o p le .’128
As part of several personal and structural changes at Division X, a new 
Chief Risk Officer was appointed there to head the insurance unit’s risk controls. 
His co-operative and constructive approach towards BWT accommodated the 
parent company’s requirements, and thus contributed to restoring trust in Division 
X’s internal controls. The working practices of the risk function at Division X 
were adjusted to mirror those at BWT’s. While previously only the risk reporting 
templates were identical, now Division X’s risk committee structures, meeting 
agendas, reporting and committee frequencies became identical too. The new 
CRO was required to report not only to his own CFO, but also directly to the 
CRO at BWT. With BWT’s CRO regularly attending Division X’s risk 
management committee meetings, formal risk controls were complemented by 
informal (personal) control. Division X’s CRO was accommodative of the 
changes and commented on the increased personal involvement of BWT’s CRO 
with Division X’s affairs positively:
‘This is for m e a  very g o o d  w ay to involve our shareholder in the important 
issues. I think it is a  h u g e  step  forward. It m eans transparency on our side, so he 
[BWT’s CRO] sees  everything that is of con cern  to risk p e o p le  in [Division X]. He is 
also taking on responsibility in that he sits here - he is part of w hat is go in g  on. He 
has a  c h a n c e  to give his opinion and  ev en  if he d o esn 't g ive his opinion he has 
b e e n  part of w hat has b e e n  d e c id e d  an d  it is m ore difficult for [BWT] to say to  
[Division X]: ‘You did it w rong.’129
128 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
129 C hief Risk Officer, Division X
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The risk controls were used intensively during the process of reducing 
Division X’s risk profile. Further, ERC was used as a tool to communicate the 
decreasing risk profile of the group to the outside world that was disapproving of 
the perceived weakening of the group’s capital base. For example, the 2002 and 
2003 annual reports disclosed the Group’s ‘Key Risk Trends’, and ERC was 
featured 'showing substantial reduction in equity exposures. ,13° Over the last five 
years, BWT’s annual reports gave more and more space to the description of the 
Group’s risk management framework. While the 1999 annual statements devoted 
10 pages to the risk controls, during the next few years the amount of information 
disclosed had tripled. 131 In the wake of the crisis, ERC was not only disclosed, 
but it was also proudly advocated as the flagship technology of the risk 
management function: 'In our industry, economic capital represents the emerging
n i
best practice fo r  measuring and reporting all quantifiable risks. ’
Deployed in investor communications, risk controls sent not only signals 
that the crisis was passing, but also conveyed a subtler message: that an 
innovative, firm-wide, consistent and homogeneous risk reporting and control 
framework was being implemented in the Group.
130 2000-01 Annual Report, BWT Group
131 There appears to be an industry trend o f  risk disclosure among increasing number o f  banks 
in the late 90s. Jorion (2002) observes that while ‘few banks disclosed [risk information] 
before 1995’, by 2002 ‘most major financial institutions [ ...]  publish their VaRs on an annual 
or quarterly basis.’ (Jorion, 2002:912) Further, a comparison with Fraser Bank shows that 
BWT was not unique in increasing the volume o f  its disclosed risk information (and the length 
o f  the description o f  its risk management organisation) in its annual statements.
132 BWT Group Annual Report 2003
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4 .S.3. E n h a n c in g  l e g it im a c y  a n d  t h e  u s e  o f  a c c o u n t in g  a n d  r is k
CONTROLS
We have seen that both in the accounting and in the risk control areas a 
process of making Division X’s practices similar to those of BWT took place. 
From an institutional perspective, this is not surprising: it has been observed that 
in conglomerates subsidiaries are compelled to adopt accounting practices, 
performance evaluations etc. that are compatible with the policies of the parent 
corporation (Coser, et al., 1982). Why? DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
homogenisation increases the legitimacy of the organization. Increased legitimacy 
stems from institutional appropriateness, which means compliance with prevailing 
institutionalised rules and norms, whether they are set by a parent company, 
regulators or emerge as a result of industry practices. As financial troubles draw 
question marks over the legitimacy of the organization’s management and 
procedures, regaining legitimacy is particularly crucial for organisational survival 
in the wake of a crisis. As far as evidence is concerned, Czamiawska-Joerges 
(1988) furthers this argument in explanation of her study of a Swedish 
organisation, which, in response to economic decline, resorted to control 
tightening. The motivation for control tightening was postulated to be 
management’s desire to enhance their legitimacy. ‘By tightening control, they are 
able to show, to both external and internal observers, first, that they are still in 
control (by making it more visible); secondly, that they are reacting to crisis (in 
ways that are legitimate for them as official controllers); and thirdly, that the 
crisis will soon pass.'
Likewise, in a hostile environment (Khandwalla, 1977), the management 
of Swiss Bank strove to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of many external 
stakeholders (regulators, analysts, rating agencies, peers etc.). Similarly to the 
Swedish case, a control tightening over Division X took place. BWT imposed its 
accounting and risk control mechanisms on the division. Apart from gathering 
banking-style information for decision making, they also impressed upon external 
observers that legitimate control practices were in place. While the accounting
133 Czamiawska-Joerges (1988), p. 417.
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(cost) controls gained legitimacy from their very own commonness (Hopwood, 
1983), the risk controls gained legitimacy from their claimed innovativeness.
The politics of the control tightening over Division X was intense. In an 
institutional reading of the case, Division X’s management also needed to 
increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the top management at BWT who for a 
while considered disposing of the business unit. BWT executives were initially 
mistrustful and showed little tolerance to resistance at Division X. A new 
management at the insurance unit was appointed. The new heads of the 
accounting and risk controls at Division X put much effort into assuaging tensions 
by embracing the control tightening process and welcoming and encouraging the 
personal involvement of BWT’s controllers in it. By giving up the autonomy of 
their control practices, and making them similar to those of BWT, Division X 
gained transparency and legitimacy -  just what its survival required at the time.
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4.4. T h e  p o l it ic s  o f  c o n t r o l  sy s t e m  r iv a l r y
The crisis offered challenges and opportunities for BWT’s controllers. 
Both accounting and risk controllers perceived a control failure to which they 
reacted with making Division X’s formal controls similar to those at Swiss Bank. 
A multiple control system was formed and interactively used at the time of 
Division X’s crisis. However, due to the different nature of accounting and risk 
controls, they did not always agree with one another. There were a number of 
contests in the multiple control system. In the first one the recognition of Division 
X’s financial troubles and the timing of the corrective action were at stake. In the 
second contest, which took place around the asset-liability and capital 
management of the insurance unit, the risk controls challenged the economic 
rationale behind the accounting controls. However, it was not economic rationale 
that was the source of control legitimacy, but institutional appropriateness. This 
explains why accounting controls (with their powerful institutional 
appropriateness in the insurance world) came to dominate in strategic decision­
making. The readjustment of Division X’s strategy, and the recapitalisation of 
Division X’s weakened balance sheet illustrate the point.
4.4.1 . Re c o g n is in g  t h e  c r is is
The risk control function at Division X had picked up a worsening trend in 
the equity portfolio of Division X well before the losses went through the 
accounting system. However, corrective action took place only after it became 
clear that the P&L account suffered. This apparent disregard of the risk controls in 
favour of the accounting controls puzzled risk people: 'We h a v e  d o n e  a  lot of 
soul searching around the [Division X] situation. How cou ld  that h a p p en ?  It alw ays 
sh ow ed  up in the scenario reports: a  m assive equity market ERC. Why w as there 
no action?' 134
When asked the same question, the CRO gave a Delphic reply that implied 
the presence of deeper organizational or institutional forces:
134 Director o f  Group Risk Reporting, BWT Group
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'My first assum ption is that p eo p le  w ho h a v e  b e e n  running a  business for 
years are not stupid. If they d o n ’t look at certain things, there are reasons why 
they d o  not look at certain things.’135
Two explanations emerged. The first one held responsible the institutional 
environment and its pressures, while the second one was a criticism of insurance 
accounting.
As for the institutional environment, Division X’s crisis was not unique to 
itself. Most European insurers had been overexposed to equity markets and they 
all suffered investment losses. It appeared that the delayed reaction to the 
deterioration in the equity markets was an industry problem. At the time of the 
1990s stock market boom an intense price competition started as insurance 
companies subsidised price-competitive insurance products with equity gains.136
Later, after stock markets peaked, many insurers still felt that they were 
locked in to their equity positions as otherwise they could not sustain 
competitiveness, should stock markets recover. This appeared to have been the 
case at Division X too. The Chief Risk Officer of the insurance unit explained:
'It w as c lear  to m e that our risk c a p a c ity  w as over-stretched. We had  
Investment C om m ittee m eetings, w here w e  in d ica ted  that our risk c a p a c ity  is not 
sufficient an d  therefore w e  should red u ce  exposure, but the H ead of Investment 
M a n a g em en t held the general market view , w hich w as optimistic. The problem  
w as that in the industry everyone w as con fid en t that a  major crash could  not 
occu r  [again]. With hindsight it w as a  con sid erab le  m isjudgem ent. But it w as  
clear  from the d a ta  w hat the risk situation w as. (...) To d efen d  the decision­
makers, o n e  has to say that the industry w as very closely looking at the
com petitors. N ob od y  w as in the position to say 'now  w e  g e t out of equities’
before everyb od y did the sam e. If you g o  a w a y  from the herd you are facing  
m assive risk. If you had  d o n e  it 3 years a g o  you would h a v e  lost your
com petitiveness in a  short time. So it w as totally clear w e  d o  w hatever the
com petition  w as doing. (...) It is not possible that an industry g o e s  bankrupt. The 
regulation has w e a k e n e d  substantially, the a cco u n tin g  rules w ere adjusted for 
valuations an d  so on. In times w hen everyb od y  has a  problem , there are
135 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
136 According to an FT analysis, in the highly competitive insurance market ‘insurers used their 
equity gains to smooth earnings and support policy-holder pay-outs.’ ( ‘Falling stocks bad news 
for European insurers’ in: The Financial Times, 18 July 2002)
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solutions. In times w hen you d ev ia te  from all your com petitors, there is no solution 
for y o u .’137
This moral hazard-type problem in the insurance industry has got an 
institutional explanation. The crisis appears to have been the result of increasing 
investor, rating agency and regulatory concerns, which together shifted the notion 
of institutional appropriateness from high equity quotas to a reduced equity 
exposure. Gradually, a sector-wide consensus was built around the necessity of 
cutting equity exposures.
At the same time, the holes that were caused in the balance sheets of 
insurers by their investment losses had to be plugged as there are strong 
regulatory rules to be met about capital adequacy. The role of rating agencies as 
quasi-regulators (enforcers of the regulatory solvency requirements) was evident 
in this case. On 21 June 2002 the Financial Times reported that BWT '‘was forced 
to inject Pounds [xx] million into [Division X], its insurance subsidiary, in order 
to stave o ff a liquidity crunch at the unit. [...] [BWT] said it had put the cash into 
[Division X], which has been expanding rapidly in recent years, to ensure the 
group met solvency requirements and would be able to continue to write new 
business at current levels. The move came as one o f the leading international 
credit rating agencies voiced concerns over insurers' financial positions as a 
result o f the current stock market downturn. ’
Some of Division X’s risk controllers held the nature of accounting 
controls responsible for delaying action in the wake of the worsening investment 
position:
‘...A nd there w as no c h a n g e  in investm ent strategy. The problem  here, 
and this is highly related to the w ay insurance co m p an ies d o  a ccou n tin g , in 2001 
[Division X] sh ow ed  a  profit of lb n . Looking at th ese  figures you would not believe  
it. This is pure accou n tin g! The a ccou n tin g  allows insurance co m p a n ies  to  show  
losses in the P&L only, but not on the b a la n c e  sh eet. From the outside world, 
looking at P&L, you g e t  d e la y ed  information: impairment occurs after 3-6 months 
of ‘staying b e low  market va lu e’. But you ca n n o t impair earlier. If you w ant to do  
so, you h a v e  to sell stock and buy it b ack . The a cco u n tin g  representation is 
d e la y ed  and  distorted.’139
137 C hief Risk Officer, Division X
138 The Financial Times, 21 June 2002. Article title not given due to confidentiality reasons.
139 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
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This criticism of the pre-crisis accounting control system of Division X 
emerged as BWT’s accounting controllers furthered their alternative for divisional 
control and the ‘bancassurance view’ came to dominate the insurance accounting 
view.
With the benefit of hindsight, risk controls were more successful in 
detecting the insurance company’s crisis than accounting controls. This has 
increased the status of the risk function. The visibility of the risk people increased 
further as they were active in crisis management, and communicated the 
decreasing risk trends to external and internal observers successfully. Having 
been used interactively by top management at the time of the crisis, risk controls 
have achieved parity with the accounting controls, and some risk people set their 
eyes on taking a more strategic role in controlling Division X going forward.
4.4.2. M a n a g in g  t h e  c a p it a l  o f  D iv is io n  X
Capital management, the assessment and monitoring of capital adequacy 
was a subject that became critical in the wake of Division X’s financial crisis. The 
business unit had to be recapitalised and its capital adequacy had to be monitored. 
Capital management turned out to be an area in divisional control where the risk 
controls and the accounting controls interacted with one another. But there were 
no complementarities offered -  it was a case of control rivalry.
In the Risk Management review of the 2003 annual report of BWT Group 
the central risk function suggests that ERC’s appeal is to complement accounting- 
based discussions: ‘I t  is ca lled  ‘econom ic ' c a p ita l because it measures risk  in 
terms o f  econom ic realities  ra th er than reg u la to ry  o r accounting ru les. ’ 140 
Internally, it appeared that risk people furthered an ‘economic’ view because they 
saw it as superior to the ‘accounting’ view on capital adequacy. The risk function 
set out to capitalise on the perceived success of ERC in detecting Division X’s 
increasing risk profile and weakening capital base in a more timely manner than 
accounting controls did.
The risk function at BWT set up a task force to investigate various 
alternatives for controlling Division X’s capital adequacy going forward. The
140 Annual Report 2002-3, BWT Group
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project team identified several possible approaches to the assessment of capital 
adequacy of the insurance company, as explained by a member of the taskforce:
'The situation is really com plex. We looked at a cco u n tin g , the regulatory 
requirements, an d  the m easures of risk. We dea lt with several m easures of risk. The 
basic sta tem en t is that w e  h ave US GAAP [solvency ratio], EU solvency[ratio], S&P 
solvency [ratio] an d  ERC and statutory solvency an d  they show  the risks 
differently.' 141
It was notable how risk people blended the language of risk with that of 
capital adequacy. By this, they in effect claimed expertise in the capital 
management area, which prior to the arrival of the ERC ratio was considered to be 
an accounting-based issue.142 Thus regulatory and rating agency ratios, even the 
US GAAP solvency ratio are taken here as measures of ‘risk’ -  de facto capital 
adequacy.
Further, ERC was shown as ‘economic’ (in the sense that it marks the 
entire balance sheet to market) and contrasted with the rest of the measures, which 
were regarded as ‘non-economic’ for their failure to mark to market. US GAAP 
solvency, with its half-hearted approach to marking to market was also considered 
as non-economic:
‘Econom ically, w e  h ave [on the b a la n c e  sh ee t of Division X] assets with 
20-30 years duration, but w e  also h a v e  liabilities with duration of 50 years. With US 
GAAP, every interest rate c h a n g e  matters. We h a v e  long duration of assets, if 
interest rates g o  up, w e  lose value from the assets, but it lea v es the liability side 
a lon e, so our equity shrinks'.143
In US GAAP, assets are marked to market, while liabilities stay at book 
value. Consequently, the market value of the asset side of the balance sheet 
changes with interest rates, and so changes the capital too. Interest rate volatility 
creates the volatility of the capital on the balance sheet.
The task force argued that risk controls (ERC) and US GAAP-based 
accounting controls created conflicting incentives. On one hand, in order to match 
the asset side with the long-term liability side, risk management would require the 
increase of the duration of the asset side. On the other hand, the management team
141 Vice President, Economic Risk Capital and Capital Management, BWT
142 For the measurement o f  capital adequacy, the ERC ratio related available capital to ERC, 
which was risk people’s proxy measure o f  the total risk profile. Meanwhile, accounting 
solvency ratios use revenues and growth as the proxy measures for the riskiness o f  an 
insurance company.
143 V ice President, Economic Risk Capital and Capital Management, BWT
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of the insurer, who are incentivised based on US GAAP performance, would 
prefer to reduce the volatility of the capital due to interest rate changes, thus 
would prefer shorter assets, or decreasing asset duration. This conflict around the 
asset-liability management of the insurance company prompted the risk people 
not only to challenge the legitimacy of accounting controls over capital 
management, but also to draw question marks over the primacy of accounting 
controls in performance measurement. As the previously quoted member of the 
taskforce put it:
'In my view  the b iggest problem  of this organisation is that som eb od y  
som etim e a g o  d e c id e d  to m a n a g e  it on a  US GAAP basis an d  not on an  
e c o n o m ic  basis. When they m oved  the acco u n tin g  from the old Swiss GAAP to 
the US GAAP they also d e c id e d  to m o v e  the m a n a g e m e n t incentives on a  US 
GAAP basis too. That m eans w e  h a v e  not m uch focu s on the ec o n o m ic  view and  
on the ERC.'144
It is worth noting that insurance accounting is contested even in the 
accounting world. Horton and Macve (2000, 2005) track how standard setters 
have been developing proposals for standardising accounting for insurance 
companies. They point out that the working group of standard setters does 
recognise the same anomaly described by BWT’s risk specialists: '‘while the 
investments that insurers hold are already accounted for by ‘marking to market ’ 
to varying degrees in different countries, their insurance liabilities are not 
generally accounted for at current value. At present, therefore, the results and 
reported net assets ( ‘shareholders equity ’) o f many insurers (and particularly o f 
US insurers under US GAAP) are subject to greater volatility than would be i f  the 
‘matching’ o f the value o f their asset and liability positions were properly 
reflected in their financial statements. ,145 The contested nature of US GAAP for 
insurance accounting is emphasised further by the observation that ‘even in the 
USA, there is widespread acceptance that the current package o f GAAP that has 
accumulated over the last twenty years or so for insurance business is no longer 
adequate.’146 Horton and Macve (2000) argue that so far the working group has 
failed to produce a set of proposals that ‘will command support in actuarially 
sophisticated countries. ’ Consequently, based on ‘a considerable body o f opinion
144 V ice President, Economic Risk Capital and Capital Management, BWT
145 Horton and Macve (2000), p. 2.
146 Horton and Macve, (2000), p. 4.
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in the industry ’, they predict that ''by default, universal adoption o f current US 
GAAP for insurance accounting will be the inevitable result (because ‘it is 
there ’), at least fo r global companies that are listed across international capital 
markets.’147 However, it was not until 2004 that the IASB issued IFRS4 on 
Insurance Contracts. The standard was approved by only eight members of the 
fourteen-member Board, suggesting its contested nature. Furthermore, the IASB’s 
insurance accounting standard setting project continues -  IFRS 4 marked only the 
end of ‘Phase I*. Horton and Macve (2005) sceptically comment: ‘Despite a 
plethora o f very lengthy discussion papers and exposure drafts, so little tangible 
progress has been made since the IASB launched its project in 1997 that the 
prospects for a timely completion o f Phase II  o f the IASB’s project must still seem 
remote. [...] Moreover, the difficulties, both technical and political, highlighted 
by the insurance project, in conjunction with those relating to 'financial 
instrum entshave in turn cast more fundamental doubts on the standard setters
1 4 0
overall approach to accounting standards... ’
BWT’s risk expert who was a member of the taskforce, which reviewed 
Division X’s capital adequacy and the alternative ways of controlling it going 
forward, did not question the external legitimacy of the US GAAP-based 
accounting controls:
‘[The acco u n tin g  controllers’] point of view  is that ‘this is w hat w e  publish, 
so it is im portant.’ If w e  ask ourselves, ‘c a n  w e  a c t  against the acco u n tin g  
standards?’ the answ er is no, the analysts and  the rating a g e n c ie s  would not 
recogn ise [a c c e p t]  that. The underlying question is w hether w e  a d d  m ore value  
by m an agin g  the co m p a n y  on e c o n o m ic  principles? Would this show up in the 
a cco u n tin g  sooner or later? Or w e  d o n ’t bother?’149
His boss, the Head of the Economic Risk Capital team, agreed:
*... the question arises if you w ant to steer the business from an  
a cco u n tin g  or an e c o n o m ic  perspective. Following public opinions, it is more 
a cco u n tin g  driven b e c a u se  of the problem s highlighted by the rating a g e n c ie s  in 
public.’'so
It appears that even though the risk people challenged the economic 
rationale of the US GAAP-based accounting control system, they did not
147 Horton and Macve (2000), p. 4.
148 Horton and Macve (2000), p. 14.
149 V ice President, Economic Risk Capital and Capital Management, BWT
150 Director, Head o f  Economic Risk Capital, BWT
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challenge its institutional appropriateness. This was so even thought US GAAP 
for insurance accounting, as argued by Horton and Macve (2000), was coming 
increasingly under attack even in the world of accounting standard setters.
4.4.3. S t r a t e g y  a d j u s t m e n t
The crisis situation presented risk people with an opportunity to enter a 
more strategic role. Re-capitalising Division X required a number of strategic 
adjustments -  a complete reshuffling of Division X ’s country portfolio, based on 
capital considerations. The top management at BWT showed an unprecedented 
interest in capital management issues, as perceived by a director from the CFO 
(finance) division:
‘C apital issues driving business decisions -  that's a  little bit new . The focus 
is so m uch on cap ita l m a n a g em en t now. This situation highlighted that w e  n eed  
a  better w ay  of, or m ore aggressive, or proactive cap ita l m a n a g em en t, if you 
will. So the term 'capital m a n a g e m e n t’ you cou ld  s e e  on various execu tive  
protocols, presentations e tc . [Leafs through presentations piled on the table] As 
for issues of cap ita l m an agem en t, w hether that b e  in the quantitative  
calculations of a  certain risk position... or issues like ‘g e e :  how  d o  w e  red u ce  our 
cap ita l n eed , d o  w e  n e e d  to g e t  rid of som e non-core businesses?’ - I think the 
m a n a g em en t aw areness at every level in the organisation, up to the Board is 
very-very h e ig h te n e d .'151
In the ensuing strategic readjustment process some risk controllers 
assumed a proactive role. A review of the capital adequacy of the international 
subsidiaries of Division X was to pre-empt a series of divestitures that aimed at 
easing the capital burden of BWT Group.
The Economic Capital team at BWT intended to capitalise on the 
enhanced credibility of the risk technologies that were the basis for elevating risk 
controls into the role of a strategic decision making tool:
'In the past no o n e  p erceived  [Division X] as a  risky business. We always 
w on d ered  why the ERC for [Division X] w as so high. P eop le  d o u b ted  if the  
m eth od o logy  ap p lied  for [Division X] w as right. It w as only in 2002 w hen risk 
m a n a g em en t w as regarded  better at [Division XJ. I think the ERC m ethodology ,
151 Director, CFO Division, BWT
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the c o n c e p t  of ERC is now  m uch more credible than before an d  has more 
credibility in Division X th an  in banking.1,52
The risk controllers at BWT proposed an ‘economic’ measure for the 
assessment of the capital adequacy of business units -  it was called the ERC ratio 
(compares the total ERC of the business unit with its available capital): ‘This is the 
best w ay to monitor the risk taking ca p a city . You can n ot b e a t  all problem s with 
only o n e  ratio, there are other KPIs (key perform ance indicators) that n e e d  to b e  
applied . But I think this is a  g o o d  ratio in order to discuss the strategy of [Division
X].’^
Due to a strong technical rational behind the ERC ratio, its application in 
divisional control was welcome by risk controllers in the insurance unit as well:
'Now w e  h a v e  limits on stand-alone ERCs but I w ould prefer to h a v e  limit 
on the ERC ratio. If w e  h a v e  en ou gh  capital, why would w e  bother about  
increasing risk? It is the [lack of] capital b a se , which should m ake us bother about  
risk.''54
Although the idea of applying the ERC ratio as a strategic decision­
making tool was appealing, not everyone among the risk people was convinced. 
There were unresolved technical issues (e.g. the calculation of available 
‘economic’ capital; setting a target for the ratio). Apart from these technical 
concerns, the CRO had reservations of a very different nature.
These came to the foreground when the ERC ratio was put forward as a 
strategic decision-making tool in the case of the disposal of one of Division X’s 
subsidiaries. Another example of the Bank’s tightened grip over the business unit, 
the divestiture decision was made by BWT’s board. The senior risk controller 
who advocated the ERC ratio recalled:
'In the [divestiture] c a s e  w e  highlighted that the risk situation w as ten se in 
terms of the ERC ratio. But then [the CRO] said w e  h a v e  to understand why ERC 
w as giving that signal. I said it w as b e c a u se  the ERC con ven tion  w as to take a  
haircut on deferred acquisition costs, just like on goodwill an d  other intangibles 
[when ca lcu lating  availab le eco n o m ic  capital]. Then he said, well, m a y b e  w e  
m a d e  a  mistake in applying the haircut! When w e  eventually p resented  it at the
152 Director, Head o f  Economic Risk Capital, BWT
153 Director, Head o f  Economic Risk Capital, BWT
154 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
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Risk M a n a g em en t C om m ittee the decision  w as already m a d e . M aybe it g a v e  an  
additional confirm ation...1,55
However, considering the wider political implications of deploying the 
ERC ratio in such a strategic role across the Bank, it appears that the cautious 
approach of the CRO was less to do with technique. He explained:
'I think w e  h a v e  ga in ed  quite a  g o o d  understanding of w hat ERC is and  
w hat ERC is not. Having said that, w e  h a v e  also a c h ie v e d  quite a  g o o d  
understanding of w here w e  c a n  actually use ERC an d  w here w e  ca n n o t use ERC. 
To g ive you an  exam p le, I think in the strategic planning process ideally you  
would say 'take the businesses, take the ERC those businesses w ould consum e, 
look at the ERC ratios, an d  rank th em .’ That’s the nai've solution. Unfortunately this 
d o es not work... [AM: Why not?) . . .b e c a u s e  of the in terd ep en d en cies. You h a v e  
a  co u p le  of nasty details o n c e  you g o  b a ck  to reality such as legal set-up, such  
as regulatory restrictions, an d  such as the question of how  in terd ep en d en t a  
business is.’156
In brief, the ‘economic’ aspect of the ERC ratio would have required a 
consideration of the interdependencies that existed among the business units: they 
relied on each other’s capital strength. Mapping the interdependencies into the 
ratio, with so much uncertainties surrounding the exercise, could arguably have 
been a matter of judgement and politics (Burchell et al., 1980). The potentially 
political nature of taking interdependencies into consideration had precedent at 
BWT. Historically, the Group had once experimented with value-based 
management157, an ‘economic’ divisional control technique that ran into a similar 
problem: the existence of interdependencies made the calculation of capital 
charges contested. The politics of mapping the interdependencies into that 
previous ‘economic’ (value-based) performance measurement framework was 
intense. Resistance from a powerful business unit coupled with other factors led 
to the abortion of the VBM implementation. The fact that the current CEO of 
BWT was formerly the head of this powerful banking unit, is suggestive that the 
decision to keep the ERC ratio out of strategic control and divisional performance 
measurement was as much political as technical.
155 Director, Head o f  Economic Risk Capital, BWT
156 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
157 Value-based management focuses on the economic value added or residual income in 
comparing and measuring business performance. The value added is the difference between the 
operating profit and a capital charge to reinforce the fact that managers create value if  and only 
i f  their business unit earns a return in excess o f  the cost o f capital.
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4.4.4. R e c a p it a l is in g  D i v i s i o n X
There was another political consideration: the accounting control function 
firmly resisted the deployment of the ERC ratio as a divisional control tool. Their 
opposition was rooted in a different cause: they defended the economic rationale 
of the accounting controls. Once ERC as a controlling tool had gained a higher 
profile with its ability to track the worsening capital and risk profile of Division 
X, risk people often contrasted this success with the perceived inadequacy of the 
accounting-based controls over Division X’s solvency. The Head of Controlling 
had a different viewpoint:
‘A nybody w ho would h a v e  b een  interested in reading the numbers could  
h a v e  learned a  lot out of them  without any fan cy  calcu lations of ERC.'158
Further, the controlling department had already a control tool for the 
measurement of Division X’s capital adequacy. It was the EU solvency ratio159, 
which derived its legitimacy from its US GAAP basis and the fact that it was a 
well-established regulatory tool:
‘There is a  so lvency ratio in p la ce , which is the regulatory requirement; it 
has to b e  greater than 150%. It is b a sed  on US GAAP. This is th e  main tool of 
statutory regulation. The EU solvency ratio has not g o t ERC in its numerator, it 
reflects the acco u n tin g  view [of capital]. The denom inator is a  certain  
p e r c e n ta g e  of net premiums written. If premiums g o  up, the denom inator g o es  
up an d  the ratio d ecrea ses . [AM: So w hat h ap p en s if they [Division X] breach  the  
so lvency  ratio limit?] There w as a  capital injection in June, a  cap ita l injection in 
Septem ber; they h a v e  to focus on businesses w hich are well ca p ita lised .'160
As accounting controllers saw the ERC ratio not as a complementary, but 
as a competing control tool, they resisted it. From their point of view there was an 
accounting control available for the Division’s capital adequacy, the merit of 
which was seen in its institutional appropriateness, the way it directly responded 
to institutional requirements.
158 Head o f  Controlling, BWT
159 In 2002, the European Union Commission published a directive (com m only referred to as 
the ‘Solvency I Life Directive’) which served to update the capital requirements for EU 
authorised insurers and friendly societies. This Directive is wide-ranging in its scope, affecting 
both the regulatory minimum capital that an insurer must hold, and also how it calculates the 
total amount o f  capital that it has available. The solvency ratio (or solvency margin) requires a 
minimum surplus capital that insurers need to hold over and above a percentage o f  net 
premiums written.
160 Head o f  Controlling, BWT
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Due to the realities of the politics of control, the risk function was 
prevented from the deployment of the ERC ratio in divisional control. Division 
X’s recapitalisation was led by accounting controls. Also, the subsequent 
reconsideration of Division X’s country portfolio and the wave of divestitures of 
the weakly capitalised businesses were driven by accounting-based solvency 
considerations.
The politics of control that unfolded suggests that instrumental to the 
success or failure of competing control systems is the extent to which they were 
able to respond to the legitimating demands of the external environment. In the 
case of the capital management of the insurance business, risk people bowed in 
front of the higher institutional appropriateness of accounting controls.
It is worth noting that the discrepancy between the ‘economic’ and the 
‘accounting’ world is specific to the insurance industry, due to the particulars of 
insurance accounting and insurance regulation. Division X’s risk people remained 
critical about the implications of accounting controls for capital management:
'As a  conclusion of this, the rating a g e n c ie s  an d  the regulators will n eed  
to rethink their ap p ro a ch . On o n e  hand, in g o o d  times w hen  share prices are 
going up, w e  should include additional cap ita l ch a rg e  for a  riskier investm ent 
strategy. Probably [Division X] would h ave n e e d e d  in the 90s m ore cap ita l than  
w as required by the external environment. And to d a y  the requirem ent should b e  
less.'161
At BWT the task force set up by the risk function accepted the realities of 
the institutional environment, but did not acknowledge full defeat. Its 
spokesperson concluded:
'I forgot to m ention that o n e  point w e  said w as to e d u c a te  the outside  
world a b o u t the shortcom ings of the US GAAP. That w as actually a  key point.''62
One should note that the IASB’s ongoing project for standardising 
insurance accounting might gradually erode the supremacy and institutional 
appropriateness of US GAAP for insurance accounting. However, BWT’s case 
suggests just how influential US GAAP was considered even by those who were 
critical of it, at the time of the study.
161 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
162 V ice President, Economic Risk Capital, BWT
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4.5. D i s c u s s io n  a n d  c o n c l u s io n
This chapter sought to explore the changing context and internal dynamics 
of a multiple control system acting as divisional control. The study probed why 
certain control systems become implicated in divisional control and 
organizational change while others get substituted or marginalised.
Contingency research has yielded a number of results that appear to 
answer the question. Simons (1991) for example argued that at times of increased 
environmental hostility top management resorts to using more than one control 
systems interactively, and we have evidence from Chapman (1998) that the role 
of informal controls complementing formal accounting systems intensifies under 
conditions of high uncertainty. The case of divisional control provided similar 
evidence. In the observed crisis situation top management indeed took advantage 
of both accounting and risk controls, they personally got involved with the 
running of Division X, and the role of informal interactions between the 
headquarters and the business unit was to complement the control tightening that 
was taking place, as well as to assuage the tensions that went with it.
Regrettably, the contingency perspective stops short of explaining the 
dynamics that took place within the multiple control package (containing 
accounting and risk controls both at BWT and Division X). Divisional control 
became a terrain where risk and accounting controls did not only complement 
each other (as contingency theory suggests) but also competed with each other for 
prevalence. To understand this aspect of the use of multiple controls, the chapter 
adopted a political and institutional perspective.
It has been argued that the rise and fall of particular management control 
systems depend upon their institutional appropriateness and their capability of 
legitimising the organization that adopts them. As external requirements change, 
the definition of institutional appropriateness shifts as well, and new control 
systems become implicated in organizational change and action.
Pre-crisis, Division X had accounting and risk controls that were unique to 
itself within the Group. Its accounting controls were characterised by the 
particularities of insurance accounting and its risk controls pioneered risk 
technologies that were adequate for the insurance business. Division X’s
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accounting and risk controls possessed institutional appropriateness in the 
insurance world.
The financial crisis seriously damaged the legitimacy of the insurance 
unit’s accounting controls as a basis for divisional control. Further, Division X 
needed to enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of BWT’s top management who for a 
while considered disposing of the business unit.
At the same time, amongst widespread speculations of the weakening of 
the entire group’s capital base and take-over threats, the whole group needed to 
increase its legitimacy in front of external observers such as regulators, peers, 
investment analysts and rating agencies.
The new accounting control system (bancassurance) helped Division X to 
regain its legitimacy within the group. By adopting a US GAAP-based accounting 
control system for internal controlling purposes (as well as for external financial 
reporting), BWT, an international group of companies, appealed to notions of 
accounting harmonization and increased transparency. Also, the implementation 
of a firm-wide, ‘consistent and comprehensive’ risk management system, with 
economic capital as its flagship-technology, corresponds well with recent 
initiatives in international banking capital regulation.
Taking the argument further, it was due to their institutional 
appropriateness that both the new (bancassurance) accounting control system and 
the risk management system were used interactively during the crisis and high 
environmental hostility. This relaxes the rather strong assumption that Simons 
(1990, 1991) makes about top management’s knowledge of key strategic 
uncertainties and their deliberate choice of matching control systems to be used 
interactively. According to an institutional reading of control system selection, it 
was not a deliberate strategy, but merely the objective of (re)gaining legitimacy 
and securing organisational survival that led to the activation of an institutionally 
appropriate control system package. What Simons considers as top management’s 
choice of interactive controls, is here argued to be the result of a competition 
among control systems for visibility and dominance by demonstrating 
institutional appropriateness.
During the period of recovery, it became more evident that control 
systems do indeed compete for visibility and dominance by striving to enhance 
their legitimacy. In the areas of crisis recognition and capital management, risk
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controls challenged accounting controls. The risk controllers appealed to 
economic rationale and advocated the ‘economic’ view of the organization as an 
alternative to the ‘non-economic’ accounting (US GAAP) view. However, 
furthering an ‘economic’ view took risk people out of the realm of economic 
calculations to the arena of organizational politics.
It would be hard to argue that the risk controllers’ view of capital 
adequacy (as opposed to the one of accounting controllers) was intrinsically more 
‘economic’. Similarly, it would be hard to establish that accounting controls 
(furthering US GAAP solvency) were fundamentally non-economic. Instead it 
appeared that risk controllers and accounting controllers furthered merely 
alternative and competing representations of the economic reality of the firm. 
Risk people’s claim of having the ability to express the ‘economic’ realities of 
capital adequacy went hand in hand with their dismissal of US GAAP’s ‘un­
economic’ nature. Nevertheless, this was a rather ideological campaign. For 
accounting controls also claim an economic view. The contested nature and 
difficulties of insurance accounting standard setting (Horton and Macve, 2000, 
2005) show that the accounting community itself is divided about what that 
economic view should be. This suggests that there might be room for various 
approaches to insurance accounting, all of which can merely approximate a 
complex and hard-to-capture economic reality.
Given that the accounting and the risk controls sent conflicting signals, the 
politics of multiple controls intensified. This was because controls that send 
conflicting signals are not complementary any more -  they offer substitution to 
each other. The question of the ERC ratio’s deployment in controlling Division X 
going forward was a salient example of the politics of multiple controls. The 
politics of multiple control was played out in a series of contests.
First, risk people were competing for legitimacy by disputing the 
economic rationale of the accounting controls. They succeeded in discrediting 
Division X’s pre-crisis accounting controls at BWT, but it was not the risk 
function, but BWT’s own accounting control function that capitalised on this. The 
new bancassurance template was moved swiftly in the space left open as the old 
insurance accounting controls were pushed into the background in divisional 
control.
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Second, the ‘economic’ approach required a consideration of the 
interdependencies of the business units that relied on each other’s capital strength 
-  an issue of judgement and negotiation. This meant that any economic approach 
(be it economic capital allocations or value-based management) to capital 
management or performance measurement faced the challenge of negotiating 
through the implications of interdependencies. At BWT, value based management 
had been stalled due to such difficulties, and the risk controllers (for the time 
being) kept away from the politics of resolving the interdependencies.
Finally, risk people claimed influence in the capital management of the 
insurance division -  where they encroached upon the territory of accounting- 
based controls. Given that in the insurance industry the regulation of capital 
adequacy builds on accounting technologies (e.g. the prominence of the ‘US 
GAAP solvency ratio’), accounting controls possess institutional appropriateness. 
BWT’s risk controls complied with a fundamentally different regulatory regime: 
that of banking capital adequacy. The ‘economic capital’ view, though legitimate 
in the banking world, proved to be conflicting with the accounting view, then 
appropriate in the insurance world.163 As for the capital management of the 
insurance unit, risk controllers had to bend in front of the higher institutional 
appropriateness of the accounting controls.
BWT’s case has intriguing policy implications for the regulation of 
bancassurance companies. Combining banking with the insurance business, these 
organizations must comply with both banking and insurance regulatory regimes. 
Given the current direction of international banking regulation, banking 
supervisors reward the firm-wide implementation of risk controls (The Basel 
Committee, 2001; Morrison, 2002), and firm-wide risk management (alias ERM) 
is emerging as a ‘world model’ in financial institutions (Power, 2004). Enterprise 
risk management promotes the extension of the ‘economic capital’ view on the 
entire financial organisation. However, as the case has shown, such firm-wide risk 
management attempts may well run into difficulties in the insurance part of
163 As noted previously, Horton and Macve (2000) draw attention to the fact that disputes about 
US GAAP for insurance did exist at the time. Thus, in the world o f  standard setters there was 
no unique ‘accounting’ view. However, the perceived institutional appropriateness o f  the US 
GAAP was quite dominant. This is likely to change due to recent development in international 
accounting standard setting. Horton and Macve (2005) reflect on the IASB’s efforts to 
‘establish the credibility o f  international standards vis-a-vis US GA A P.’ (Horton and Macve, 
2005:10).
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bancassurance groups. In this case, where accounting controls measure capital 
adequacy and ensure regulatory compliance, the risk controls lose their 
institutional appropriateness. The case study showed how the risk controls 
challenged accounting controls in the insurance unit... in vain. The control 
systems ended up confined to where they possessed institutional appropriateness. 
Consequently, firm-wide risk management (and risk controls) did not make a 
difference in the control of the insurance division where the accounting controls 
prevailed. Due to the conflicting definitions of regulatory appropriateness in the 
banking and the insurance world, bancassurance groups have to live with a 
balance of controls, which frustrates the ideal of firm-wide risk management. This 
warrants a reconsideration of regulatory expectations about the role of risk 
management in bancassurance groups.
The case of the divisional control over BWT’s insurance company 
suggests that in the presence of conflicting regulatory expectations risk controls 
bowed in front of the accounting controls that enjoyed a higher institutional 
appropriateness. However, given the currently contested nature of insurance 
accounting in the world of standard setters, it is plausible that the institutional 
appropriateness of current accounting controls will eventually shift according to a 
new accounting view, which might be yet another economic representation of risk 
and capital adequacy in the insurance world. As multiple representations of the 
economic are possible, the institutional appropriateness of control systems (be 
they ‘risk’ or ‘accounting’ controls) is liable to shift, creating opportunities for 
different actors, inside and outside the organisation,164 to become implicated in 
the definitions of capital adequacy and performance. The next chapter further 
probes how risk controls stand up to accounting controls in the face of other 
conflicting pressures. In particular, it will address a very general conflict of 
objectives that troubles many financial services firms: how to deal with 
conflicting profit-seeking and risk management initiatives.
164 Horton and Macve (2005) draw attention to the increasing responsibility o f  the auditors in 
the accounting practices o f insurance companies, in particular, the role o f auditors in providing 
assurance on the full balance sheet and capital adequacy calculations (traditionally the role o f  
actuaries.).
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C h a p t e r  5
R i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  c o m p l e x
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS
‘Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper  
when he is called upon to act in accordance with
the dictates o f  reason.'
Oscar Wilde
Chapter 3 described the alternative patterns of strategic significance that the 
observed risk functions displayed: one required risk management to become an 
integral part of planning and control (at Frasers), the other was based on the 
senior risk officers’ active involvement with key strategic decisions that were 
discussed outside the formal planning cycle (BWT). In both cases the influence of 
risk officers hinged upon the nature of alliances they were able to form with 
planners and controllers. Management control, from this account, appeared to be 
about the operation of a multiple control package where accounting and risk 
controls competed for relevance and managerial attention.
Chapter 4 provided an organisational-symbolic explanation (Dutton, 1997) 
for the rise and fall of individual controls in multiple control packages. The 
interactive use of risk controls (e.g. the frequent and regular attention devoted to 
risk controls, the creation of task forces and committees) was both instrumental 
and symbolic. It carried meaning for members inside and outside the organization. 
It signalled top management’s commitment to tightening control over the 
underperforming business unit. Chapter 4 further emphasised the micropolitics of 
control. Risk and accounting controls appeared to be complementary during the 
crisis period (when both got interactively used for a while). However, in the 
redefinition of divisional control, going forward, they became rivals to each other. 
In particular, the politics of divisional control intensified when risk controls and 
accounting controls signalled conflicting implications for the capital management 
of the insurance unit -  at that stage they claimed to substitute each other.
This chapter is based on the observation that risk management and 
accounting controls can give conflicting signals to organizational actors - and not
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only in specialist cases confined to bancassurance groups. Minimising risk and 
maximising return are often conflicting objectives in business organisations, 
particularly so in financial services.
Indeed, it is well-recognised that multiple, competing and even conflicting 
objectives may well be present within the same organization. This can give rise to 
the simultaneous application of several control systems, conveying often 
confusing and even contradicting signals. Under such circumstances a gap might 
open between traditional notions of management control and the actual control 
practices that surface.
Otley (1994) and Otley et al. (1995) have argued that although traditional 
controls may in principle be applicable for large hierarchical manufacturing 
organizations, contemporary changes have resulted in more complex control 
practices. They attribute the rise of complex controls to the increased uncertainty 
in the operating environment of many firms. This, it is argued, has led to a 
reduction of the power of traditional control systems: the ability of cybernetic 
models to determine and monitor means and ends has decreased. Given a 
perceived shortage of empirical evidence and a need for more detailed 
conceptualisation of complex controls, Otley et al (1995) call for more empirical 
and theoretical research.
This chapter will argue that the simultaneous application of traditional 
controls might also create an operating environment in which the very notion of 
cybernetic control can get compromised. It has been argued that the blueprints of 
both risk management and accounting controls are essentially cybernetic. Their 
simultaneous application, however, might result in control situations in which 
goals and cause-effect relationships can be highly ambiguous. Such situations can 
be expected to give rise to apparently complex, non-cybemetic applications. The 
aim of this chapter is to improve our understanding of this complexity.
The inclusion of formal risk controls into the organizational control 
landscape gives a new visibility for the risk aspect of the old risk-retum dilemma. 
If risk and return are conflicting objectives, then the suggestions of risk controls 
can easily be at odds with other return-oriented control systems. This can be 
expected to make organizational control ridden with confusing signals, problems 
and complexity. The role of risk management in influencing the strategies that 
organizations deploy to cope with the newly visible risk-retum dilemmas
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therefore adds an additional facet to our understanding of the organizational 
significance of ERM.
Following Argyris (1976) the chapter applies the distinction between three 
types of theories. Firstly there are the traditional normative theories (for example 
that of cybernetic control), which can be found written up in textbooks and in the 
normative literature. Individual practitioners have an enthusiasm for some of 
these theories, which they hold as ‘espoused theories'. People report espoused 
theories as the basis for their actions. They often do so even when the actual 
actions defy conformity to the cited models. This is because ‘the empirical fact to 
date is that very few  individuals can routinely act on their espoused values and 
skills, yet they are often unaware o f this situation'165. Argyris observes that 
individuals create designs that they do not follow but that they believe they do 
follow, while they are also unaware of this discrepancy. Consequently, the actual 
'theories-in-use' can differ significantly from the espoused theories (Argyris, 
1995). In such cases espoused theories serve as the rationalization of actions.
The objective of the chapter is threefold. First, it aims to uncover the 
normative and espoused theories that were cited as relevant to the control of risk 
and return objectives in the case study companies. The cases of BWT and Frasers 
will be revisited. It will be argued that the cybernetic notion of control has a 
strong hold not only in the normative risk literature (c.f. Chapter 2), but also over 
the risk practitioners at the case study banks.
The second objective of the chapter is to offer field study evidence for the 
presence and workings of the cybernetic control ideal in risk management. The 
cases are suggestive of the conceptual power of the cybernetic control ideal, 
however, the actual practices observed appear to be distinctly non-cybemetic.
Thirdly, the chapter attempts to conceptualise the apparent theories-in-use. 
This conceptualisation is somewhat speculative, but by attempting it we can draw 
attention to the mismatch between the normative (regulatory) prescriptions of risk 
management, the espoused theories that practitioners report to hold, and the actual 
observed practice of controlling risk and return in financial organisations.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section reviews a body of 
theoretical literature on cybernetic control practices and argues that the cybernetic
165 Argyris (1995), p. 22.
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control ideal has influenced risk management blueprints. The second and third 
sections turn to the case studies. They trace out the espoused theories that 
practitioners held about risk control, and the realities of actual risk control when it 
appears in the context of controlling both risk and return objectives. Finally, the 
Discussion section aims to formalise the apparent theories-in-use by demarcating 
the features that distinguish them from the espoused theories.
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5.1. R is k  m a n a g e m e n t  and  t h e  c y b e r n e t ic  c o n t r o l  b l u e p r in t
Popular definitions of management control such as those proposed by 
Anthony (1965) and Lowe (1971) are rooted in control system theory and 
describe what one could refer to as the ‘traditional’ or the ‘cybernetic’ ideal of 
control (Lilienfeld, 1978; Hofstede, 1978). In particular, Anthony ‘s widely 
quoted definition of management control ( 'the process by which managers ensure 
that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment o f the organization's objectives'166) has been broadened by 
others to spell out the elements of control. An example is Lowe (1971) who 
identifies '‘information seeking and gathering, accountability and feedback 
designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes'' and achieves its overall 
objectives. Together these two popular definitions describe the cybernetic control 
ideal: ‘a process which uses the negative feedback loop represented by: setting 
goals, measuring achievement, comparing achievement to goals, feeding back 
information about unwanted variances into the process to be controlled, and
1 f \  7correcting the process. ’
In order to be applicable, the cybernetic control ideal presupposes that a 
number of conditions are met: there is a clearly defined standard or objective, 
actual accomplishment is measurable, and variance information can be used to 
intervene in a timely manner. Furthermore, there are demands on organizational 
arrangements: a division of labour between the controller (‘staff) and the 
controlled (Tine management’), a shared understanding of the objectives, as well 
as motivation to act according to the control model, and effective communication. 
Taken together, these conditions ensure the presence of ‘cybernetic validity’168 
(Beer, 1981). Hofstede (1978) offers a similar, but more concise set of criteria for 
cybernetic validity: presence of standards, measurable accomplishment, usable 
feedback.169 The presence of standards, and the behavioural conditions (such as 
the shared understanding of the standard, motivation to respect it etc.) ensure that 
actors are supposed to follow an overriding objective, or at least a set of
166 Anthony (1965)
167 Hofstede (1978), p.451.
168 Beer (1981), p. 17 defines cybernetic validity in control systems terms as follows: a process 
that ‘must have a feedback loop in which a standard, a sensor, a discriminator and an effector 
are present.’
169 Hofstede (1978), p. 457.
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complementary, non-conflicting goals, thus cybernetic control is theoretically 
possible.
A somewhat dated survey, but nevertheless remarkable for its wide 
historical sweep, Giglioni and Bedeian (1974)’s review of over hundred titles, 
concludes that management control theory between 1900 and 1972 reflected 
entirely the cybernetic paradigm. More than a decade later, Ezzamel and Dent 
(1987) assert a similar argument: ‘ cybernetic concepts form the basis fo r many o f 
the more traditional management controls, fo r example, the principle o f 
management by exception, or in a more specific context, budgetary control and
170variance analysis.’ These practices are well documented in text books and
policy manuals.
Chapter 2 pre-empted the argument that risk management is yet another 
control system innovation conceived in accordance with the cybernetic control 
paradigm (2.3.1.). In particular, the cybernetic notion of control is present in the 
way risk management is prescribed for financial institutions in the normative 
practitioner literature.
Three elements of the regulators’ proposed risk management framework 
stand out, which together put the three conditions of cybernetic validity 
(objective, measurability and feedback) on the risk management agenda. Firstly, 
the regulators provide risk management with the task of deriving clear and stable 
objectives: ''From a decision making perspective, (...) risk management typically 
involves the establishment o f hierarchical limit systems and risk management 
committees to help determine how to set and allocate such limits. ,171 Paraphrasing 
Thompson and Tuden (1959), a hierarchical process is expected, starting with a 
statement of the overall risk limit o f the organization, escalating down to lower 
level risk limits fo r the organization.
Secondly, the regulators require risk managers to make the controlled 
process (the risk profile of the bank) measurable: ‘ Common tasks for dedicated 
risk management functions include the development (...) o f common definitions 
and metrics for risk throughout the firm. (...) The Working Group believes that 
supervisors and regulators should continue to monitor and support(...) firm s’
170 Ezzamel and Dent (1987), p.92.
171 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1.
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efforts to develop means o f aggregating (to the degree possible) their risks. ’172 
This presupposes the existence of risk quantification methodologies that address 
different types of risks consistently and thus can aggregate them into a single 
measure.
Finally, the regulators emphasize the reporting and feedback aspect of 
cybernetic controls: the prescribed risk management framework includes ''the
171preparation o f risk reports for senior management. ’ The regulators observe 
that accordingly, ‘many firms have invested (...) in centralized information 
systems to help keep track o f risks within the firm .,174
It also appears that the very same control ideal has left a mark on the risk 
management guidelines in the corporate governance literature too. The influential 
COSO document, which outlines the Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
(COSO, 2003), recommends that the risk control process includes objective 
setting, event identification, risk assessment (c.f. measurement), risk response as 
well as reporting and monitoring (c.f. feedback). This model of organizational risk 
management can be recognised in subsequent corporate governance publications, 
such as the one recently issued by the Institute of Directors (Institute of Directors, 
2004)'75.
From a controlling viewpoint, two questions can now be addressed. First, 
does the actual risk profile of the bank correspond to what is found necessary (and 
acceptable) by the board of directors? The second question is, how to articulate 
the necessary and acceptable level of risk-taking, metaphorically also known as 
the ‘risk appetite’ of the bank? These questions have eluded banks for a long time. 
It is the invention of risk measurement metrics that can be aggregated across 
different risk types (c.f. economic capital) that makes the ideal of cybernetic 
control look practicable in the financial services sector. The developments in the 
risk measurement technology thus reinforce the cybernetic control ideal by 
(apparently) creating the conditions of possibility for it in the risk management 
area.
172 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1-2.
173 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1.
174 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1.
175 The IoD advocates a four step control process consisting o f  policy setting (c.f. objective 
setting), risk assessment (c.f. measurement), risk treatment and risk monitoring (c.f. feedback).
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Accordingly, the normative practitioner literature echoes the regulatory and 
corporate governance models of risk control. In this literature new risk 
management metrics gain legitimacy by their claimed ability to help practitioners 
exercise the prescribed control cycle over the risk profile of their institution. Even 
the critics of the literature accept the plausibility of cybernetic control over risk, 
uncritically. Their concern rests with the reliability and the robustness of the 
measurement techniques that the normative literature advocates. For example 
Danielsson (2001) mounted a critique on Value-at Risk on the grounds that 
‘current risk modelling technology still is in the early stages o f development, is 
lacking the robustness o f risk forecasts, and produces excessively volatile risk
17forecasts. '
Significantly, the normative literature’s concern is with the quality of risk 
modelling per se, and not with the control logic that the techniques are supposed 
to serve: ‘I f  risk modelling is not done with great skill and care, the risk forecast 
will be unreliable to the point o f being useless. Or even worse, it may impose 
significant but unnecessary costs on the financial institution, due to the 
misallocation o f capital and excessive portfolio rebalancing.1,77 This quote is 
based on the implicit assumption that risk models are used in the cybernetic way 
by practitioners -  the results of the models are supposed to determine the capital 
allocations and the corrective actions, such as portfolio rebalancing. There 
remains a great deal of optimism in the normative literature about the possibility 
of creating the measurement models that make the cybernetic ideal practicable, as 
suggested by Danielsson (2001)’s concluding remarks: 'A risk model which 
incorporates insights from economic and financial theory, in conjunction with 
data during crisis, has the potential to provide much more accurate answers... 
[...] Risk modelling does, however, serve a function when implemented correctly
i  no
internally within the firm... ’
The next section turns to investigate to what extent the cybernetic design 
principles (apparently embedded in the normative and regulatory literature) 
transpired in the actual risk management practices of the two case study 
organisations.
176 Danielsson (2001), p.20.
177 Ibid., p.20.
178 Danielsson (2001), p.21.
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5.2. ‘R e f l e c t iv e ’ r is k  c o n t r o l  a t  BWT
As explained in Chapter 3, the development of the risk management 
function at BWT resulted in three separate types of risk officers. The first group 
of risk silo officers was organized in three sub-departments (Market Risk 
Controlling, Credit Risk Controlling and Operational Risk Controlling). During 
the course of the study all of them were engaged in the development of new risk 
measurement techniques. Secondly, based on the risk measurements provided by 
the three risk management silos, the Economic Risk Capital team determined the 
amount of capital to be allocated to each risk category and the aggregate amount 
of Economic Risk Capital (ERC) that BWT and each of its subsidiaries ought to 
hold. By promoting the importance of setting limits for the overall risk that the 
group (and its individual subsidiaries) took, these risk capital specialists strived to 
add further risk controls to the management of organizational life. Finally, senior 
risk officers had secured Board-level visibility to the results of both of these 
activities. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, risk reports got frequent attention from top 
management at the time of economic crisis, however, there was little evidence for 
the continuing interactive use of formal measurement-based risk controls. Senior 
risk officers started to deploy their agenda-setting power for the discussion of 
non-quantifiable risk issues instead.
5.2.1. T h e  e s p o u s e d  t h e o r i e s  o f  r i s k  c o n t r o l  a n d  c a p i t a l  m a n a g e m e n t  
ATBWT
The blueprint that the risk management function followed was articulated 
not only by several interviewees, but also by internal policy documents, 
presentations, and the annual reports of BWT. The 2001 Annual Report described 
a risk management framework that was very much in line with the industry 
standard set by the normative-regulatory literature:
‘[BWT Group] has d e v e lo p e d  an integrated framework of best-p ractice  
risk m a n a g em en t, risk policies, m ethodologies structure an d  infrastructure. [BWT 
Group] is linking risk m a n a g em en t an d  perform ance m easurem ent using an  
Econom ic Risk Capital framework, with E conom ic Risk C apital u sa g e  as the 
com m on  denom inator for all major risks. Together with a  proactive risk
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m a n a g em en t culture and  the appropriate qualitative an d  quantitative tools, this 
econom ic cap ita l m a n agem en t framework supports decision-making b y  senior 
m a n a g em en t a t [BWT Group], thus linking risk m a n a g em en t to the Group's 
shareholder value strategy. [...] In addition, [BWT Group] is closely following the 
d ev elo p m en t of the new  BIS capital a d e q u a c y  fram ew ork...'179
This overall blueprint is indicative of the espoused theory of risk control 
which was reported to shareholders by BWT’s risk department. According to this 
description, risk management was linked to capital management as well as to key 
strategic decision making. Next we turn to the espoused theories that were 
communicated in the course of the research interviews, both about the link 
between risk control and capital management (this such-section), and the other 
supposed link between risk control and strategic decision making (the following 
sub-section).
The director who was responsible for risk communication at group level 
explained the risk management framework as follows:
'In an  organisation like ours there is a  hierarchy of limits. There is an overall 
ERC for [BWT], [the investm ent banking arm of the Group], an d  limits for certain  
risk areas, for exa m p le  private capital exposures. Then it g o e s  dow n to divisions, 
a n d  risk ca teg o r ies  to prevent risk concentration  in certain risk buckets. Most of 
them  are in terms of ERC but som e of them  are VaR. It g o e s  dow n to the 
individual trading desk. At the board level, to b e  frank, the limit is not extremely 
tight. Unless w e  h a v e  a  major c h a n g e  in our risk profile you w ould not e x p e c t  that 
the limit is b rea ch ed . We also h a v e  warning flags. If risk reach es 90% [of the limit] 
w e  discuss it. We w ant to c rea te  a  fe e d b a c k  process so that issues are 
[discussed] at th e right tim e.'180
By establishing the hierarchy of limits, BWT Group set the risk limit o f the 
organization, as well as risk limits for the organization. This reported design 
feature corresponds to the first condition of cybernetic validity. In addition, a 
feedback process was designed, based on ‘warning flags’ and a vertical reporting 
chain that went up to the Group Board. This design feature appears to echo 
another cybernetic design principle (feedback). The risk profile of the 'risk 
buckets’ (business units, risk categories and even individual trading desks) was 
quantified, apparently in accordance with the cybernetic principle of
179 BWT Group Annual Report, with emphasis added by the researcher. No page number given 
for confidentiality reasons.
180 Director o f  Risk Reporting, BWT Group
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measurement. There seemed to be an agreement in BWT about the desirability of 
measuring risk. This was said to be primarily motivated by concerns with capital 
management.
Capital management became a prominent issue during the economic crisis 
that saw a marked weakening of the group’s capital position. Regulators and 
rating agencies expressed doubt whether the available capital base of BWT 
sufficiently covered its risk profile, especially with respect to its troubled 
insurance company Division X. In 2002 this business unit suffered substantial 
investment losses. The group repeatedly injected additional capital into Division 
X in order to alleviate the weakening of the insurer’s balance sheet.
Such capital management concerns paved the way for new risk measures 
that could simultaneously indicate the amount of risk taken and the corresponding 
amount of capital that the bank (and its business units) ought to hold. A director 
from the CFO division explained:
‘In th e w ak e of [Division X's] capitalisation issue an d  the current e c o n o m ic  
environm ent there has b een  a  lot more focus on cap ita l m a n a g em en t... on 
knowing, understanding, being ab le  to report on a  m ore frequent basis w hat our 
capital position is, w hat influences it, w hat kind of scenarios cou ld  h a p p en  and  
w hat m easures are possible. Of course w hen w e  w ere discussing Division X’s 
capital, the obvious question w as, w hat c a n  w e  d o  to a lleviate [the situation]... 
Capital issues driving business decisions -  th at’s a  little bit new . The focus is so 
m uch on cap ita l m a n a g em en t now. This situation highlighted that w e  n eed  a  
better w ay  of, or m ore aggressive, or proactive cap ita l m a n a g em en t, if you
will.''81
Three measurement techniques emerged with the promise of 
simultaneously indicating the risk profile and the capital need of the bank. The 
first one was called the ‘Respectability Capital’ -  it was a multiple of the 
minimum regulatory capital that the bank ought to have held. In effect, it 
indicated a safer cushion than the minimum capital. However, the explanation 
given for the origin of the multiplier that determined the extra margin of safety 
was not technical. A risk officer put it as follows:
'The multiplier is a  m atter of judgem ent: h ow  m uch the market ex p ects  
you to  hold .''82
181 Director, CFO Division, BWT
182 Team member, Economic Risk Capital team, BWT
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The other two risk (and capital) measures appeared to be more technical. 
One of these was value-at-risk, the measure that was well established in the 
normative risk management literature and text books. The other was Economic 
Risk Capital (ERC), which, according to BWT’s risk officers, was emerging as 
the flagship (normative) technology of the risk measurement process in the 
financial services industry:
‘In our industry, e c o n o m ic  capital represents the em erging best practice  
for m easuring an d  reporting all quantifiable risks.’183
Economic risk capital was seen to be replacing value-at-risk (VaR), a 
perhaps more arcane, and older language of risk communication. The Director of 
Group Risk Reporting explained:
'Here traditionally only the trading book has b e e n  cap tu red  using VaR. 
With ERC w e  h a v e  other risks as well, so this is m ore com prehensive. We started to 
use it for the banking book, credit risk, em erging markets, ev en  insurance 
underwriting, so it is m uch m ore com prehensive in terms of w h at it captures. (...) It 
should allow for m ore m eaningful discussions with senior m a n a g e m e n t and  the 
Board w ho are not familiar with the specifics of VaR ...I m ean  they  are not familiar 
with the specifics of ERC either, but at least with ERC risk is expressed  in a  
com m on  unit, as consistently as possible. Yes, it is a  starting point for m eaningful 
an d  g o o d  discussions at senior m a n a g em en t level b e c a u s e  it m akes risk buckets 
com p arab le ... w h ereas with VaR you alw ays g e t  into the tech n ica l details. It is a  
bit geek y , although con cep tu a lly  the s a m e .’184
The following table summarises the main differences seen in the two 
measures of risk and capital adequacy, which constituted one of the espoused 
theories of risk measurement among the risk people.
ERC VaR
Scope o f  application More comprehensive (applicable for 
both the banking and the trading book)
Trading book only
Assumptions Parameters fixed across risk buckets Parameters are changed 
according to users’ needs
Expected impact Meaningful and good management 
discussions
Technical discussions
Overall assessment Suitable for senior management /  Board ‘Geeky’
Table 2. Two measures of risk
183 BWT Group Annual Report 2003
184 Director o f  Risk Reporting, BWT Group
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From the reports of these risk practitioners it transpires that the espoused 
theory of risk control at BWT resembled the cybernetic design in its aspirations. 
The espoused theory included limit setting, measurement and feedback. However, 
it also became apparent that there were competing risk measurements. In order to 
exercise control through measurement, there was a need for an agreement on a 
single measurement technique. This happened in two steps, according to another 
elaboration of the espoused theory of risk control.
First, the ERC metric was furthered to replace the apparently more arcane 
VaR measure in the risk control process. Risk officers were aware that the 
difference between the two was mostly semantic. ERC was in effect the 
application of the VaR technique to all risk areas (rather than just in the market 
risk silo), according to a common confidence level, which made the measures 
comparable across different risk types.
Second, the Respectability Capital was calculated in parallel, and 
compared to the ERC. The higher of the two was then considered as the measure 
of the risk profile and the corresponding capital need.
This is suggestive of an espoused theory of risk control in which capital 
management has become closely intertwined with risk control.
5.2.2. Th e  e s p o u s e d  t h e o r ie s  o f  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  s t r a t e g i c  
CONTROL AT B W T
The development of ERC was driven not only by capital management 
considerations (i.e. establishing a means of setting capital limits, tracking risk 
measurements and providing a feedback mechanism), but also by the intention to 
direct the attention of other organizational members to risk issues in the course of 
the strategic planning, decision making and control process. As one senior risk 
officer put it:
'We are the risk c o n sc ie n c e  of the bank. We h a v e  to b e  very sensitive to  risk, 
to s e e  risk w here others d o n 't.'185
Being the 'risk conscience’ of the bank even appeared explicitly in the 
mission statement of the risk department at BWT:
185 Head o f  Market Risk Controlling and Asset Liability Management, BWT
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‘Mission -  Act as the in d ep en d en t "risk co n sc ien ce"  a n d  policy enforcer for 
[BWT] for all risks that could  h a v e  a  material im pact on the firm in an in tegrated  
and com prehensive fashion. 186
Designing risk communication and getting ERC acceptable as a strategic 
control device in the eyes of the board (and other organizational members) was a 
major challenge for the risk function. ERC was put forward as a tool to control the 
overall risk profile of the organizational strategy:
‘What w e  c h a n g e d  this year are two things. First, w e  said: risk has to b e  an  
explicit top ic  in the strategic business plan. So you c a n ’t just say 'w e are planning 
to grow retail banking by 4% and private banking by 6%.' You h a v e  to m ake it 
explicit w hat the risk levels are going  to look like. [AM: How d o  you express risk 
level? In the form of ERC?] Yes, ERC. That’s a  fundam ental c h a n g e . (...) What w e  
also said was: the board of directors d o es  not only h a v e  to ap p rove the strategic  
business plan, but it also has to ap p rove the risk a p p etite ... in the form of an  
overall ERC limit for the Group. At least con cep tu a lly  that's h ow  you integrate risk 
in the strategy. It is another story w hether it actually flies.'187
This is suggestive of the presence of both the espoused theory and the a gap 
that might open between this and its application, in the mind of the CRO.
The espoused theory of risk control that was considered in the above quote 
is about the integration of risk management and strategic control. Having defined 
the overall risk limit of the organization, the risk function admittedly set out to 
escalate risk limits down for capturing and capping the risk content of lower-level 
strategies and divisional business plans. Bringing the risk calculations into the 
strategic planning process was (reportedly) an important element of this espoused 
theory.
To the ERC team the attraction of breaking down the overall risk limit to 
lower levels of the organization was that it created an apparent option to use it as 
a strategic control tool at divisional level. The head of the economic risk capital 
team reported the following driving theory:
‘My vision of the integration b e tw een  risk an d  strategic business planning is 
to d o  varian ce analysis - to g e t  the business m anagers to justify if they either 
e x c e e d  the p lanned  risk or they h aven 't exploited  the risk that has b een  
p la n n ed .'188
186 Internal document, BWT, October 2002
187 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
188 Director, Economic Risk Capital, BWT
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It appeared that within two years’ of the establishment of the formal risk 
function at BWT, ERC was advocated as the key tool to communicate risk in the 
organization and to control the risk profile of the business units. Risk capital 
specialists saw its value in that it rendered the risk aspect of business performance 
to quantitative scrutiny and control. Their efforts to translate risk analytics into 
the language of economic capital made it possible that risk measures were 
comparable with accounting measures of performance and financial health.
Among the risk people there was a perception that because of the trade-off 
between profit and risk targets, there was a need to integrate them both into a 
common control framework. Accordingly, within the risk function two 
approaches were debated. The first one can be called the ‘ratio approach’, the 
second one the ‘value based management (VBM) approach.’
The ratio approach furthered the notions of risk-adjusted profitability and 
risk-adjusted capital adequacy. Risk adjusted profit would be captured by 
comparing net profit with ERC (Return on ERC). Risk adjusted capital adequacy 
would be measured by the ratio of actual capital over ERC (in BWT this is called 
the ‘ERC ratio’). The latter was strongly promoted by BWT’s risk capital 
specialists, who were advocating it at divisional level as well:
'Now I h a v e  limits on stand-alone ERCs but I w ould prefer to h a v e  limit on  
the ERC ratio. If I h a v e  en ou gh  capital, why would I bother a b o u t increasing risk? 
It is th e  [lack of] cap ita l b a se , which should m ake us bother a b o u t risk.’189
The value based management (VBM) approach involved the calculation of 
a capital charge and netting it off against divisional profit measures. Although a 
seemingly standard residual income method, the VBM approach had a twist. The 
capital charges were not based on accounting (book) capital amounts. Instead, 
they were to be derived from the economic capital measures -  reflecting risk- 
adjusted capital amounts. In other words, the calculation of capital charges was to 
be based on the total risk profile of the business units, rather than on the 
historically determined capital amount they carried in the books. This means that 
the notion of ‘charging business units for the capital they used’ was to become 
equivalent with another notion: ‘charging business units for the risk they took.’ 
The risk-adjusted residual income was called Economic Profit.
189 Head o f  Financial Risk Control, Division X
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All three measures (Return on ERC, the ERC ratio, Economic Profit) were 
calculated and put forward by the economic capital team of BWT for the control 
of the risk-retum profile of business units. However, none of these approaches 
have become control practices as envisioned in the espoused theories.
5.2.3. A ‘REFLECTIVE ’ APPRO A CH TO RISK CONROL
This section turns to some of the actual capital management and strategic 
control practices that were observable during the course of the study.
Having derived a set of approaches to capital management and 
performance measurement, senior risk officers sought to influence organizational 
action in these areas. To this end they set out to educate influential managers 
about the nature of risk control. The CRO explained:
‘We h a v e  to con vin ce  line m a n a g em en t. They h a v e  to b elieve  in it. [...] 
So it is the Executive Board m em bers w ho first h a v e  to understand w hat the ERC 
d o es an d  d o es  not d o  and how you ca n  m easure it. The big a d v a n ta g e  of it, 
co m p a red  to Respectability Capital, is that this is the only thing w e  h a v e  so far to 
cover  risk. We might not like it, it might not b e  com prehensive, but it is the best 
thing w e  h a v e .'190
ERC and the espoused theories of its application were toured around in the 
organisation. However, the presence of an alternative measure of risk and the 
corresponding capital amount -Respectability Capital -  caused much confusion. 
A director from the CFO Division recalled:
‘Com ing from an engineering background, I w as struggling with the 
term inology. This m eth od ology  c h a n g e  [ERC] w as in troduced earlier this year, I 
think it w as March w hen  [Peter]191 c a m e  an d  g a v e  a  presentation to our 
m anagerial board ab ou t the 'higher o f  an d  that there w ould b e  an interest 
ch a rg e  on ex cess  capital com ing from the Group, e tc . As it h ap p en s the m odel 
tends to point to the Respectability C apital.'192
After the investment management debacle the ERC calculations showed a 
lesser amount than the Respectability Capital approach, in particular, in the case 
of the troubled business unit Division X. The risk people saw the reason in the 
fact that by this time a stop-loss strategy had significantly reduced Division X’s 
risk profile, which was reflected in a decreasing ERC trend. Nevertheless, under
190 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
191 The head o f  the Economic Risk Capital team, original name concealed.
192 Director, CFO Division, BWT
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the watchful eyes of regulators and rating agencies the management control 
department continued to calculate the Respectability Capital measure, and applied 
the ‘higher o f  principle in order to signal the capital need of the group (and its 
business units).
ERC was visible, but was not viewed as the sole indicator of the absolute 
amount of capital need. Instead, it has started to take a curious meaning, explained 
by a member of the CFO roundtable193 as follows:
'My feeling ab ou t it is that the ERC is more like a  plausibility ch eck , if you 
will. The risk m a n a g em en t function is responsible for doing that plausibility ch eck , 
but [...] those numbers are not used in d ay-to -d ay  m a n a g e m e n t .’194
'That plausibility c h e c k  which has b e e n  in troduced  through a  
com prehensive calculation  of Econom ic Risk Capital, b a se d  on ad d in g  our risk 
positions into this, is a  hugely valuable thing. It gives a  confirm ation of the 
[appropriateness of] respectability capital a llocation .’195
This suggests that at least for some senior executives, in a situation where 
the group was under pressure to demonstrate its capital strength, ERC became a 
measure that increased their confidence in the Respectability Capital amount. The 
calculation of ERC and the application of the ‘higher o f  principle rationalized the 
use of an apparently much less technical, more judgmental measure for capital 
management decisions.
BWT’s case is suggestive of a gap between a currently popular normative 
theory of capital management (BIS 2003b) and an alternative espoused theory of 
capital management. The latter was converted into practice, suggesting that in this 
case the espoused theory conformed to the in-use design (or vice versa). This 
practice of capital management applied risk calculations as a rationalisation 
(‘plausibility check’) of the capital targets that were arrived in a judgmental, 
perhaps even intuitive way, second-guessing regulatory and rating agency 
expectations.
Strategic control proved to be another area in which the in-use designs of 
risk control defied the cybernetic control ideal. Interestingly, in this case the in­
193 The CFO roundtable was an occasional meeting that was attended by the divisional and 
group-level CFOs o f  BWT Group.
194 Director, CFO Division, BWT
195 Director, CFO Division, BWT
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use practice of risk control also differed from the espoused theories held by 
BWT’s risk officers.
By measuring the risk profile of the ongoing activities (or the risk content 
of the proposed divisional strategies), risk people sought to contribute to 
discussions about strategic decisions and strategic planning. Risk officers claimed 
access to strategic control on the basis of being able to compare the risk content of 
business units with the actual (or proposed) returns that their activities yielded. 
Such comparisons immediately brought into surface the fundamental problem of 
value-creation in banking: namely, the conflict between risk and return. The head 
of the economic capital team asserted:
'You ca n 't  increase profit an d  increase volum e without increasing risk. 
Otherwise w here should the profit c o m e  from? Particularly in the lending business,
196w hat kind of product d o  you sell without taking risk?'
The visibility of the conflicting risk and return objectives made the 
simultaneous use of risk limits and profit targets problematic. Minimising risk and 
maximising return appeared to be conflicting objectives. In order to resolve the 
trade-off, it transpired that risk control should not act in isolation, but in a fashion 
that recognises the return side. This has become an espoused theory that was held 
in the risk function:
‘...But isn’t that w hat m a n a g em en t is ab ou t?  You h a v e  that tension  
[b etw een  risk an d  return]. It is ab ou t striking a  g o o d  b a la n c e  b e tw e e n  risk an d  
return an d  allocating our risk ca p a c ity  to the areas w here you  h a v e  g o o d  return. 
That’s a  g o o d  feature [of risk m a n agem en t], to m ake this transparent.’’97
The dilemma of risk and return could potentially be resolved by fusing the 
conflicting risk and return objectives into a single risk-adjusted control objective, 
as was apparent in the espoused theories of risk-retum control such as the ratio- 
approach and the VBM-approach. However, as Chapter 4 showed, these risk- 
based performance measures were slow to take root in BWT.
Indeed, the bank had a history of paying attention to the conflicting risk 
and return objectives sequentially (rather than simultaneously), swinging attention 
from one to the other as circumstances warranted. The example of the lending 
business is presented below, followed by the structural arrangements put in place
196 Director, Economic Risk Capital, BWT
197 Director o f  Group Risk Reporting, BWT Group
160
by senior risk officers which aimed at detecting excessive risk taking while not 
curbing risk-taking behaviour otherwise.
Lending was a business area characterised by clear risk-retum trade-offs: 
the riskier the client, the higher the profit margin on the loan. A director from the 
Credit Management department called attention to the apparent conflict between 
the lending and the risk management departments:
'In the past you basically had the sales organization...their targets w ere  
defined  by volum e, like 'increase your market share by x% next year.' They did 
not ca re  ab ou t risk. Then you had  the risk m a n a g e m e n t. They said, ‘OK, w e  want 
to avoid  doing business in those areas, w e  w ant to r e d u ce  our exposures here'... 
The tw o sides w ere uncoord inated  in the b an k .'198
This caused the bank a control debacle in the 90s. Focusing on the growth 
objective, it had followed an offensive strategy in the mortgage market with 
apparently little regard to the increasing exposure to the real estate market. Then a 
real estate crisis occurred, and the bank suffered heavy losses. Management’s 
attention swung to the risk aspect: 'In the last 4-5 years it w as really the risk side 
which defin ed  w here the bank should g o  in terms of lending. It w as to a  lesser 
extent the business side. Of course they h ad  their strategic business plans an d  so 
on, but you know, it d e p e n d e d  on th e risk a p p e tite  of the b an k .'199
More recently, in the wake of the weakening of the group’s economic 
performance, in a turnaround situation, another attention swing occurred:
‘The n ew  Chief Executive Officer focu ses rather on revenues. Increasing 
revenues is not a  b a d  thing. Everybody knows how  they cou ld  im prove revenues, 
it is a  target very easy  to com m u n ica te  to the businesses. (...) N ow  the targets are 
clearly on Return on Equity (ROE) an d  the equity co m p o n en t is irrelevant of the 
risk. There is a  c lea r  focus on return rather than on  risk.'200
Accordingly, the management accountants who orchestrated the 
quantitative planning process expressed doubts whether risk capital charges 
mattered at all at the time:
'The only th em e now  is to g e t  b ack  to  profitability. 90 p ercen t of the focus 
is on P&L, net operating profit. ERC is ca lcu la ted , togeth er  with all the ratios, 
return on equity, return on ERC, but at the m om ent th ese  g e t  a  low w eight in 
decision making. [Division X] is d e e p  in the red, so there is a  discussion ab ou t how
198 Director, Credit Management, BWT
199 Director, Credit Management, BWT
200 Director, Economic Risk Capital, BWT
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w e  bring it b ack  to profitability again . (...) I a g ree  w e  should h a v e  m ore focus on  
ERC w hen the co m p a n y  is running well en ou gh  but not in a  turnaround situation. 
On the insurance side w e  have a  turnaround situation an d  on the banking side 
everybody is reorganising all the tim e...’20'
Both agenda shifts occurred in response to unfavourable circumstances. In 
the 90s a persistent clamp-down on risk-taking took place in the wake of a credit 
crisis. Apparently the emphasis was on decreasing the risk profile of the lending 
portfolio (even though the control methods through which this was monitored 
were pre-ERC credit management practices). The recent shift to an expansionist 
strategy occurred in response to the underperformance of the insurance division 
and institutional pressures for improving the Group’s economic performance. 
Controlling the risk-retum trade-off appeared to be a matter of selective crack­
down on each objective, as they became pressing.
Although not consciously embracing this apparent theory-in-use, the risk 
management function was realising the importance of timely crack-downs:
‘In th e  past often they only paid attention to the risk side o n c e  risks started  
to materialise, if you w ere losing m oney. Now it is ch an g in g , there is a  n ew  
paradigm : risk is m uch more transparent. Risk should b e  m ore visible before  
som ething [bad] h a p p en s .’202
The CRO drew a similar lesson from previous control failures:
‘What h a p p e n e d  in 2002, looking at the results, obviously som ething w ent 
wrong, otherwise w e  would not h a v e  lost [X bn]. Now w hether it w as risk 
m a n a g em en t or som ething else that w ent wrong, that's a  different story. We 
knew the risk position that w e  had, w e  presented  the risk position to senior 
m a n a g em en t, to the Board of Directors, everybody w as aw are of it. So it is not 
that w e  did not know. We just did not d o  anything a b o u t it or not fast en ou gh . 
That w as pretty similar to the situation in Russia in 1998. Everybody knew that w e  
had that position, it w as ev en  part of the conscious strategy (...) to b e  o n e  of 
the largest players in Russia. It w as here on the tab le . But n ob od y  asked  the  
questions. Is this really w hat w e  w ant? Are you really a w a re  that if interest rates g o  
up or if w e  h a v e  a  crash in Russia w e  are go in g  to lose our shirt? W hose function  
is it to bring up th ese  questions? That’s risk m a n a g em en t. What w e  are here for is 
to bring up honest questions.’203
201 Director, Strategy and Controlling, BWT
202 Director o f  Group Risk Reporting, BWT Group
203 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
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Senior risk people were turning the risk committee meetings into a forum 
where they could discuss and challenge underlying business assumptions:
‘We say w e  w ant to discuss em p lo y e e  benefit sch em es  in Switzerland or 
w e  w ant to discuss issues of banking secrecy  or w h atever  w e  think is of 
im portance to those guys. W e set the a g e n d a . If I set the a g e n d a  I c a n  g o  to 
m a n a g em en t an d  if they say ‘no, th at’s not an important top ic' -  that is usually a  
g o o d  indication for m e that it w as the right topic. That’s how  it works.'204
Senior risk officers at group level started to look beyond the risk silos in 
order to find problem areas to which they would have to alert the attention of the 
executive and supervisory boards. This approach set example for senior risk 
officers within the business units too. For example, the post-crisis CRO of 
Division X instigated ‘special risk reviews' to be presented at Risk Management 
Committees by line management staff on topics as diverse as foreign exchange 
risk and specific strategic issues. The business unit CRO was conscious of playing 
the devil’s advocate at these meetings ( ‘My role is not to be a nice g u y ’ ), and 
sought out issues that would have implicated excessive risk-taking:
‘If I sch ed u le  a  top ic for this m a n a g em en t com m ittee , n ob od y  says no. If 
so m eb o d y  says no, I am  going to b e  suspicious very quickly.' 206
Being a decidedly innovative, opportunistic organization where new 
strategies were allowed to emerge and opportunities were seized, BWT was a 
bank not afraid of risk-taking. However, this resulted in an uneven growth pattern 
characterised by bold risk-taking followed by a crack-down on risk when risk- 
taking proved excessive and damaged the bottom-line. In this respect BWT 
resembles Mintzberg and Waters (1982)’ entrepreneurial firm where cycles of 
strategic ‘sprints and pauses’ were reflected in switches between an opportunistic 
entrepreneurial mode and a more reflective planning mode, resulting in hectic, 
uneven growth.
The selective crack-down on profit and risk objectives appears to be 
associated with the strategic spurts and halts of the organization. It can also be 
associated with the contested status of risk measures that were put forward by the 
risk capital specialists for controlling the risk-taking capacity of business units.
204 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
205 C hief Risk Officer, Division X
206 C hief Risk Officer, Division X
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‘Control by selective crack-down’207 appeared in a control environment 
that was characterised by uncertainties around both means and ends. First, the 
mutually exclusive risk-retum objectives put top management in a dilemma. 
Secondly, the presence of multiple measures of risk, and a rule of thumb that 
produced a hierarchy among them (the ‘higher o f  principle), suggest that there 
were cause-effect uncertainties about the risk measurement (and risk prediction) 
process too. The presence of such uncertainties defies cybernetic validity and 
would theoretically question the applicability of the cybernetic control ideal. 
Empirically, the control pattern that emerged in the face of these uncertainties 
appears to be non-cybemetic. It was a process where learning about a hard-to- 
understand phenomenon (the risk-retum trade-off inherent in new strategies) took 
place at the same time as managing it. Instead of demanding technical ‘rigor’, this 
control style required the practitioner to be ‘reflective’ (Schon, 1992) and intuitive 
(Burchell et al., 1980).
Indeed, senior risk officers at BWT call into mind Schon’s ‘reflective 
practitioners’ (Schon, 1992) who manage by ‘reflection-in-action’, an artistic 
process which requires more than technical expertise. It involves experience, trial
• 7fi8and error, intuition and muddling through.
207 Control by selective crack-down is a term coined by political scientist Andrew Dunsire 
(Dunsire, 1990). In a decision environment, where two mutually exclusive goals put the 
controller in a dilemma (and several potentially competing constraints result in a polylem m a), 
the controller may choose to maintain control by ‘selective crackdown on one goal at a time, 
'steering the equilibrium” (Dunsire, 1990: 9). He also called this control style ‘collibration.' 
Collibration is associated with notions o f ‘compensation’ and ‘redressing the balance’ {libra, 
lat. means ‘scales’). Hood (2001) explains this control style as a means o f  deliberately 
juxtaposing countervailing forces. He further argues that ‘since it requires no general 
underlying stable consensus on goals, [collibration] makes much lower demands on social 
rationality' (Hood, 2001: 215) than earlier control system theory models. Conceptually not 
alien to the literature o f  political science, collibration as a theoretical construct has been 
furthered to explain how real-life political systems handle conflicting policy-making tasks 
(Hood, 2001). However, collibration has not been recognised as a control practice in 
organizational settings, nor has it been furthered as an explanatory construct in organizational
theory.
208 Schon talks o f  the ‘reflective practitioner’ (Schon, 1992) as opposed to the ‘technical 
expert’ otherwise known as the ‘rigorous practitioner’. The argument begins with the 
observation that practitioners face the dilemma o f  rigor vs. relevance. Some, out o f  concern 
with ‘rigor’ build practices around formal, analytic models, convert problematic situations to 
well formed problems, so that they can exercise technical rationality. This ‘positivist’ 
epistemology o f  practice is contrasted with an alternative epistemology that deliberately 
immerses itself in what Schon calls the ‘swampy lowland’ o f  practice: confusing but crucially 
important situations, which are out o f  the reach o f ‘rigorous’ practices built around the use o f  
formal, analytic models. In these circumstances skilful practitioners manage by ‘reflection-in- 
action’, which may take the form o f on-the-spot problem solving, theory-building or re-
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This conceptualisation of the theory-in-use is at odds with the espoused 
(and normative) theories of control over the risk return trade-off. BWT’s risk 
officers cited the ratio approach and even the value based management approach 
when asked about the integration of risk management and strategic planning, even 
though some of them made it clear that they treated these with a pinch of salt, as 
did the CRO:
‘O ne of ch a llen ges w e  h ave with the business units is to  c o m e  up with a  
com m on  a g reem en t ab ou t the right w ay  to d o  it [the integration of risk 
m a n a g em en t an d  strategic planning]. VBM is o n e  possibility, but you h a v e  to b e  
careful it d o es  not b e c o m e  a  religion. P eople w ho really b e lieve  in it, for them  it is 
pretty c lo se  to  religion. Personally, I think it is a  g o o d  tool.'209
Talks of such conventional (normative) ways of dealing with the risk 
return trade-off led to discussions of the technical challenges of risk-based 
performance measurement. For example, the CRO mentioned the problem of 
defining the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for each business unit, as a 
major challenge in the VBM framework:
'Com ing b a ck  to your original question, yes, you c a n  use ERC for EP 
[Econom ic Profit], but you still h a v e  to solve your WACC question. And it n eed s to 
b e  established from business unit to business unit. C onceptually , it is easy , but if 
you really w ant to d o  the calculations, it b e c o m e s  pretty nasty .’210
These technical asides punctuated the descriptions of what appeared to be 
a more ad hoc, experimental and intuitive approach to managing the risk-retum 
trade-off. The apparent pattern of controlling the risk-retum trade-off (here 
conceptualised as control by ‘selective crack-down’) did not depend on solving 
the technical challenges of risk-based performance measurement.
Chapter 3 argued that BWT exemplifies a pattern of strategic significance 
to be gained by the risk function through senior risk officers’ access to top-level 
discretionary decision making. Following a number of control debacles, senior 
risk people used their agenda-setting power to discuss non-quantifiable 
(‘strategic’) risk issues at top management meetings. By mobilising line 
management knowledge to bear relevance on these issues, they played the devil’s 
advocate in the face of risk-taking strategies.
appreciation o f  the situation. It requires ‘professional artistry’, experimentation, learning and
an awareness o f the limits o f ‘rigorous practice.’
209 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
210 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
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Thus the nature of the influence of senior risk officers on controlling the 
risk-retum trade-off (in strategic decision making) was not in line with the 
espoused theories of risk-based performance management. However, the senior 
risk officers of BWT were gradually creating structural arrangements that allowed 
them to influence strategic decisions in another way. This took place outside the 
formal planning and performance measurement cycle, in the risk management 
committees, where they set the agendas. Here senior decision makers learned 
about, and reflected on, risk issues at the same time as making decisions about 
them, in much the same way as Schon’s ‘reflective practitioners’ leam to cope in 
complex situations (Schon, 1992).
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5.3. Q u a si-c y b e r n e t ic  r is k  c o n t r o l  a t  F r a s e r  B a n k
One of the oldest and largest banks in the UK, Fraser Bank resembles 
BWT Group in that it offers universal banking services. Structurally, it is 
segmented into five product divisions (retail banking, private banking, corporate 
lending, investment banking and the credit card business), and the business units 
enjoy substantial autonomy.
Fraser Bank turned to modem risk management techniques in the wake of 
the largest loss that it suffered in its 300-year history during the early 90s UK 
credit crisis. It was the first European bank to adopt a default probability-based 
credit assessment methodology and a Value-at-Risk based approach for its total 
loan portfolio and market risks.
At the time of the case study the formal risk management function was 
going through a major structural overhaul. After an essentially organic 
development phase in the first ten years of its functioning, the risk management 
department had formed a complicated web of committees, teams and individuals - 
each working on diverse topics such as information systems maintenance, risk 
analysis, governance and policy, insurance, and data protection. Although Frasers 
had a reputation for ‘leading edge’ risk management initiatives among its peers, it 
appeared that internally the risk department showed two faces to other 
organizational members. It had a team of risk experts who performed and reported 
risk analytics to outsiders and the executive board, while there was also a group 
seen by others as bureaucratic:
‘Part of the problem  with [Fraser’s risk departm ent] is that it is just a  h u ge  
burden on the Group - in the sense that by its nature risk m a n a g e m e n t build risk 
policies upon risk policies upon risk policies and  reporting upon reporting upon  
reporting. Until the point w hen the business is suffocating under all of this and  
there is a  revolution. Look at the regulator. The FSA a n d  Basel and  all the rest of it. 
Policies are pouring in. This is nonsense. (...) A lot of p e o p le  in the large risk 
m a n a g em en t team s in big banks are, to my mind, not very dynam ic. It is all 
ab ou t policies. It is a  c o t ta g e  industry. So I would characterise half of the risk 
p eo p le  as not add ing  m uch. If you started an enterprise from scratch  you would
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not h a v e  them  in the business. The other half is the o n e  com ing up with the  
leading e d g e  risk policies.’211
There was a consensus among the risk people that analysts placed a 
premium on Frasers’ share price due to the high reputation of the risk function. 
Maintaining this ‘leading edge’ position became an important priority as the 
realisation came that further organic and policy-driven growth may be a threat to 
it.
With the arrival of a new Risk Director, an attempt was made to 
rationalise the risk department. Four risk silos were established (credit, market, 
non-financial and compliance risk) and separately, an additional team that was 
responsible for deriving economic capital measures for the risk content of 
business unit plans. These five teams formed a sub-department that was very 
similar to BWT’s formal risk function. The difference was that in the case of 
Frasers there remained additional (though ‘streamlined’) specialist teams taking 
care of specialist projects that the risk department had instigated during its organic 
growth period (e.g. a data warehouse, governance and policy work).
5.3.1. T h e  e s p o u s e d  t h e o r i e s  o f  r i s k  c o n t r o l  a  t F r a s e r  B a n k  
The reorganisation of the formal risk function was part of an ongoing 
group-wide efficiency review, and the structural overhaul of many other central 
functions from marketing to IT. These structural changes were the reflections of a 
fundamental change in management and control that had been initiated at the top 
of the organization as Fraser Bank was switching to value-based management 
(VBM) principles. The Chief Executive Officer was a passionate advocate of 
shareholder value:
‘Positioning [Frasers] am on g the leading value-creating  co m p a n ies  world­
w ide is my highest priority. (...) M anaging for va lue is not a  one-off c h a n g e  
initiative. It is an enduring w ay  of running th e enterprise.’213
The VBM imperative was communicated to the organization:
211 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
2121 could find no empirical proof for this sentiment. It was probably based on the widespread 
reputation that Fraser, an early adopter, earned in the area o f  risk management. The 2004 
Annual Report, for example, reminds the reader o f  the long history o f  risk expertise in the 
company. It is stated that the risk framework ‘builds on the analytical capability developed and 
used within [F rasers] since the mid 90s.' (Page number not quoted for confidentiality reasons.)
213 C hief Executive, Fraser Bank, quoted in an internal training document
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‘Our governing objective is to maximise shareholder v a lu e  over time and  
at any point of tim e.'214
A sense of urgency was added when the executive board set the group 
goal of ‘doubling value every four years. ’215
As the reorganisation of the risk function took place against the backdrop
of the group-wide VBM implementation, risk management was (re)developed as a
pillar of the new control framework. The espoused theory of risk control was
communicated in the Annual Reports with reference to important milestones in
the development of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance. The 2001 and 2002
Annual Reports asserted that the 1 risks are identified, measured and monitored
[...] in a manner consistent with the requirements o f  the ‘Internal Control:
Guidance fo r Directors on the Combined Code’\  referring to the guidelines first
outlined by the Turnbull committee. The 2003 Annual Report reported that the
risk management framework was in line with the COSO (2003) document that
advocates the Enterprise Risk Management agenda. The espoused theory of risk
control at Frasers (as communicated to shareholders) adopted the essentially
cybernetic notion of risk control that is implied by these corporate governance
models. The espoused risk management design principles echoed the ingredients
of cybernetic validity. In particular, the risk framework was based on the risk
appetite as approved by the Board (c.f. objective), risk assessment (c.f.
measurement), and a control process that *ensures that risks are regularly
216monitored and the corrective action can be taken in a timely manner’ (c.f.
feedback).
The link between modem corporate governance standards, the normative 
theories of risk control and the blueprint that Fraser Bank was implementing was 
made explicit by comments such as the following, communicated by the Director 
of Risk Reporting:
‘Now that the Board has expressed  a  financial risk a p p e tite  - post-Turnbull, 
post-Enron -, the risk reporting should b ack  that up, it should d em on strate  that the  
w ay the limits apply  to risk are consistent with th e risk a p p e tite  of the Board of 
Directors. [AM: D oes this financial risk a p p etite  include market a n d  credit risk?] 
Yes. The intention is to define som ething similar to non-financial risks as well but
2,4 Internal training document, Fraser Bank
215 Internal training document, Fraser Bank
216 2003 Annual Report, page number not quoted for confidentiality reason.
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then it b e c o m e s  very difficult with issues like 'do w e  h a v e  any ap p etite  for 
regulatory n on -com p lian ce?' [...] These [non-financial risk] issues are not very 
techn ica l, m ore subjective. The issue is to identify som e quantitative m easures 
that w e  c a n  assess on a  regular basis. So w e  ca n  gain som e c o n fid e n c e  that w e  
com ply with the a p p e tite  for risk in that a rea .'217
Economic capital was becoming the common denominator metric for risk 
at Frasers. According to the 2002 Annual Report, this was the metric by which 
risk specialists measured aggregate risk by type, ran risk limit setting systems and 
allocated capital to each business corresponding to its risk profile.
Nevertheless, a similar espoused theory of risk control transpired from the 
interviews as well. The head of Economic Capital explained the risk framework 
as follows:
‘We obviously g e t  involved with risk a p p etite . W e m ake sure that w e  h ave  
o n e  unit of m easurem ent across the bank of u n ex p ec ted  loss, which is Econom ic  
Capital, an d  then w e  use that to a llo ca te  out the risk a p p etite . (...) This is the  
report that w e  sen d  to [the board] -  a  monthly brief summary. [Leafing through 
the risk report:] It is practically a  dashboard saying this is how  this or that business 
unit is using up its e c o n o m ic  ca p ita l.’218
The calculation of the risk content of different business plans and business 
units created new visibilities and had the potential of bringing previously latent 
risks into the open. The espoused theory of risk management deployed the idea 
that risk officers represented an increasingly loud voice of risk conscience:
‘I think the risk m an ager  is the c o n sc ie n c e  of the co m p a n y . Sales p eo p le  
bring everything in [from the street], and  the risk m an ager  is the com m o n  sense  
c o n sc ie n c e  saying, it is not as g o o d  as it looks. So the risk m a n a g er  has tw o major 
functions. O ne is to e d u c a te  sales p eo p le  an d  to bring risk to life. The se c o n d  is to 
b e  technically  g o o d  en o u g h  to know w hen  the risk is not cap tu red  or 
m iscalcu lated . To this end , o n e  n eed s  to understand the con ven tion , everything  
that has b e e n  d o n e  ab ou t risk. But the va lue of the risk m a n a g er  is giving 
interpretations of loads of facts that are relevant for [Frasers].’219
This espoused theory was similar to the one at BWT in that it adopted the 
notion o f ‘risk conscience’ and the ambition to educate non-specialists about risk.
217 Director o f  Risk Reporting, Fraser Bank
218 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
219 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
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While at BWT there was a plurality of alternative espoused theories (and 
techniques) of risk control, capital management and performance measurement, at 
Fraser Bank there appeared to be a single risk management approach that 
prevailed. The ‘risk organisation’ was developed to *support the Value Based 
Management principles o f the Group. ,22°
In this VBM context Economic Capital was the measurement that was 
deemed to be able to express the risk profile as well as the corresponding capital 
need of the various business units and the Group. In this framework there was a 
dual role for risk management. Through a single metric (Economic Capital), risk 
assessments were linked not only to capital management, but also to strategic 
performance measurement. In particular, risk capital specialists held this as the 
espoused theory of risk control, as related by the head of the function:
'So that is the first part of the job, figuring out how  m uch w e  w ould lose [in 
an u n e x p e c te d  loss scenario], how  m uch cap ita l w e  should hold [to cover  
u n ex p ec ted  loss]. The seco n d  part is to provide information of the risk-adjusted 
perform ance of the business. Econom ic Profit (EP) inherently n eed s  Econom ic  
Capital b e c a u s e  you h a v e  to adjust your profit by the risk that you h a v e  taken in 
order to  reach  that profit.’221
The economic capital measures were seen to be key in determining the 
capital need (‘the risk appetite’) o f the organization, and the hierarchy of risk 
limits fo r the organization. Also, economic capital measures were put forward for 
monitoring and feedback in the form of risk reports to the board. This espoused 
theory among the risk specialists reiterated the essentially cybernetic conception 
of risk control that was detectable in the annual reports. The espoused theories of 
risk control, as reported in the annual statements and in the interviews, echoed 
contemporary regulatory and corporate governance guidelines (c.f. normative 
theories) on risk control.
5.3.2. A ‘QUASI-CYBERNETIC ’ APPROA CH TO RISK CONTROL 
The economic capital framework at Fraser Bank was designed with 
considerable technical rigour to allow risk capital specialists to join discussions
220 Annual Report 2001
221 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
222 During the research project the annual statements for the period o f  2001-2004 were 
reviewed.
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on capital adequacy and to contribute to the evaluation of the proposed strategic 
plans and business performance.
As for capital management, it was espoused that economic capital limit 
breaches should not occur. If a limit was being approached, corrective action 
would be taken either in the form of risk reduction (by the business unit 
concerned) or by the raising of additional capital. In practice economic capital 
limits were set and monitored closely. However, the method of calculating the 
limits was regarded as fluid by the decision makers. The director responsible for 
the risk policies of the group explained:
‘What h ap p en s if the bottom -up assessm ent [of e c o n o m ic  cap ita l n eed ]  
is higher than the book value? Well, w e  h a v e  a  to lera n ce  ran ge which says you  
ca n 't m easure th ese  things dow n to the last penny an yw ay . So if it c o m e s  within 
120% then w e  are happy, if it co m es over 120% then w e  n e e d  to either review the  
am ount of risk w e  are taking or w e  n e e d  additional ca p ita l.’223
This suggests that the control style appeared to be based on the cybernetic 
logic, in particular, corrective action took place with reference to a limit. 
However, the limit that eventually mattered was a secondary one -  it allowed a 
certain amount of flexibility around the originally set limit. The 20% tolerance 
range suggests that decision makers had less than full confidence in the risk 
measurements or that they did not intend to act upon the risk measurement signals 
blindly. Some senior risk officers even suggested that a certain amount of 
subjectivity in risk control was desirable, given the assumption-driven nature of 
risk assessment. The risk policy director gave the following example:
‘The important point ab ou t it is that very small c h a n g e s  in the assum ptions 
m ake very big differences in the answers. And w h o  knows... I just h ad  an  
en cou n ter  with risk yesterday, looking at E conom ic C apital for the retail portfolios. 
O ne of the things that c a m e  through w as that the E conom ic Capital you c a m e  
up with w as d e p e n d e n t on the num ber of cohorts that you  used. So w e  h a v e  ten  
grad es of counterparty. If you use 10 grad es of counterparty you g e t  m uch less 
e c o n o m ic  cap ita l than if you use 20 g ra d es.224 [...] O n e of the con cern s I h ave  
with [Thomas225] is that I think he b elieves in his figures to o  m u ch .’226
223 Director, Group Risk Policy, Fraser Bank
224 The degree o f  refinement o f  the counterparty credit risk categories changes the shape o f  the 
credit loss distribution curve. Higher refinement is achieved by applying more credit grades. 
More grades result in a loss distribution that has a ‘fatter’ tail on the low  frequency - high loss 
end o f  the distribution. Consequently, the 99.97 % cut-off point (or any other confidence level)
172
During the second year of the case study there was a significant change in 
capital management at Fraser Bank -  the internal capital allocation methodology 
was overhauled. This was another example of risk specialists compromising the 
measurement principle of cybernetic validity, while they still upheld the notions 
of objective setting (risk capital allocations should reflect risk limits for business 
units) and feedback (reporting on the risk profile of business units).
There was a history to the change. The previous risk capital allocation 
methodology took into account that diversification benefits existed in the Group, 
which were reflected by an amount of capital that was not allocated out to 
business units but was held at the centre. However, in the course of the years a 
larger and larger capital amount remained unallocated, as the bottom-up risk 
aggregation process came up with increasingly lower capital need than the 
available capital. To the risk capital team it became apparent that the capital 
allocation method either consistently overestimated diversification benefits or did 
not account for an increasing amount of risk taken by the business units. This was 
feared to have caught the eyes of analysts, who could have drawn question marks 
over the famed robustness of the risk methodology at Fraser Bank. A manager 
from the strategy department (who had worked in the risk capital team at the time 
when these concerns surfaced) recalled:
'That's w hen  the problems started. I joined [the e c o n o m ic  capital] tea m  
in June 199x. At that time there w as already [Xbn] pounds surplus. The m eth od  in 
1995 did not cap tu re  all the risks the group h a d  -  w e  did all th e  credit risk an d  the  
market risk, but there w ere loads of other risks not p icked  up (for exam p le  our 
half-share of a  c o m p a n y  in [Tunis] h ad  no cap ita l a llo c a te d  to it e tce tera ). So 
[Robin227] started to say that part of the [Xbn] w as und iscovered  risk, or risk not 
co v ered . But the top-dow n capital w as growing faster than [Robin] an d  I cou ld  
discover assets to a llo ca te  cap ita l to. Although w e  w ere plugging the hole with 
the risks w e  d iscovered , the w ater w as pouring in at the top . So the w ay w e  
reported it was: bottom -up cap ita l is [... bn]. The surplus w e  said w e  held for 
growth. It w as another w ay  of explaining a w a y  surplus. W e fea red  at som e point
will result in a higher economic capital amount than the same cut-off point would on a ‘less 
fat’ distribution tail.
225 Reference to the Head o f  the Economic Capital team, name disguised for confidentiality 
reasons.
226 Director, Group Risk Policy, Fraser Bank
227 The then head o f  the Economic Capital team.
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the market w as going  to turn around an d  say to us: you are not a llocating out 
[Xbn] (or w hatever), that’s really od d . Why is that? That's w hat w e  thought the  
worst scenario is go in g  to b e .’228
A new capital allocation methodology was proposed by the head of the 
economic capital team. However, he encountered fierce resistance from some of 
the business units whose share of the total capital would have consequently 
increased disproportionately. A ’two-year battle’ ensued, recalled by the previous 
witness as follows:
'[Robin] thought he n e e d e d  an army of information to co n v in ce  [Division 
A]. He w as trying to say, w hat's the b eta  of [such a] bank? How d o  I adjust that 
for the fa ct that [Division A] d o n ’t d o  som e of those activities? M eanwhile  
[Division A] go t their two or three clever guys togeth er  in order to c o m e  up with 
their m eth od ology  an d  to co n v in ce  the [Division A] chief ex ecu tiv e  that [Robin] 
d o es not know w hat he is talking about. Or v ice  versa: the [Division A] political 
m achine saying w e  can n ot a c c e p t  that cap ita l figure ev en  if he is right -  there 
w as this ca m p a ig n  of creating en ou gh  sm oke an d  trouble over it so that no o n e
229will c o m e  to  a  conclusion. And that w as the tw o-year battle really.
The pressure became so great that the whole economic capital team 
migrated away from the bank and a new manager was tasked with the challenge 
of resolving the conflict around the new capital allocation methodology. This 
manager was appointed at a time when his task became seen as imperative by the 
Chief Executive of the Group, so he enjoyed the political-institutional support that 
his predecessor lacked. He chose a consultative, consensus seeking approach, 
which he recalled as follows:
‘[The Chief Executive] said, everyon e knows w e  c a n n o t hold [Xbn] at the  
Centre. In the current environm ent it d o es not work. So everyon e said, yes, let's 
g e t  it more a ccu ra te . But they w an ted  to minimise their portion of the more 
a ccu ra te  pie. So there is a  tension b e tw e e n  the tw o. By setting the ob jective and  
clarifying the rules there w as less room for p eo p le  to m ove. That’s not to say you  
don't g e t  p e o p le  arguing a n d  so on but the rules k eep  p e o p le  straight. And you
228 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
229 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank. The ‘two-year’ battle was a 
sensitive topic at Fraser Bank at the time o f  the study. I interviewed the then Head o f  
Economic Capital (here referred to as ‘Robin’) who was, I later learned, preparing for his 
resignation from the bank. Given the sensitivity o f  his position, I was not allowed to record 
these interviews. However, his view s on the events were closely echoed by the above quoted 
strategy manager, who was then a member o f his team. The Director o f  Group Risk Policy had 
a more distant view, and it was in line with this recollection too.
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k eep  it all consistent. By sitting around a  table, instead  of o n e -to -o n e  negotiations  
you en d  up with group negotiations. The best minds in business bank an d  in [the 
investm ent bank] c a m e  up with the m ethodology , so they c a n n o t argue on  
tech n ology . Each business unit w as represented by risk m an agers an d  lenders, 
o n e  representative of both to m ake sure w e  took in both th e tech n ica l risk 
perspective an d  the market p ersp ective.'230
This process took the best part of the year, but eventually produced a 
capital allocation methodology that was accepted as a basis for risk capital 
allocation and limit setting in the Group.
The above described production of the capital allocation methodology 
suggests that risk control at Fraser Bank was heavily reliant on an acceptable 
measurement tool. However, the production of internal (and external) legitimacy 
for the method-in-use was not a purely technical affair. Similarly, the use of the 
risk capital limits allowed some fluidity into the control framework.
It is suggested here that this control practice (in the capital management 
area) is therefore quasi-cybemetic -  it was based on cybernetic principles, but was 
bent to accommodate the political and institutional realities of the control context.
This quasi-cybemetic control style was present in the control of business 
unit plans and performance as well. Here the control of the conflicting return and 
risk objectives was at stake. Two divisions were mentioned in particular: the 
credit card and the mortgage lending businesses.
As for the credit card business, a strategy manager was pondering what 
might be the consequence of creating a visibility for such conflicts as follows:
‘The strategy of the [credit card  division] m ay b e  proven wrong by the risk 
p eo p le . The term inology is ‘near prime’ -  they are go ing  for the near prime 
market. These are p e o p le  w ho are very b a d  dealing with their finances. In the  
credit card  world they are very profitable custom ers. In the risk world they are risky 
custom ers. If there is a  credit crisis the first p e o p le  w ho are go in g  to stop paying  
their credit cards are the near prime custom ers. Historically, [the credit card  
division] d o es  not h a v e  m any near-prime customers; it m akes its m on ey  without 
them . Strategically, should it b e  in that market? (...) We h a v e  a  strategy versus risk 
issue here that is not clear ye t.'23'
A similar dilemma arose in the mortgage lending business:
230 Head o f  Economic Risk Capital, Fraser Bank
231 Assistant Director, Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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'The w ay  [this product] works -  sa lesm en love it. The risk m a n a g er  has to  
ask: is it as g o o d  as it looks? It is, but there are e lem en ts that are worse than it 
looks. We d o n ’t know exactly .'232
The initial reaction to these dilemmas was an effort to leam about the 
cause-effect uncertainties that surround them. The head of the Economic Capital 
team explained:
‘You h a v e  to b e  practical - ev en  though m ost risk m anagers are 
com p lete ly  im practical. You h a v e  to know w h at is possible, a n d  try to b e  sensible, 
err on the side of caution. (...) You can n ot stop the business from working. (...) So 
the risk m a n a g er  has to b e  careful and  say: let's put it out, but in a co n ta in ed  
fashion, so w e  c a n  live with it if it g o e s  wrong. The salesm an says, I just w ant as 
m uch of it as possible. So w e  said, le t’s run it for a  few  years a n d  then let's h ave a  
look at it. (...) So w hat w e  take to [the ex ecu tiv e  board] is -  w e  run it for a  year as 
it is a n d  then reconsider.'233
In Fraser Bank’s case there was a very practical reason why risk people 
were keen on learning about the new business initiatives. Risk people were trying 
to capture the risk profile of the new businesses by applying the economic capital 
framework. Rendering the new risks to measurement required the reduction of the 
cause-effect uncertainties surrounding the new products, which were initially 
high. A strategy manager commented:
‘[Decision making] is su p p osed  to b e  d o n e  on a  risk-adjusted basis. So [the 
credit card business] has to prove that the premium they ch a r g e  will cover  the  
extra cap ita l ch a rg e  that [the eco n o m ic  cap ita l team ] are g o in g  to m a k e .’234
With regards to the mortgage lending product, there was again an attempt 
to quantify the risk content of the venture:
‘The problem  is w e  c a n ’t service it. The systems w ere put togeth er  for a  
m uch smaller operation. (...) So w e  h a v e  to hold e c o n o m ic  cap ita l against 
operational risk as a  result of our system failures.'235
These quotes suggest that the conflicting risk and return objectives were 
gradually forced into, and dealt within, a common control framework. Fraser 
Bank resolved the conflict between risk and return by integrating them in the 
value-based management framework. Risk measurements were fed into the 
calculation of Economic Profit, which was the key target performance measure.
232 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
233 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
234 Assistant Director, Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
235 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
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The rationale was (to paraphrase an internal training document) that business 
units only created value when they made profit that was greater than the cost of 
economic capital invested.
However, economic capital was not only a measure of the risk profile of 
business units and their proposed business initiatives. Its allocation to business 
units also reflected the competing risk and return interests inherent in the 
organisation. Thus the economic capital allocations mirrored and confirmed the 
existing power balance in the Group.
The espoused cybernetic design principles were echoed by the actual 
practices of risk limit setting and the regular reporting of business unit risk taking 
to decision makers who made strategic, capital and performance management 
decisions based on the feedback. However, the measurement aspect was only 
quasi-cybemetic in the sense that it was not a purely technical matter, but one of 
political negotiations and compromise.
It is the subjective, assumption-driven nature of the risk measurement 
techniques that allowed room for discussion and debate. However, Fraser Bank 
also had the culture that allowed for such negotiations to take place. The bank is 
known for (and admittedly fosters) a consensus-seeking and risk-aware culture, in 
which constant negotiation and compromise-seeking behaviour were the norm. A 
strategy manager commented:
'So there is a  h u ge  process: before w e  m ake decisions w e  try to consider  
all the im pacts. Decisions at [Frasers] take a  long time to h a p p en . O ne of our 
friends w ho left som e years a g o  h ad  this com m ent: Am erican banks h ave the  
mentality 'let's just d o  it an d  worry ab ou t the im p acts afterw ards’. W hereas 
[Frasers] tends to worry ab ou t the im pacts before it d o e s  anything. We are not 
very big on taking a  c h a n c e . Having said that, w e  d o  not necessarily alw ays 
m ake g o o d  decisions. O ne of the consultants said a b o u t us that rather than  
'ready and fire’, w e  are always ‘ready, ready, ready, aim, ready an d  fire.’ That 
definitely is a  cultural issue. The culture of risk is g o o d : w e  are very-very risk 
oriented .'236
Characterised by a preference for even growth and calculated strategic 
moves, Frasers appeared to be associated with a very different approach to risk 
and return from that of BWT. The ability of the risk function to express the risk
236 Assistant Director, Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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profile of the business units in the language of accounting made it possible to 
integrate and discuss the risk and return implications of business plans in one 
framework. The successful implementation of the value-based management 
framework in the organization gave risk people the opportunity to contribute to 
capital management, planning and performance measurement, and to the 
negotiation process that sought to resolve the risk-retum dilemma. Chapter 3 
described this as an alternative pattern of strategic significance that the risk 
function gained via its political aptness in the capital allocation process. By 
resolving capital allocations within the group, the risk function contributed to the 




Both banks have embarked on enterprise-wide risk management projects 
that sought control not only over individual risk types but also over the ‘cost of 
risk’ and the risk taking capacity of their business units. The espoused theories 
(Argyris, 1976) of capital management and performance measurement in both 
banks responded to the increased institutional appropriateness (and the normative- 
regulatory guidelines) of risk management. Accordingly, risk capital specialists 
set out to contribute to management control in the areas of capital management 
and performance measurement. They furthered what was essentially a cybernetic 
ideal: target (limit) setting, measurement and feedback.
In both banks there was a formal risk management function with a similar 
division of labour. The risk silos were dealt with by specialist teams. In addition, 
there was a separate team in both banks that was responsible for translating risk 
analytics into what was becoming the common metric of risk: economic (risk) 
capital. Economic (risk) capital was put forward as a basis for the essentially 
cybernetic control design that underpinned the risk management framework at the 
banks. Thus, in both cases risk limits were set for the overall organization as well 
as for lower-level ‘risk buckets’, all in terms of economic capital.
However, at BWT the economic capital measure was seen as contested. It 
had a competitor in the form of a more judgmental, though legitimate, 
approximation of capital need (Respectability Capital). In the espoused theory of 
risk control there was a rule of thumb (‘the higher o f  principle) that ordered the 
two measures into a hierarchy, so that the higher of the two would indicate the 
risk profile and the corresponding capital need. Further, risk people envisioned 
two approaches for the control of the risk profile of the business units -  the ratio 
approach and the value-based management approach. Accordingly, risk-adjusted 
return on capital and Economic Profit measures were developed for the ex-ante 
assessment of business plans and the ex-post measurement of performance.
At Fraser Bank there was one single metric for the assessment of the risk 
profile (and capital need) of the business units. It was developed in the context of 
a value-based management framework that was consciously chosen for the control 
of business unit performance in the Group. It is notable that while at BWT it was 
the espoused theory of risk control that advocated the value-based management
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framework, in Fraser Bank it was the other way round. The value-based 
management ethos led to a complete redesign of the risk control process.
At both banks the risk capital team had considerable difficulties with the 
implementation of a particular aspect of cybernetic control - the measurement 
principle. As a result a gap emerged between the espoused theories of risk control 
and the actual practices.
Historically, BWT’s rapid growth was punctuated with occasional set­
backs, calling into mind Mintzberg and Waters (1982)’ entrepreneurial firm 
which alternated between an opportunistic entrepreneurial mode and a more 
reflective planning mode, resulting in hectic, uneven growth. Accordingly, at 
BWT strategic choices were made either principally based on return 
considerations (at a time of sluggish economic performance) or predominantly 
based on risk considerations (at times of risk materialisations). This was in line 
with a control pattern whereby profit and risk objectives were discovered 
gradually by organizational participants and considered sequentially, as 
circumstances evolved. As the risk control and decision making process was seen 
as intertwined with (rather than conditional on) the process of learning and 
reflecting about the risks, it was noticeable that apart from computations, a fair 
amount of judgment and intuition were present in the control process (Burchell et 
al., 1980).
This was apparent in both the areas of capital management and the 
discussion of business initiatives. In capital management the decision makers 
considered the risk calculations as a rationalisation (‘plausibility check’) of the 
capital targets that were arrived in a judgmental, perhaps even intuitive way, 
second-guessing regulatory and rating agency expectations. In the strategic 
control area it was the example of the lending business that is suggestive of a 
rather non-cybemetic control approach. Senior risk officers were learning when 
and how to orchestrate attention swings by selectively using risk information at 
top management meetings. They relied on intuition and judgment in the setting of 
the agendas for these decision making forums. The control style of ‘selective 
crack-down’ can thus be put forward as theory-in-use, in order to formalise the 
apparently non-cybemetic control practice. The emerging picture of the senior 
risk officer is not merely that of a technical expert -  it is akin to what Schon 
described as the ‘reflective practitioner’ (Schon, 1992).
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Fraser Bank’s strong value-based management imperative and politicised, 
consensus-seeking culture set the scene for a quasi-cybemetic control process. 
Due to the performance implications of capital allocations, the exercise of 
measuring the risk profile of business units gave rise to much discussion and 
debate. The perceived need to revise the existing methodology was driven by 
Fraser Bank’s sensitivity to the expectations of its institutional context. The 
external expectations were seen as technical -  Fraser Bank aimed to have a 
methodology that would further its reputation as a market leader in the risk 
management area. However, the external expectations were complemented by a 
number of internal expectations about the implications of the change in the capital 
allocation methodology. The conflicting risk-retum interests of different business 
units had to be resolved as part of the same exercise. Given the subjective nature 
of the risk measurement process, there was room for business unit risk experts to 
negotiate the assumptions of the economic capital model, expressing the business 
unit view of their risk profile. This led to a quasi-technical, consensus-seeking 
measurement process. The resulting capital allocations, targets and limits thus 
emerged via compromise, to some extent tampering computations (Burchell et al., 
1980). Technical expertise was combined with political aptness on the part of the 
risk practitioners who orchestrated these control and decision making processes.
E spoused theories o f  risk control B W T F raser Bank
Risk management's self-definition ‘Risk conscience’ ‘Risk conscience’
The organization o f  risk 
management
Segmented by risk silos, 
ERC team
Segmented by risk silos, 
EC team
The metric o f  risk Respectability Capital and  Economic 
Risk Capital (ERC). A rule o f  thumb 
orders the two metrics into a 
hierarchy.
Risk analytics, Economic Capital (EC) 
as common denominator
The age o f  economic capital 
methodology at the time o f  
research
1-2 years (little history) 6-7 years (history)
Value based management Weak VBM  ethos Strong VBM ethos
Espoused theory (and tool) o f  
control over conflicting risk-return 
objectives
Ratio approach 
(Return o f ERC, ERC ratio); 
Value based management approach 
(Economic Profit)
Value based management approach 
(Economic Profit)
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Theory-in-use B W T F raser Bank
Apparent control style over 
conflicting risk-return objectives
Control by selective crack-down. Quasi-cybemetic control (subject to 
group-wide consensus - political 
agreement).
Related decision making style Decision making by judgment and 
intuition (Burchell et al., 1980)
Decision making by computation and 
compromise (Burchell et al., 1980)
The risk officer as... Reflective practitioner’ (Schon, 1992) Technical expert with political aptness
Table 3. Summary of case discussion points
Table 3 summarises the discussion points that describe the espoused theories 
of risk control, as well as the in-use theories that are put forward for the 
explanation of the observed practices.
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5.5. C o n c l u sio n
A cybernetic conception of control underpins much management control 
system thinking. However, in today’s complex organizations the simultaneous 
application of cybernetic control systems to multiple and conflicting 
organizational objectives presents controllers with rather complex control 
situations. Under such circumstances more complex (non-cybemetic) control 
practices have been anticipated (Hofstede, 1978; Otley, 1994).
In particular, Otley (1994) attributes the rise of complex controls to the 
increased uncertainties in the operating environments of many firms. In such 
circumstances the conditions for cybernetic validity may get undermined, 
reducing the ability of control systems to determine and monitor means and ends. 
This chapter has argued that uncertainties that might frustrate the cybernetic ideal 
can be found within the firm itself, independently of the perceived uncertainty of 
the operating environment. Specifically, considerable cause-effect and means- 
ends uncertainties (Thompson, 1967) can surround a measurement technique that 
is espoused to be the tool of cybernetic control. Such uncertainties may also lead 
to the weakening of the cybernetic validity of a control system, giving rise to non- 
cybemetic (‘complex’) control practices. The case study part of the chapter 
focused on empirical manifestations of such non-cybemetic controls.
Due to a particular regulatory framework, the notions of risk and capital 
adequacy are converging in the banking world. This, at least in some companies, 
led to the translation of risk analytics into the language of Economic Capital. 
Having a 'risk conscience' that speaks the more familiar language of 
accounting offers a bridge over the communication gap that has so far excluded 
risk people from strategic planning and performance measurement discussions.
However, some uncertainty around the economic capital methodology arose 
at both banks. In BWT it was the presence of cause-effect uncertainties that did 
not allow ERC to become accepted as the sole indicator of risk content and capital 
adequacy in the bank. The cause-effect uncertainties were resolved via the 
application of another, judgmental indicator (‘Respectability Capital’), and a rule 
of thumb that created an ordering between the two. This led decision makers to 
view risk control as a matter of judgment, intuition and learning. The apparent
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practice of risk control was described with reference to the notion of control by 
selective crack-down (Dunsire, 1990). In orchestrating the apparent attention 
swings, in the practices of decision making the role of judgment and intuition 
(Burchell et al., 1980) was emphasised. The risk officers, who appeared to 
exercise this control style by creating formal structures for it, still did so with 
reference to the espoused theories of risk control that echoed the cybernetic ideal. 
However, some of the senior risk officers were more conscious of the mismatch 
between the espoused and the actual practices -  they accepted it in a way that 
makes them akin to Schdn’s ‘reflective practitioners’ (Schon, 1992).
In Fraser Bank there was a strong external (and eventually, internal) drive to 
resolve the uncertainties that surrounded the economic capital methodology. The 
company had a value-based management ethos and a desire to demonstrate 
excellence in risk technologies. Linking risk calculations to capital management, 
planning and performance measurement required the improvements in the 
Economic Capital methodology. However, due to the implications for target 
setting and performance measurement, during the production of risk assessments 
a great deal of means-ends uncertainties arose among the business units in the 
group. The resolution of these uncertainties took place in a process that included 
decisions to be made by compromise, to some extent tampering computations 
(Burchell et al., 1980). The risk practitioners who could successfully manage this 
process appeared to be technical experts with considerable political aptness.
The study has pointed to an emerging re-conceptualisation of value-based 
management in the espoused theories of control over the risk-retum objectives at 
the banks. In the normative literature on VBM the calculation of capital charges 
based on the historically determined capital amount that a firm carries in the 
books. The point of departure in the espoused theories of risk-retum integration in 
the banks was that the capital charges were supposed to be based on the total risk 
profile of the business units. This means that the notion of ‘charging business 
units for the capital they employ’ was becoming equivalent with another notion: 
‘charging business units for the risk they take’.
This ‘risk-adjusted’ approach to VBM advocates the integration of the two 
sides of the risk-retum trade-off into one measure (Economic Profit). In practice, 
this allows controllers to look for compromise between the conflicting objectives. 
As by doing so the controllers are likely to disturb the power balance of the
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organization, much depends on their political skills and on the credibility of the 
technologies they deploy in the negotiation process. Compromise, if found, would 
manifest itself in an overriding risk-adjusted performance target. The experience 
of Fraser Bank indicates that the successful implementation of risk-based control 
is proving to be a formidable political task for risk managers. It requires a 
willingness on their part to carry through intricate discussions among the business 
units over risk capital allocations.
In the absence of a risk-based performance measurement framework (or the 
willingness or political backing to establish one), risk managers have one forum 
left to channel risk concerns into strategic discussions: the risk committee 
meetings for which they set the agenda. BWT’s example showed that in this 
manner a more ‘reflective’ control style might emerge. This can be viewed as an 
alternative non-cybemetic control mode, entailing senior risk officers to 
orchestrate timely attention swings, as and when required, among the decision 
makers.
The chapter also observed that the non-cybemetic risk control styles were 
associated with ERM’s alternative patterns of gaining strategic significance 
(chapter 3). Risk management, when integrated with planning and performance 
measurement, gave rise to the possibility of quasi-cybemetic control over the risk- 
retum objectives. However, lacking access to the formal planning and control 
cycle, senior risk people were found to strive for a more ‘reflective’ control style. 
Having gained agenda-setting power, and playing the devil’s advocate, senior risk 
officers were become instrumental in the emergence of what might be the 
entrepreneurial firm’s alternative to controlling the risk-retum trade-off, control 
by selective crack-down.
Nevertheless, the espoused theories of risk control (and the cybernetic 
ideal) were still influential. They guided the formal structures of the risk 
organisation at both banks, and fuelled the ambitions of risk practitioners. The 
cybernetic control ideal also helped practitioners to make sense of the challenges 
of capital management and performance measurement. It also gave them a short­
hand way of explaining their actions to outsiders - senior management, investment 
analysts, regulators and the researcher. The cybernetic control ideal thus remains 
influential not least because it offers practitioners a way to rationalise their 
actions.
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While this chapter benchmarked actual practices to the espoused theories 
of risk control, the next chapter will examine the alternative patterns of strategic 
significance in the context of the normative notions of Enterprise Risk 
Management. To the extent the normative notions of ERM guide espoused 
theories, ambitions and have influential institutional origins, the patterns observed 
might be expected to surface in other organizations too.
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C h a p t e r  6
E n t e r p r is e  R i s k  M a n a g e m e n t , C o r p o r a t e
GOVERNANCE AND CALCULATIVE CULTURES
'When they come downstairs from their Ivory Towers, 
Idealists are very apt to walk straight into the gutter.’
Logan Pearsall Smith
‘We are all in the gutter, but som e o f  us are looking at the stars.’
Oscar Wilde
This chapter aims to bring together what the previous chapters have found 
about the organizational significance of risk management. It also probes to what 
extent the findings might be suggestive of wider developments in the financial 
services sector. So far the organisational significance of risk management has 
been argued to stem from the micropolitics of ERM and its relations with 
planning and control (chapter 3), its institutional appropriateness (chapter 4) and 
its role in the control o f conflicting risk-retum objectives (chapter 5).
Chapter 4 concluded that risk management had become endemic to 
organizational life in the banking sector, not least because of its high institutional 
appropriateness. Risk officers, who drew a distinction between the ‘accounting’ 
and the ‘economic capital’ representations of risk, were found to further the 
‘economic’ view. They developed the Economic (Risk) Capital framework, to 
give an ‘economic’ representation to risk, and to place risk management and the 
issue of capital adequacy on an ‘economic’ basis.
However, chapter 3 and 5 have made the case that, although in place at 
both banks, the Economic Capital framework played very different roles. While at 
Frasers it was an integral part of strategic planning and control, its contribution at 
BWT was more controversial. The Economic Capital framework was actively 
called upon to answer questions of capital adequacy at the time of the crisis of 
BWT’s troubled business unit Division X. However, in the normal course of the 
planning and control cycle its impact was secondary. BWT’s senior risk officers
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sought to make a strategic impact operating outside the boundaries of the 
Economic Capital framework.
This chapter argues that the above difference might be suggestive of the 
current co-existence of alternative models of Enterprise Risk Management in the 
financial services sector. Digging below the surface of the loosely defined 
enterprise-wide risk practices, one finds variations in the specific 
conceptualisations and uses of risk management in individual organizations. This 
chapter proposes that in a given organisation various risk management practices 
form a constellation, the risk management mix, which corresponds to the 
particularities of the organisation and its context. As for the content of the risk 
management mix, four increasingly clear types of risk management ideal types are 
surfacing. These are Risk Silo Management, Integrated Risk Management, Risk 
and Value Management, and Strategic Risk Management. It can be expected that 
in practice these four types emerge in combinations, constituting at any 
organization the risk management mix. However, it is not argued that the risk 
management mix is entirely firm-specific. Instead, this chapter proposes that 
systematic variations in ERM practices exist.
The chapter revisits the cases of BWT and Frasers. This time the objective 
of the case study presentation is twofold. Firstly, the cases illustrate the four risk 
management ideal types and show how they form a the ‘risk management mix’ in 
a given organisation. Secondly, the chapter attempts to explain the differences in 
the two risk management mixes pointing towards firm-specific and institutional 
pressures.
In particular, following on Power (2003b)’s notion of calculative cultures, 
it is proposed that senior risk officers develop ‘personal philosophies’ about the 
‘manageability’ of risks. While there appears to be much consensus on the 
manageability of certain risks (e.g. market risks), the issue of non-quantifiable 
risks and that of internal capital allocation are contestable. They fall into a grey 
area where it is a matter of organizational politics and managerial discretion 
whether it is the risk function, or others, who exercise influence over them (if at 
all), and in what way.
Further, the chapter emphasises the role of institutional pressures in the 
selection and use of ERM practices. Above all, the influence of two powerful
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contemporary corporate governance concerns will be implicated in the analysis: 
the risk-based internal control imperative and a strong shareholder value drive.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section outlines and explains 
four types of risk management, with reference to their institutional origins, 
techniques and ambitions. Recognising that the notions of ‘integrated’ and 
‘strategic’ risk management are already in existence, and used interchangeably, 
along with similarly loose adjectives such as ‘enterprise-wide’ and ‘holistic’, the 
chapter will attempt to (re)define and distinguish the two concepts (Integrated and 
Strategic Risk Management) for the purposes of the analysis presented here. Next, 
by presenting the case studies, the chapter describes and explains developments in 
the risk management mix of the studied banks. Some of the observed risk 
management types were found to co-exist and compete even within the same 
organisation, representing (not always mutually exclusive) alternatives. A 
discussion of the implications for the further development of enterprise risk 
management will form the conclusion.
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6.1. F o u r  t y p e s  o f  ERM
Many observers, commenting on the development of risk management in 
financial institutions, highlight the increasing spread and codification of risk 
practices under the fashionable term Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). 
International bank capital regulation and corporate governance are two areas 
where the prominence of ERM is observable. So much so, that Power (2003a) 
wonders if ERM might be emerging as a ‘world model V 'If we were to imagine 
the creation o f a new banking organization, we know that it could not be founded 
without rapidly adopting the mission and principles o f ERM ...,23?
In particular, ERM is being prescribed by the new international bank
capital regulatory framework (Basel II). The Basel Committee, leading the reform
of banking supervision, endorses enterprise risk management as an umbrella
notion that can accommodate the techniques required for bank capital adequacy
calculation: ''...integrated firm-wide approaches to risk management should
continue to be strongly encouraged by the regulatory and supervisory 
218community. ’
ERM is also encrypted in corporate governance texts, prescribed as best 
practice by landmark reports from the North American Treadway Commission 
and the UK Turnbull Committee. Europe is likely to follow, with Germany 
already in tow with the Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG).
Still, enterprise risk management remains a rather elusive and under­
specified concept. Its broad definition (e.g. COSO (Treadway Commission), 
2003) is an umbrella to diverse risk management techniques and arrangements, so 
long as they create the image of consistent and comprehensive application. Just 
like Lam (2000) and Gilbert (2004), ERM advocates typically outline a set of risk 
management tasks and envision a ‘framework’ for the treatment of these under the 
auspices of an appointed senior risk officer. This requires the prioritisation and 
the ordering of the various elements into a control cycle (as described by 
corporate governance advocates and regulators) with recognisable structural and 
personnel arrangements.
237 Power (2003a), p. 10.
238 BIS (2003b), p.2.
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Making sense of these developments is a challenge. What follows is an 
attempt at ‘unbundling’ enterprise risk management. Building on the four risk 
management themes reviewed in Chapter 2 (risk quantification, risk aggregation, 
risk-based performance measurement, the management of non-quantifiable risks) 
four ideal types of risk management are proposed, all of which qualify as 
‘enterprise-wide’, but vary in terms of their focus and purpose.
6.1.1. T yp e  I :  R is k  Sil o  M a n a g e m e n t
Chapter 2 gave a brief introduction to the advances in the risk 
measurement capabilities of financial institutions (Garside & Nakada, 1999; 
Marrison, 2002). At the heart of the first risk management ideal type, Risk Silo 
Management, is risk quantification, the rendering of more and more types of risk 
susceptible to quantification, measurement and control. Thus Risk Silo 
Management can be defined as the measurement and control of market, credit and 
operational risks in ‘silos’, across the institution.
The most frequently cited technique of Risk Silo Management is Value-at- 
Risk. It is a statistical measure of unanticipated loss, derived from the loss 
distributions of different risk types that institutions track (e.g. market losses, 
credit losses, operational losses, insurance losses). The data that feeds into the 
Risk Silo Management models vary in nature across risk types.
Advances in Risk Silo Management have increasingly influenced the 
design of the international bank regulatory framework. The so called Basel rules 
require banks to set aside regulatory capital that must reflect the amount of risk 
they take, calculated as the aggregate of risks measured in the risk silos. The 
current regulatory framework is being replaced by a new one (‘Basel II’), which 
recognizes recent developments in Risk Silo Management while challenging
239 Due to their frequency o f change, market risk data are abundant. They are apparently 
distributed in a quasi-normal fashion, and thus lend them selves for the calculation o f  value-at- 
risk in a fairly straightforward manner. Credit risk data are derived from the analysis o f  the 
loan portfolio. Due to less frequent changes, credit loss data are often simulated. The 
simulations are based on macroeconomic scenarios and the suspected effect o f  these on the 
loan portfolio, in the light o f the default probabilities calculated for each loan title. However, 
generating credit loss data requires much judgment, for example, in the process o f  the random 
macroeconomic simulation or in the determination o f loss-recovery rates. The resulting loss 
distributions are typically non-normal (Marrison, 2002), nevertheless, a maximum probable 
loss ( ‘credit-at-risk’) is possible to derive. Operational risk presents risk silo managers with the 
greatest quantitative challenge. Most institutions are still in the early stage o f  learning about 
operational losses by establishing databases that collect information on risk materializations.
At this stage only the more frequent operational risks lend them selves to modelling.
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bai}ks that are lagging behind in terms of their risk measurement capabilities. 
Basel II differs from Basel I in two respects. The first difference is in the 
recognition of risk silos it advocates to be measured - along with market and 
credit risk, it now includes operational risk as well. The second difference is in the 
measurement options that are outlined for banks. These stretch the measurement 
capabilities of even the most advanced banks, especially with regards to the 
advanced measurement approach (AMA) to operational risk. Thus the Basel II 
framework is emerging as an important driver of further Risk Silo Management 
initiatives within banks.
The emergence of the new Basel II framework (due to the consultative 
approach taken by the Basel Committee) has taken place in the furore of loud 
industry debates. The international regulators started working on the new 
standards in 1998, but the projected date of the new framework’s entry into 
enforcement has been slipping for years. The current intention of the Committee 
is that regulators will begin applying Basel II on a test basis in early 2007 and 
then fully implement it in January 2008 (Paletta, 2005).
In recognition of the various industry viewpoints coming from a broad 
mix of domestic and international financial institutions, Basel II has enabled a 
range of approaches to be implemented (‘basic’, ‘standardised’ or ‘advanced 
measurement’ approaches)240. By this an apparent methodological plurality has 
been introduced in the credit risk and operational risk areas of Risk Silo 
Management.
Industry surveys suggest that despite the noticeable methodological 
pluralism, the advanced measurement approach (AMA) delivers reputational and 
efficiency gains to adhering institutions. A recent survey suggests that banks 
pursuing AMA ‘believe their choice o f approach would reduce their capital 
requirements, [and] agreed that their adopted approach would improve their
240 The Basel Committee offers two major options to users (BIS, 2003a). On one hand, with respect 
to credit and operational risk, banks can chose to remain compliant with the ‘standard’ regulatory framework 
that places less demand on their internal risk systems - this is called the ‘standardized approach.’ On the other 
hand, the Basel Committee now recognises that some banks might have more ‘advanced’, internal risk 
measurement capabilities, and proposes the second, ‘advanced measurement approach’, also known as 
’internal model-based’. This allows qualifying banks to use their internal models for the calculation o f each 
risk silo capital element. Note that the calculation o f market risk capital is unchanged from Basel I (e.g. Model 
Approach including Value at Risk for the market risk capital element).
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credit rating systems, process quality and management o f operational risk.,24] 
Thus the AMA approach being taken by financial institutions to signify good 
practice over and above the ‘basic’ and ‘standardised’ approaches. However, a 
recent FSA report observes that the realisation of institutions’ AMA aspirations, 
at least in the operational risk area, 'is generally still at a conceptual stage,’242 
Nevertheless, there is a sentiment in the financial services industry that current 
advances in Risk Silo Management are being motivated by institutions’ desire to 
show compliance with the new regulatory framework.
6.1.2. T yp e  I I :  I n t e g r a  t e d  R is k  M an a  g e m e n t
Risk aggregation has been a challenge for risk practitioners for a long 
time. This was largely due to the variety of risk measures applied to the different 
risk silos, and the correlations that exist between risks. The recent development of 
a common denominator measure for market, credit and operational risks, enables 
firms to aggregate their quantifiable risks into a total risk estimate. As has been 
stated in previous chapters, the emerging common denominator of quantifiable 
risks is called Economic Capital.
The Economic Capital framework gives rise to a new risk management 
ideal type, Integrated Risk Management. It is defined here as a risk management 
approach that applies the Economic Capital framework for the measurement, 
comparison, aggregation and control of risks.
The Basel Committee has legitimised the Economic Capital methodology 
that in the last decade has emerged as best practice among practitioners (see for 
example Marrison, 2002). But the real institutional force behind the spreading of 
Economic Capital in the industry is the rating agency community. Banks tailor 
Economic Capital not to a regulatory standard, but to the capital adequacy 
expectations coming from rating agencies. Economic Capital is the measure of the 
maximum probable loss that the bank must appear to be able to withstand in order 
to justify its target credit rating.
Given that rating agency opinions concern different banks to different 
extents, Economic Capital (or its promise) appeals primarily to banks that wish to 
maintain a high credit rating. For example, firms rated AA by S&P have
241 KPMG (2004), p. 8.
242 FSA (2003), p i7.
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historically defaulted with a 0.03% probability over a one-year horizon. If a bank 
aims for an AA credit rating, then the corresponding capital level (Economic 
Capital) is the amount required to keep the firm solvent over a one-year period 
with 99.97% confidence (Garside & Nakada, 1999). Given the higher confidence 
level applied, the ‘economic’ capital amount is to be higher than the regulatory 
minimum.
The influence of the rating agencies is apparent in the widespread industry 
discussions about the potential (or illusionary) gains resulting from AMA 
compliance. It has been believed that banks with advanced measurement systems 
will be able to demonstrate less capital need than postulated as minimum 
regulatory capital under the current framework. Some large banks (with advanced 
risk management systems) would expect their costly capital burden to ease. 
However, rating agencies have their own expectations about bank capital 
adequacy. Some argue that the rating agency expectations are as binding as 
regulatory ones. A banking industry magazine for example asserts that ‘without 
the agencies’ blessing, any capital reductions granted by the regulators will be 
meaningless.,243 It quotes a senior rating agency figure from Moody’s Investor 
services: ‘ I f  banks say, 'We are holding all this excess economic capital, and we 
want to eliminate it, ’ that could certainly increase the risk profile o f the bank. ,244 
A representative of Standard and Poor’s made similar comments: '‘I f  a bank is at 
an A rating level, and they substantially decapitalize from there, its rating could 
drop.'2*5
The role of rating agencies as quasi-regulators thus extends beyond the 
enforcement of minimum capital adequacy rules. In some cases they provide (and 
impose) even stricter capital expectations and extra scrutiny.
It is not suggested that Integrated Risk Management is a necessary 
evolutionary step after Risk Silo Management. For example, the take-up rate of 
Economic Capital among Swiss canton-banks is very low and they continue to 
show little interest in it.246 The explanation lies in the particular circumstances 
(historic traditions) of these banks - Swiss canton-banks typically reserve 200% of
243 Paletta (2005), p .l.
244 Paletta (2005), p .l.
245 Paletta (2005), p .l.
246 I owe this to a senior manager o f  the Association o f  the Sw iss Canton Banks whom I met in
London in July 2004.
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the minimum regulatory capital. It is plausible that banks which by tradition hold 
capital levels well above the regulatory minimum would see little benefit from the 
fine-tuning of their capital levels via the use of Economic Capital.
6.1.3 . T yp e  I I I :  R is k  a n d  Va l u e  M a n a g e m e n t
Recent works in the risk management literature advocate the idea of using 
risk-based internal capital allocations for performance measurement and control. 
The possibility of introducing risk-based performance measurement in banks has 
emerged as a result of developments in risk quantification and risk aggregation. It 
also appears to coincide with the rise of the shareholder value concept in 
corporate rhetoric, as well as with general concern with the quality of reported 
earnings in the mid 90s (Arnold & Davies, 2000; Hunt, 2003).
The type of risk management that is able to feed the performance 
measurement ambitions of the advocates of shareholder value has gone well 
beyond the original remit of Risk Silo Management or even that of Integrated 
Risk Management. It is put forward as the third risk management ideal type, Risk 
and Value Management, its distinguishing aspect being a strong shareholder value 
rhetoric.
Although the concept of shareholder value (or as it was previously 
referred to, residual income) dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, its 
wide-spread incorporation into management thinking has only recently gained 
momentum. This is largely to do with the renewed efforts of business schools and 
consulting firms that are advocating shareholder value and Value Based 
Management (the revival of the residual income concept is often associated with 
Stem et al.,1995).
The application of VBM in large financial institutions requires the 
allocation of capital to centres of accountability (for example, to business units), 
and then the measurement of their performance relative to the capital allocations 
(Hall 2002; Marrison 2002; Jameson 2001; Haubenstock & Morisano 2000). 
Given that capital allocations supposedly reflect risk taking, business unit 
performance is becoming measured relative to the quantifiable risk they incur.
Pushing these performance measurements down to business units, 
products and even transactions gave rise to ambitious claims as to what risk 
management can do in order to enhance shareholder value. Risk pricing, risk
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transfer, portfolio risk management (as in Lam, 2000) are the most frequently 
advocated possibilities in the literature.
There is also case study evidence on VBM implementations from major 
British, Dutch and US banks (Davies, 2000; Bruggnik & Buck, 2002; Barton et 
al., 2002, respectively). The joint consideration of risk and profitability in a 
common performance measurement framework247 is an application of value based 
management that is specific to the financial services sector. At the same time, it 
represents an application of risk management that is equally specific -  Risk and 
Value Management may be favoured by certain banks while doomed to fail in 
others.
6 .1 .4 . T y p e  IV : S tra  t e g i c  R i s k  M a n a  g e m e n t
We have seen how the ascent of the shareholder value concept gave rise to 
a specific ideal type of risk management, Risk and Value Management. This 
section focuses on the impact of another powerful notion, heralded by corporate 
governance advocates, that of risk-based internal control.
The reports from the Treadway Commission (COSO, 2003) and the 
Turnbull Committee (ICAEW, 1999), which are important milestones of Anglo- 
Saxon corporate governance, advocate ERM as a framework for capturing risks 
that are material from the point of view of the achievement of the strategic 
objectives of the enterprise. According to the Treadway Commission’s recent 
authoritative definition, ERM is '... a process, effected by an entity’s board o f 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement o f entity objectives.,248 Apart from the 
measurable risk silos, this conception of ERM encompasses risks that cannot be 
readily quantified or aggregated. These non-quantifiable risks include, for 
example, the risks of strategic failure, environmental risks, reputational risks and 
operational risks that materialise only rarely. Recent developments in corporate
247 Theoretically, Risk and Value Management offers two broad approaches to risk-based 
performance measurement in banks. The ratio approach  relates risk-adjusted profit to 
economic (risk) capital (RAROC). The second, shareholder value added  approach calculates 
the residual income left after subtracting a charge on economic (risk) capital from profit.
248 COSO (2003), p.6.
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governance have emphasized the importance of monitoring and managing these 
risks.
As a result, there have been calls for the risk management framework to be 
gradually expanded to incorporate non-quantifiable risks in addition to those that 
can be quantified. Here we define this ‘strategic’ version of ERM as the fourth 
risk management ideal type: Strategic Risk Management.
However, what lies beyond the management of quantifiable risks, is not 
specified. We have a picture of risk managers casting their nets wide to catch non- 
quantifiable risks that ‘keep senior management awake at night,249. Ironically, this 
fuzzy, undetermined risk management practice is what most likely attracts the 
fashionable adjectives ‘enterprise-wide’, ‘holistic’, and ‘strategic’, which are used 
interchangeably.
The management of non-quantifiable risks is not statistics-based. 
Advocates talk of the role of judgement, experience and intuition, comparing it to 
strategic decision making. Even the recommended techniques, such as scenario 
analysis and decision tree methods, are borrowed from the strategy and decision 
making literature (Pickford, 2001).
To sum up, this section has outlined four types of risk management that all 
have ‘enterprise-wide’ ambitions. A summary of the discussion is presented in 
Table 1.
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Table 1. Four ideal types of enterprise risk management
Whether these risk management archetypes represent transitory stages in 
what might be called the evolution of ERM, or are permanent variants 
representing alternatives to firms, is an empirical question. The subsequent two 
sections revisit the two case studies, presenting field-based evidence for the 
apparent clustering of the ideal types in distinct risk management mixes.
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6.2. T h e  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  m ix  a t  B W T
To recoup, a surge of risk projects took place at BWT at the time of the 
case study. BWT Group, after a number of high-profile mergers in the late 90s, 
was consolidating its risk systems by implementing a blueprint devised by the 
investment banking arm of the group.
However, BWT was also suffering a downturn in its profitability. By 
updating its risk management systems BWT signalled to both internal and 
external stakeholders that it had got to grips with the situation , and, in 
particular, with its troubled business unit, Division X. The new risk function 
displayed a wide array of risk practices that gave rise to the possibility of 
exercising all of the four types of risk management outlined in the previous 
section. However, BWT’s ‘risk management mix’ was a specific combination of 
these, as will be shown next.
6.2.1. R is k  Sil o  M a n  a g e m e n t a  t B W T
The three risk silo sub-departments had a shared mission: to 'act as the 
independent "risk conscience" and policy enforcer for [BWT] for all risks that could have a 
material impact on the firm in an integrated and comprehensive fashion.'251
This mission statement carries multiple ambitions: apart from the usual 
exercise of Risk Silo Management, the aspiration of Integrated Risk Management 
(‘integrated and comprehensive’) as well as that of Strategic Risk Management 
(dealing with ‘all risks that could have a material impact’) are present. In order to 
understand the use and balance of these risk management types in the mix we 
need to look at them closer.
At the time of the start of the field work, in the market risk silo, the 
development of Value at Risk for non-conventional investment products was the 
major preoccupation. Risk people saw their role in providing a service to traders, 
with whom they were housed together in separate offices from all other risk 
officers. The head of market risk controlling explained:
250 Literally - BWT had issued Group Risk Processes and Standards, abbreviated as GRIPS...
251 BWT, internal document
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‘It is not my job to decide whether or not w e should make a deal. It has never 
happened that traders cannot take a deal because w e are not able to calculate a risk. 
We are helping them to understand what they do. (...) I see  myself as providing a service 
for the traders and the treasurers.'252
Market Risk Controlling saw its challenge in the quantification and 
tracking of risk that the traders took. However, the emergence of innovative new 
products (the so called Alternative Investment products), demanded the invention 
of a measurement new methodology:
'Our job is to deliver a measure of risk. How w e are doing that is our business. (...) 
The big issue for us... in our trading book the majority of the risk does not com e from 
traditional trading products, but from Alternative Investments... basically hedge funds that 
are sold to our private clients. BWT is providing the market maker function for these 
products. The Alternative Investment products on our book behave very stably over a long 
time, then all of a  sudden their value can decline quite considerably. The most common
example is LTCM. One reason for its collapse is that they invested in non liquid titles.
253Illiquidity is not covered by market risk, Value-at-Risk m ethodologies.'
The new methodology was Value-at-Risk-based, but was packaged under 
the ingenious title of ‘AstHRx.,254 ‘ AstAIRx’ was a significant success, not least 
because its initial messages pleased the traders who perceived that the previous 
risk limits were too conservative with regards to Alternative Investments:
'While the old method produced a VaR of around [20m], the new tool gives 
around [10m].255 Risk appears to be half. The trading department is more than happy of 
course. They say: w e always knew the risk is not that big.'256
However, risk people remained cautious about the interpretation of their
measurements:
‘Do you think the risk m anagem ent tools are really accurate? The Value-at-Risk 
model particularly for Alternative Investments is based on a lot of assumptions. I was 
always afraid that w e go for the accuracy of the risk that w e have recognised and do not 
realise that there are huge risks, which are not covered at all. (...)l am absolutely 
convinced that [AstAIRx] is better than the old method, so why not use it. (...) [The old 
method] was really-really basic. That's why w e overstated risk, w e could see that from 
backtesting.'257
This pragmatic attitude to risk quantification among market risk officers is 
all the more striking, given that the literature suggests that the market risk area
252 Head o f  Market Risk Controlling, BWT
253 Head o f  Market Risk Controlling, BWT
254 Pseudonym for confidentiality reasons
255 The real numbers are, for confidentiality reasons, disguised
256 Head o f  Market Risk Controlling, BWT
257 Head o f  Market Risk Controlling, BWT
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provides risk managers with the most confidence in their calculations. While most 
market risk people are expected to be ‘calculative idealists’ (Power, 2003b), 
BWT’s risk silo officers appeared closer to be ‘calculative pragmatists' , in that 
they regarded numbers as attention-directing devices with no intrinsic claims to 
represent reality. For them risk models made Value-at-Risk trends visible for 
management purposes and helped to steer behaviour in the right direction.
This calculative pragmatism generally characterised the control of all risk 
silos at BWT. An understanding emerged that in a large organization, where there 
is a hierarchy of limits, lower-level risk limits can be fluid, negotiable, and 
adjustable for the needs of the business. During an afternoon spent observing the 
work of the members in the market risk team the researcher came across a market 
risk chart, which showed an increasing trend of market VaR, with a step function 
of the limits, climbing up in parallel. This chart was shown to several risk people. 
The Chief Risk Officer’s response revealed that risk control involved much 
learning on the side of the controllers:
'(AM) I saw this chart about the VaR limits on Alternative Investments. (Draws.) 
When I saw it my first reaction was, oh my god...
(CRO)...they don't respect the risk limit, the limit just tracks the risk?
(AM) Exactly.
(CRO): (smiles) First, this is still part of the overall limit that has been  accep ted  by 
the Board -  that has never been exceeded . It [the overall limit] is relatively large. The one 
you were looking at is a sort of sub-limit. If you look at those positions, I would not call them 
trading positions as such because it is not the trader who decides whether he wants to 
have them or not. But I think the environment is relatively stable and w e understand the 
dynamics. If w e go back to that chart, the big question is to what extent you actually 
understand the dynamics of the beast you are looking at. If you have a very good  
understanding of the beast then probably a thermostat approach [AM: to control] is not 
bad.'258
On the nature of risk control, he added:
‘It is not so much a question of stable versus unstable [environment]; it also could 
be a question of how well you understand what is actually going on. '259
The extension of calculative pragmatism into the practice of control at 
BWT shattered the boundaries of traditional notion of cybernetic control. Risk 
limits were used as indicative, breaches triggered negotiations whether limits
258 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
259 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
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should be adjusted to accommodate the risk taking, and the process was 
considered as part of learning about the dynamics of risk.
This suggests that Teaming about the beast’ might imply slackening off on 
risk limits and letting the business-side (to a certain extent) run with the risk. 
Further, on the part of risk officers, it also involves orchestrating timely attention 
swings, in case risk taking should be contained. In the market risk area there was 
a hierarchy of limits, with higher-level limits being less and less flexible. 
However, the case of Division X showed just how difficult it can be to orchestrate 
swings between the profit and the risk sides. The CRO commented:
'I believe in the quality of our risk m anagem ent function, absolutely. But you have 
to be honest enough to check if something went wrong. What happened in 2002, looking 
at the results, obviously something went wrong, otherwise w e would not have lost [lbn]. 
(...) We knew the risk position that w e had, w e presented the risk position to senior 
management, to the Board of Directors, everybody was aware of it. So it is not that w e did 
not know. We just did not do anything about it or not fast enough.'260
Risk people realised they needed to be able to give more timely and firmer 
signals to the decision makers -  they needed early warning indicators. 
Responding to the perceived need for early warning systems, the credit risk silo 
controllers devised a warning indicator, which was expected to give more timely 
signals of emerging problems. A crude measure it was, its simplicity compensated 
by the pragmatism of the credit risk controller:
'Here is something very interesting and important to me. The migration matrix. This 
is part of risk calculation. (...) We take the ratio between up- and down-gradings [both 
measured as percentages of the loan portfolio] and if it is lower than 1 -  it says that there 
are more down-gradings than up-gradings. It means if you are below 50% you tend to 
have more risk in the portfolio. It doesn’t say anything about the amount [of risk]. However, 
the trend is interesting. The big picture behind it can be recession or recovery, you are not 
sure, but it is an indicator for me. (...) My function is to show the problems.'261
The operational risk silo also displayed much calculative pragmatism. On 
the face of it, risk officers in the operational risk controlling area were developing 
Key Risk Indicators that would render operational processes to measurement and 
control.
However, the director of the silo remained cautious about the use of risk 
measurements:
260 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
261 Director of Credit Risk Controlling, BWT
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‘(Director, OpRisk): It is not as easy as in case of market risk or credit risk. I don’t 
know if I should put all my effort into risk measurement to quantify [given that] when it 
really happens my figure would be for sure completely wrong. So why should I put all my 
resources into something that is senseless? I am not a fan of the quantitative approach in 
OpRisk. If you look at the losses, most of them are based on human behaviour -  now how 
do you measure it? '262
Given the doubts about the plausibility of the quantification of operational 
risk, the controller’s informed judgement based on experience was the key to 
operational risk control. The operational risk silo aimed at pushing responsibility 
for operational risk down to business unit and line management level. Based on 
his extensive operational experience and relations within the bank, the operational 
risk director cultivated an advisory and collaborative, rather than policing role 
over the business unit risk managers, which encouraged them to report operational 
losses (over a certain threshold, as and when they occurred) into a loss database. 
This was then used for preparing ‘risk reviews’, thereby turning risk control into a 
learning exercise. The CRO confirmed:
‘(CRO): I have doubts whether you actually can define things such as key risk 
indicators on operational risk. Maybe the thing kind of evades as soon as you start 
measuring it. Which is not bad -  then you have solved at least your perceived problem. 
Instead of this, however, I agree with [the Director of Operational Risk] that it is highly 
judgemental. It is a question of how you can bring in that judgement. What you also have 
to see whenever w e talk about operational risk... in [Operational Risk Controlling] there are 
four or five people, but this is just the tip of the iceberg, because operational risk is a  line 
m anagem ent function. They have to set up their procedures and processes in an 
appropriate way so that these things do not happen. (...) Then the question becom es, if 
you want to do something on operational risk on a firm-wide basis, which I think we 
agreed, what is the most meaningful thing you do with a couple of people? I think it has to 
do with risk reporting and risk reviews. Let me give you an example on risk reviews. It is to 
evaluate accidents. So w e say w e had a ca se  X, it costs us 5 million, now what can we do 
to prevent it from happening in the future?
(AM): Is that learning from mistakes?
(CRO): Yes, exactly.'263
It appears that Risk Silo Management at BWT was characterised by the 
exercise of a great deal of calculative pragmatism. Risk controllers respected the 
inherent need for risk taking in the banking business. But they recognised the 
additional need for learning about the dynamics of risk. Thus limits and risk
262 Director o f  Operational Risk Controlling, BWT
263 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
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management objectives emerged in a flexible, fluid manner, as senior 
management made decisions about risk taking following not only risk 
measurements, but also experience, judgement and intuition. There were cycles of 
spurs and halts on risk taking, whereby business strategies were enacted in a 
relatively lassaiz faire manner, up to a point where risk was judged as excessive 
and got clamped down.
6.2.2. S tra t e g ic  R is k  M ana  g e m e n t a  t B W T
BWT’s senior risk officers, it seemed, extended this calculative 
pragmatism to risks that are considered as lying outside the Risk Silo 
Management framework. By the inclusion of these risks into the remit of the risk 
people, the intention was to move beyond Risk Silo Management towards 
Strategic Risk Management. Pondering the monthly board risk report, the CRO 
reflected:
'(CRO): If you look at the Key Exposure Report, it tries to cover all significant risks in 
a more or less comprehensive fashion.
(AM): You mean all significant risks that are quantifiable?
(CRO): Absolutely -  that's the big caveat. The big risks today are: are w e running 
the right strategy or not? What do w e do with private banking going forward? Should w e  
grow retail banking [domestically] or rather abroad? Now, how do you integrate these into 
the monthly report?’264
It is remarkable that BWT’s senior risk officers claimed access to the 
discussion of corporate-level strategies. When the researcher suggested that by 
doing so, the risk people might be encroaching upon the territory of the strategy 
and planning function, the CRO gave a brisk reply:
'Not if you have a Chief Risk Officer. Because that’s what you pay him for.'265
At the time the Strategy and Planning function was sceptical about the 
possible contribution risk people could make to strategy analysis. A few months 
later it emerged that the risk function sought to render strategic uncertainties to 
scenario analysis, in order to deal with problems that were on the borderline 
between strategic planning and the risk silos, between non-quantifiable and 
quantifiable risks. The senior risk officers of BWT Group (the CRO of BWT, the
264 Chief Risk Officer, BWT
265 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
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CRO of the investment bank, and the Group-CRO) treated this as part of their 
personal agenda:
‘(CRO): We [the 3 CROs of BWT Group] have discussions about what the most 
dangerous things that could happen are, we put together a report to the board about 
these and what w e do against them. (...) It could be the quality of the [domestic] lending 
portfolio, given its sheer size. It could be the impact of an interest rate increase on the 
asset portfolio of [Division X]. It could be further erosion, further defaults in the energy 
sector in the US.
(AM): So this is really a bird’s eye view, looking at the business from the top.
(CRO): Right. It is a 30,000 feet view of the world.'266
Senior risk officers thus looked beyond the risk silos, scanning a ’30,000 
feet view’ of the organizational landscape, in order to find problem areas to which 
they would have to alert the attention of the executive and supervisory boards. 
This Strategic Risk Management approach set example for senior risk officers 
within the business units too. For example, the post-crisis CRO of Division X 
instigated ‘special risk reviews' to be presented at Risk Management Committees 
by line management staff on topics as diverse as foreign exchange risk and 
specific strategic issues. According to the meeting schedules, quantitative risk 
analyses received 15-30 minutes of attention, while special risk topics were 
discussed for 45-90 minutes.
‘(CRO, Division X): ‘My role is not to be a nice guy. If I schedule a topic for this 
m anagem ent committee, nobody says no. If somebody says no, I am going to be 
suspicious very quickly. The people [invited to hold presentations on specific issues] know 
that there is no value in undermining it because they are going to talk in front of the Chief 
Executive Officer, not just to me. (...) If risk m anagement has a  strong opinion on certain 
risk profiles, it is more difficult for top management not to consider it.’267
It appears that in the same way as in BWT, the risk framework, originally 
Risk Silo Management, was augmented by Strategic Risk Management within 
Division X too. Accordingly, the business unit CRO perceived an increase in the 
profile of the risk committee meetings for which he set the agenda.
The growing strategic influence of senior risk officers was acknowledged 
by other members of the executive board meetings, who recognised that the 
nature of CRO power was informal. As the Chief Credit Officer of BWT 
commented:
266 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
267 C hief Risk Officer, Division X
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‘(CCO): [The CRO's] organization is relatively new. This year I feel his influence has 
increased. I am part of these [executive board-level] meetings. In my opinion, his influence 
in strategic discussion and decision [making] has increased. He contributes on a regular 
basis and he has his own opinion, ja.
(AM): Would he contribute with information he gets formally from his own people 
[the risk department]?
(CCO): Ha! (Laughs) He has different sources. That’s good. I mean even sources 
like discussions with people between four eyes, when he just talks to important people in 
the organization, informally. As I said he has different sources.’ 268
The background and qualifications of the CRO might be indicative of his 
orientation towards the alternative information sources that he was perceived to 
draw upon. His background (and doctorate) in risk-based internal audit suggest a 
sensitivity to non-quantifiable risks, and an approach of looking for these at their 
source by calling upon line management. His superior, the CRO of BWT Group, 
was the author of a practitioner book that detailed an internal control-based 
methodology to operational risk management.
6.2.3. I n t e g r a  t e d  R is k  M a n a  g e m e n t a  t B W T
Apart from the activities of risk silo controllers and senior risk officers, a 
third group deserves attention in the risk function -  the Economic Risk Capital 
team. At the time of the financial downturn of the company there were heightened 
stakeholder concerns regarding BWT’s capital adequacy. In late 2001 the ERC 
team was tasked with working out an economic capital methodology.
The resultant ERC methodology brought integration to the quantifiable set 
of BWT’s risk management framework. ERC was calculated for each risk silo and 
trends were reported monthly to the board. ERC has gained authority as an 
indicator of worsening capital trends, as was learned from Division X’s crisis. As 
a result of using ERC as a common denominator of risk, it became possible to 
aggregate risk across risk silos, in order to calculate the risk profile of the group, 
or the projected risk profile, based on planning forecasts. With ERC becoming a 
tool to declare the risk appetite of the group, Integrated Risk Management was, 
apparently, in place:
'What w e changed this year are two things. First, w e said, risk has to be explicit 
topic in the strategic business plan. (...) What w e also said was, the board of directors does
268 C hief Credit Officer, BWT
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not only have to approve the strategic business plan, but it also has to approve the risk
269appetite, in the form of an overall ERC limit for the Group.’
In addition, ERC was used in investor communications, not least to signal 
the advanced risk management capabilities of BWT, which allowed it to 
‘integrate’ risk measurement, given that ERC was reputed to be the best practice 
common denominator of risk in the financial services sector.
6.2.4. Risk a n d  Va l u e  M a n a g e m e n t  a t  BWT
Subsequently the ERC team realised that it could contribute to strategic 
planning, control and performance measurement in a much more ‘integrated’ 
fashion. In the early 2000s there was talk at group level of an imminent Value 
Based Management implementation. Risk capital controllers saw this as an 
opportunity to establish what would have been Risk and Value Management. The 
CRO saw it as a way of ‘integrating risk management and strategic planning’, 
which was the subject of much of our initial talks:
'One of the challenges w e have with the business units is to com e up with a 
common agreem ent about the right way to do it [integrating risk and strategy]. VBM is one 
possibility, but you have to be careful it does not becom e a religion. People who really 
believe in it, for them it is pretty close to religion. Personally, I think it is a good tool.’270
But it was the head of the ERC team who championed the move to 
establish a link between risk management, planning and control in what would 
amount to a Risk and Value Management framework:
'What w e should have done last year is to verify that the business plan is consistent 
in terms of profit and volume, growth assumptions, because w e can use risk as a plausibility 
check in order to see whether the planning process has considered all the relevant 
aspects. For example, you can't just increase profit and volume without increasing risk. 
Otherwise where should the profit com e from? 1271
However, in the wake of the dawning financial problems of the group, 
VBM has been taken off the agenda. As the director then responsible for VBM 
implementation explained wryly, '...the VBA [Value Based Analysis, BWT's internal 
jargon for VBM] numbers didn't look very good, there were big losses. Then management 
decided not to report it externally, only internally, at group-level.’272
269 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
270 C hief Risk Officer, BWT
271 Director, Economic Risk Capital, BWT
272 Director, Group Accounting & Reporting, BWT Group
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With a stalled VBM implementation, the ERC team struggled to find a 
point of linkage with the strategy and control departments:
'We could calculate Economic Profit, but if we did, nobody would want to have it 
in the Strategic Business Plan that goes to the board. (...) Controlling for example does not 
support it.’273
There were two problems. First, capital allocation was seen as a politically 
sensitive exercise, requiring careful communication both internally and vis a vis 
external stakeholders. The second issue was that by relying on each other’s capital 
strength, there were interdependencies between the business units. Attempting to 
quantify these in an economic manner was a major challenge that the ERC team 
struggled with. The economic capital calculations, although indicative of trends, 
were judged as insufficient to reflect the absolute risk profile of individual 
business units.
Finally the CRO abandoned the idea of integrating risk management and 
strategic planning and control in a VBM framework. Instead, Strategic Risk 
Management was salient, with senior risk officers exercising influence on 
strategic decision making in a much more pragmatic, informal fashion.
6.2.5 . Th e  CRO a s  ‘l  ' E m in e n c e  G r is  ’
BWT displayed a wide exemplar of best practice in risk management, 
which could have given rise to all of the four risk management types described in 
Section 2. Risk Silo Management, Integrated Risk Management and Strategic 
Risk Management emerged as clearly visible in the risk management mix, 
furthered by risk silo controllers, risk capital controllers and senior risk officers, 
respectively. It appeared that Risk and Value Management struggled and to date 
failed to take root at BWT. Why?
The characteristic feature of risk management in BWT was the strong 
calculative pragmatism it applied to risk quantification. Risk silo control was 
turned into a learning exercise. This approach to control created the ground for the 
exercise of Strategic Risk Management.
However, the calculative pragmatism that helped risk silo control and fed 
the strategic aspirations of senior risk officers became a hindrance to the 
ambitions of risk capital controllers. Deploying risk calculations in performance
273 Director, Economic Risk Capital, BWT
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measurement required ‘trust in numbers’ (Porter, 1995). As the ERC methodology 
struggled to gain sufficient credibility for becoming a basis for performance 
measurement, the archetype of Risk and Value Management was doomed at 
BWT.
Strategic Risk Management emerged as an alternative way to link risk 
management and strategic decision making, even though that took place outside 
the formal planning and control cycle. It appeared that at the time of the case 
study, the risk function lacked in-house strategic capabilities. Strategic 
information had to be channelled to the risk committee meetings directly from 
line management. Senior risk officers exercised their influence and accumulated 
power formally, through agenda-setting, and informally, via knowing influential 
others.
This left the risk function with a structural anomaly. Due to the existence 
and dedication of the ERC team, it had the capabilities for Integrated Risk 
Management and risk capital specialists furthered the notion of integrating risk 
and strategy in what would have been a Risk and Value Management framework. 
However, the integration of risk management and strategy took place in a much 
more informal way. In this loose Strategic Risk Management setting there was no 
formal capability within the risk function that would provide senior risk officers 
with strategic information. This conjures up a medieval metaphor for the Chief 
Risk Officer: that of the ‘Eminence Gris’, acting behind the scenes, powerful, but 
left to his own resources and, essentially, lonely.
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6 .3 . THE RISK MANAGEMENT MIX AT FRASER BANK
On the face of it, Fraser Bank’s risk management practices resembled 
those at BWT. Risk was measured, managed and reported by silos and business 
units, giving the impression of enterprise-wide coverage. There was a separate 
Economic Capital team and a Risk Director, who sat on the executive board. Out 
of a crowded committee structure, quarterly and monthly risk committee meetings 
emerged, with timely and increasingly formalised reporting practices.
6.3.1. R is k  a n d  Va l u e  M a n a g e m e n t  a t  F raser  B a n k
What was strikingly different in Frasers, however, is a strong Value Based 
Management ethos, which was instigated in 2000, with implementation well 
under way at the time of the start of the case study. Although the risk 
management department had been in place for some ten years by then, the VBM 
initiative led to a complete overhaul of the central risk function. Its mission was 
restated in terms of ''supporting the [Fraser] Group Strategy ’ by ‘providing better 
support to [business unit] risk management’ in anticipation of 'a direct effect on 
economic value creation.,274 Frasers was aiming for the implementation of a Risk 
and Value Management framework, in which the risk people were tasked with the 
‘granular attribution o f Economic CapitaV215 to business units.
What this meant in practice was a formal integration of business planning, 
performance measurement and economic capital allocation, the latter under the 
auspices of the risk management function, as explained by strategy and planning 
people as follows:
'The businesses put forward their proposals having linked in with [the central risk
m anagem ent department] and [the] Economic Capital [team]. They generate
appropriate figures upon which we make the choices about where to bet the bank. The
calculations are done by the businesses initially. They work it through with [the] Risk
[department]. (...) There is a methodology provided by Risk that the businesses must use in
276order to calculate Economic Capital.'
The Strategy and Planning function then negotiated the alternative plans 
through with the business units, in an attempt to optimise risk-adjusted
274 All quotes from a presentation by the Group Risk Director titled ‘Creating an expert team’
275 ibid.
276 Assistant Director, Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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profitability across the group, until an agreement was reached with each of them. 
The agreed plans were then presented to the executive board, where the focus of 
discussions was Economic Profit. The Economic Capital charges were aggregated 
into operating costs in these pro-forma financial statements. In other words, risk 
calculations were an integral part of the planning process, but the actual figures 
used for the capital charges were not explicitly shown to the Executive Board.
6.3.2. S t r a t e g ic  R is k  M a n a g e m e n t  a t  F raser  B a n k  
Some senior risk officers, however, expected greater visibility and voice in 
strategic decision making. The director of risk reporting, for example, envisioned 
a different role for his function. With a hint of irony he likened the role of the risk 
manager to that of the ‘medieval licensed jester, allowed to be more sceptical 
about what is going on ', constantly challenging existing assumptions and views, 
and scrutinising strategic decisions before they are made. Such a ‘licence’ would 
have given rise to Strategic Risk Management. However, this was not to happen 
at Frasers -  risk officers with strategic ambitions got marginalised.
Reflecting on the case, three reasons might account for this. First, the very 
idea of Value Based Management and the value-focused, in extremis single- 
minded culture it imposes, proved to be a hindrance to the senior risk officer with 
strategic ambitions:
‘[The] Risk [function] by definition, like audit, sits outside the culture of an 
organization as a whole, it has to. And the more important it becom es to a business that 
everybody sings in tune the less space is given for any kind of business voice. And it 
becom es very difficult for a risk manager, at any level, either talking to a trader or talking 
to the Chairman of the bank, to challenge. The skill is challenging without causing offence 
and if the trading manager and the Chairman are wise they listen. But it is also possible to 
get carried away by trying to drive the corporate culture and by a  general desire from 
everyone to get there, that any kind of challenge is not welcom e, even if it com es from 
the risk function (...) whose role is to challenge.’277
Second, it appeared that at Frasers the centre of power concentrated on staff 
who furthered the Risk and Value Management framework. This favoured the 
Strategy and Planning function, as was perceived by risk people:
‘The Strategy and Planning function are the guardians of the executive committee 
and as a result they don’t actually want conflict.’278
277 Director o f  Risk Reporting; Fraser Bank
278 Director o f  Risk Reporting; Fraser Bank
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Senior risk officers did not possess the agenda-setting power that their 
counterparts at BWT did. As a result, this particular senior risk officer at Frasers 
concluded, ‘[This] does not feel like a toothsome risk function ’, and after a wave 
of reorganization that washed him further on the side he left the organization.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it was the commitment of risk 
people to risk quantification that prevented them from framing strategic issues 
outside the main risk silos in a way that would have allowed them to voice their 
opinion. The above-quoted senior risk person defined the problem as follows:
'These non-financial risk issues are not very technical, more subjective. The issue is to 
identify some quantitative measures that we can assess on a regular basis. So w e can gain 
some confidence that w e comply with the appetite for risk in that area, even if w e haven’t 
m anaged to articulate it yet for some reason.’279
Referring to the balanced scorecard idea, he further iterated:
'There is nothing new under the sun. Instead of slogans, the w ay w e m anage is to 
keep track of measurements and target metrics. We track these and adjust behaviour to
improve metrics to the desired level. (...) The issue is to identify some quantitative measures
280that w e can assess on a regular basis.'
Ten months later his boss, the Risk Policy Director, opened our first 
conversation with a line in very much the same spirit:
281'If you want to m anage risk, you have to quantify it'.
This approach is strikingly different from the calculative pragmatism
displayed among several risk officers at BWT. It is closer to what Power (2003b)
calls calculative idealism, represented by adherents aiming to ‘ induce correct
282economic behaviour in the light o f [the] risk measures.’
However, the strategic issues in which risk people wanted a voice defied 
quantitative measurement. Hence, the insistence to control these risks via 
measurement frustrated the archetype of Strategic Risk Management. In order to 
further explore the extent of this calculative idealism among the risk officers, a 
look at Frasers’ Risk Silo Management is warranted.
6.3.3. R is k  Sil o  M a n  a g e m e n t a  t  F raser  Ba n k
Frasers operated with risk silos similar to those found at BWT: market 
risk, credit risk and operational risk (also referred to as ‘non-financial and
279 Director o f  Risk Reporting; Fraser Bank
280 Director o f  Risk Reporting; Fraser Bank
281 Director, Risk Analysis and Policy; Fraser Bank
282 Power (2003b), p. 14.
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compliance risk'). The risk methodologies had a decade-long history: they had 
been evolving since 1993. The central risk function was also the custodian of a 
loss data warehouse that supported the continuous development of quantified risk 
measurement approaches and back-testing.
Characteristically of the calculative idealism at Frasers, the progress of the 
risk function was assessed by judging how advanced the quantification 
methodologies were. The Risk Policy Director, whose long tenure at the bank 
made him qualify as 'the institutional memory’ (as he liked to call himself), 
recollected:
(Director, Risk Policy): ‘Initially there was a market risk m anagem ent team and a  
credit risk m anagem ent team. But even the market risk m anagem ent team was not very 
professional, w e did not have a proper measurement system. We did have crude 
measurement systems.[...] Market risk was m anaged by the treasurer. The head of credit -  
well, his job was regarded as taking big lending decisions. Operational risk at that stage  
wasn’t really talked about. [...] (Risk management] has been evolving since 1993. First we 
m ade the m anagem ent of market risk more professional, so it is much more structured and 
quantified. Then w e m ade credit risk more quantified. The job of the Chief Credit Officer 
becam e quite different. Even though he was still quite involved in big decisions, his job was 
to m anage the portfolio rather than individual credits.'283
Frasers was the first European bank to implement Value-at-Risk in the 
market risk area, together with the quantitative credit rating of the entire lending 
book, leading to the application of modem portfolio theory to the credit risk 
profile. In the bank’s committee structure there was a separate body devoted to 
discussing and updating the methodologies in use.
During the years, Risk Silo Management has gradually become a quasi­
line management function. As risk management got pushed down to the business 
units, it became more and more difficult to tell whether the risk function at 
business unit level was a staff or line management activity, the distinction was 
blurred. The Risk Policy Director explained:
‘You need to go down to the business units as that is where the real risk 
m anagem ent takes place. All w e do is set policies and constraints and measurement 
systems. (...) One of the post-1992 principles was that risk has to be m anaged as close to 
where the risk is taken on as possible. So you have your credit risk m anagem ent process 
integrated with lending. The market risk managers also sit on the trading floor next to the 
people who are taking the risk. (...) So, the real risk m anagem ent is in the dataflow and
283 Director, Risk Analysis and Policy; Fraser Bank
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conversation that takes place between risk m anagem ent guys and the traders or people 
who are taking on the risk. '284
This decentralised approach left the risk people at the centre with 
responsibility for the methodologies used at business unit level, but distanced 
them from the businesses at the same time. Business unit risk managers developed 
'‘double loyalties' , sometimes shielding their business from outside inquiries, 
which made it even more difficult for headquarters risk managers to see into their 
affairs, reinforcing the decentralised nature of Risk Silo Management.
Talking to senior risk officers revealed that underneath the calculative 
idealism of the process design, there was a fair amount of pragmatism when it 
came to application. The director of risk reporting, for example, liked to remind 
others of the 1 insufficient amount o f subjectivity ’ that the risk processes entailed. 
The Risk Policy Director came to think of risk in terms of two dimensions: the 
extent of measurability and the extent of liquidity (to what extent one can 
trade/hedge/insure the risk). He considered the risks that were high on both 
dimensions to be market and credit risks -  these he regarded as well under 
control. Risks that were low under both dimensions (strategic and legal risks) he 
regarded as problematic from the point of view of risk management. Finally, he 
placed operational risk in between -  the operational risk team, at the time of the 
study, was engaged in working out a quantified methodology for the assessment 
of material risk concentrations. Figure 1 is a copy of the chart the Risk Policy 
Director drew as illustration.
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Figure 1. Mental mapping o f  risks at Fraser Bank r*s  ^*s quantifiable
284 Director, Risk Analysis and Policy; Fraser Bank
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This mental mapping of the risks helps to explain why risk people at 
Frasers ultimately kept away from getting involved with the management of non- 
quantifiable risks, and concentrated on the risk silos.
6.3.4. I n t e g r a t e d  R is k  M a n a g e m e n t  a t  F ra ser  B a n k  
Crucial to the workings of Risk and Value Management at Frasers was the 
existence of an Economic Capital framework:
'Economic Profit inherently needs Economic Capital b ecau se you have to adjust 
your profit by the risk that you have taken in order to reach that profit. So that's how w e  
link to the rest of the Group and Strategy and Planning in terms of providing cost of risk [the 
product of Economic Capital times the cost of equity, for ea ch  business unit]. That's how 
we feed into the Finance and Strategy areas.'285
A separate Economic Capital team was set up, initially within the planning 
function. Later the risk capital controllers got transferred to the risk department. 
They provided risk management services in two ways. First, the Economic 
Capital framework helped determining the risk appetite of the group, as well as 
contributed to risk limit setting within the organization:
'The other element that w e obviously get involved with is risk appetite. Making sure 
that now w e have one unit of measurement across the bank of unexpected loss, which is 
Economic Capital and then w e can use that to allocate out risk appetite.'286
Secondly, the Economic Capital framework was used for fine-tuning the 
capital level required by the group in order to maintain its AA credit rating:
'...your point is, what happens when the bottom-up assessment [of risk capital 
need] is higher than the book value [of available capital]... Well, w e have a tolerance 
range which says you can't measure these things down to the last penny anyway. So if it 
com es within 120% then we are happy, if it com es over 120% then w e need additional 
capital.’287
This twofold contribution was a significant step toward Integrated Risk 
Management. What bestowed the Economic Capital framework with the image of 
being ‘integrated’ was Economic Capital’s status as a common denominator and 
language of risk. It expressed and made comparable risk taken by the business 
units and the group.
285 Head o f  Economic Capital, Fraser Bank
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Applying Power (2003b)’s definition, calculative idealism also entails the 
following: 'While practitioners under this approach may be short-term
pragmatists, they (...) worry constantly about the 'robust’ and 'hard’ nature o f 
(...) risk analysis.,288 Indeed, characteristic of the calculative idealism of risk 
people at Frasers was the amount of concern they devoted to maintaining the 
‘leading edge’ reputation of their risk methodologies, including that of the 
Economic Capital framework.
There was a widespread conviction across risk officers as well as non-risk 
people at headquarters that external constituencies rewarded Frasers for having 
‘leading edge’ risk practices. Debates on methodology were sparked by concerns 
that this leading technical position might be eroded:
‘Back in the 90s I think Frasers had a really good methodology. The perception w e  
had was: some American banks were further down the road than w e were, but w e were 
ahead of the UK banks. I think w e have got to the point where there is this big upheaval: 
there is a big question mark about whether our risk methodology is up to scratch. With 
Basel II going on, the feeling is that everyone is catching up, I assume it is the impetus to 
the current debates. (...) We can't afford having any of the analysts or anyone else saying 
w e have a bad methodology.'289
During the course of the study the researcher was witness to the complete 
overhaul of the Economic Capital methodology. It was a process with extreme 
political sensitivity, which has consumed an entire Economic Capital team before 
a second lot of risk capital officers finally managed to negotiate it through. 
Chapter 5 showed how the creators of the new methodology derived much 
credibility from the procedural fairness and political appropriateness that 
characterised the implementation. Their success was also due to the perceived 
technical competence that was deployed in the process, appealing to the 
calculative idealism of the people involved.
By successfully maintaining the internal credibility of the ERC framework 
risk capital officers ensured that both Integrated Risk Management as well as Risk 
and Value Management rested on a solid foundation.
288 Power (2003b), p. 14
289 Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning, Fraser Bank
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6.3.5 . Th e  p a r a d o x  o f  g e t t in g  t h e  p o l it ic s  o f  r is k  m a n  a g e m e n t  r ig h t  
The evidence suggests that Fraser Bank’s preference for resolving 
conflicting risk and return objectives was via negotiation in a characteristic Risk 
and Value Management framework. The resulting agreements represented the 
compromise that was expected to be reached within Frasers’ consensus-oriented 
culture. Reconciling competing risk-retum interests across the business units in 
the course of the planning process was a formidable technical and political 
exercise that risk capital controllers gradually learned to resolve.
Maintaining credible risk capital allocations for the purpose of risk-retum 
optimisation required a great deal of political aptness on the part of risk capital 
controllers. However, their contribution to the workings of the Group’s Value 
Based Management framework was so endemic that it became taken-for-granted 
and invisible in the eyes of top-level decision makers. Hence the paradox of 
getting the politics of risk management right: by doing so, the risk function turned 
invisible - a mere cog in the wheel of value creation.
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6.4. D is c u s s io n
Both BWT and Frasers have embarked on implementing risk management 
practices with an aspiration to apply these consistently and coherently across their 
organization. Accordingly, it can be claimed that these projects furthered the 
notion of Enterprise Risk Management. However, it appeared that ERM took very 
different shapes in the two banks.
Instead of a recognisably common risk management framework, ERM 
proved to be a particular risk management mix in both organizations. In this 
respect ERM is not unique.
It is a noted characteristic of a number of management accounting 
practices that they appear to be an assembly of various normative elements. 
Activity Management (Gosselin, 1997) and the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996, 2001; Speckbacher et al., 2003) are but two examples. From this 
perspective, although ERM is unique in the specifics of its technology and its 
initial focus, its scope and development might warrant parallels with other 
management control innovations. In particular, Gosselin (1997) distinguishes 
three levels of Activity Management: Activity Analysis, Activity Cost Analysis 
and Activity Based Costing. The levels build on each other in the sense that 
activity analysis, the identification and classification of activities, paves the way 
for cost analysis. ABC takes activity cost analysis further by tracing costs to 
products. ABC is also advocated to establish a link between cost analysis and 
various aspects of profitability measurement and strategic decision making (e.g. 
customer profitability assessment). This latter, strategic application of ABC is 
often distinguished as a further level of Activity Management, adding yet another 
idea to the assembly of AM practices. Gosselin (1997) present empirical evidence 
that the implementation of ABC often does not progress further than the 
implementation of activity analysis or activity cost analysis. Gosselin postulates 
this is because Activity Management is an assembly of practices that offers 
adopters several opportunities for selection and revision.
Similarly, based on Speckbacher et al. (2003)’s classification, the 
evolution of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has also resulted in a set of normative 
practices that offer firms choice between different implementation patterns. The 
BSC assembly contains multidimensional performance measures, cause-effect
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modelling, and strategy maps (Kaplan and Norton, 2001). The addition of new 
normative elements has led to the transformation of the original BSC ideal type 
(which was a performance measurement system) to more strategic models (e.g. 
the scorecard aligned with strategy via causal links, the scorecard as a strategic 
management system290). Empirical evidence shows that BSC implementations 
rarely reach these strategic variants -  they merely reflect multi-dimensional 
performance measurement (Speckbacher et al., 20003, Ittner and Larcker, 2003). 
As in the Activity Management case, it is the assembly nature of the BSC that 
allows adopters several opportunities for selection and revision.
This chapter has argued that ERM is an assembly of a number of firm- 
wide risk management ideal types. Its original presentation (Risk Silo 
Management) appears to specialise on a problem not addressed by previous 
management control practices. However, the ERM assembly has been 
complemented by applications that aim to link with strategy and performance 
management. It appears that assemblies of practices do not only give rise to 
different conceptual and implementation patterns. They also appear to be 
developing (at least conceptually) towards becoming more ‘strategic’.
This section compares and contrasts the risk management mixes, and the 
resultant control practices, which appeared in the two banks. It seeks to explain 
these by exposing the underlying calculative cultures.
6.4.1. Th e  r is k  m a n  a g e m e n t  m ix
BWT’s ERM mix allowed only senior risk officers to link up with strategy 
via their influence on key strategic decisions. Accordingly, BWT’s risk 
management mix displayed Risk Silo Management, Integrated Risk Management 
and Strategic Risk Management, furthered by risk silo controllers, risk capital 
controllers and senior risk officers, respectively. Risk capital controllers furthered 
the ideal of Risk and Value Management in vain.
At Frasers it appeared that Risk and Value Management was a prominent 
element of the mix, resulting in a link between risk management and planning and
290 Speckbacher et al. (2003) distinguishes three types o f  Balanced Scorecard. Type I -  the 
BSC as a multi-dimensional performance measurement system. Type II -  the BSC is linked to 
strategic objectives via cause-effect modelling. Type III -  the BSC as a strategic management 
system, which is linked with strategy implementation ( via defining objectives, action plans, 
results) and reward systems.
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performance management. Further, Integrated Risk Management and Risk Silo 
Management defined the territory of risk officers. In this organization Strategic 
Risk Management, the idea of extending the risk managers span of control to non- 
quantifiable risks, was frustrated.
The case studies suggest that the ERM assembly appears to offer two 
alternatives for the linking of risk management to strategy -  either to discretionary 
decision making or to planning and performance measurement.
6 .4 .2 . C o n t r o l  pa  it e r n s
Both banks grappled with conflicting risk and return objectives. A control 
pattern of ‘selective crack-down’ (Dunsire, 1990; Hood, 2001) was evidenced at 
BWT. The orchestration of timely attention swings between the competing risk 
and return objectives became a challenge that senior risk officers took on. This 
explains the appeal of Strategic Risk Management within this context. Curiously, 
senior risk officers did not possess an expert information and support system 
within their departments that would have formalised this risk management type. 
Instead, information was channelled directly from line management to the risk 
committee meetings in the form of specialist presentations. By exercising agenda 
setting power and by cultivating personal contacts within the organization, senior 
risk officers were able to collect and disseminate information. However, their 
influence on decision makers was rather informal and difficult to trace, making 
BWT’s senior risk officers appear to be the modem counterparts of the Eminence 
Gris. Division X’s example showed that at times of crisis, this influence on 
strategic decisions became even more prominent, lending Strategic Risk 
Management the status of interactive control (Simons, 1990, 1991).
Fraser Bank’s preference for resolving the conflicting risk and return 
objectives was via decision making by compromise (Burchell et al., 1980). 
Backed by a strong shareholder value ethos, Risk and Value Management rose as 
a rather political but nevertheless effective framework for the joint management 
of conflicting objectives. It also warranted a considerable level of integration 
between the strategic planning and the risk management functions. The Integrated 
Risk Management framework was the source of Economic Capital allocations that 
fed into the planning and performance management process both at the level of 
the group and the business units. However, as a mere cog in the wheel of value
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creation, the risk function lacked the visibility and voice that would have allowed 
senior risk officers to influence key strategic decisions. In any case, most of them 
considered strategic risks outside the remit of the quantified risk management 
framework. Their mandate was understood as measurement-based control over 
quantifiable risks, latent, taken-for-granted and drawing the attention of top 
management only at times of control breaches -  a diagnostic control (Simons, 
1990, 1991).
6.4.3. C a l c u l a  t iv e  c u l t u r e s
In order to determine the remit of risk management and the corresponding 
risk management methodologies, the senior risk officers of the study had to 
decide to what extent they regarded risk numbers as representing economic 
reality.
The interview material suggests that BWT’s senior risk officers regarded 
the risk numbers as attention-directing devices with little intrinsic claims to 
represent reality. They saw their contribution in helping to steer line management 
behaviour in the right direction. Further, in a control setting where conflicting risk 
and return objectives wrestled with one another, senior risk officers sought to 
direct the attention of decision makers to issues that warranted priority at any 
given time. This calculative pragmatism can in part be located in the professional 
background and convictions of the CROs of BWT (the Group CRO was the 
author of a practitioner book that detailed an internal control-based methodology 
for operational risk management, and his deputy, the CRO of BWT, had a 
doctorate in risk-based internal audit).
At Frasers it appeared that risk officers displayed a great deal of 
calculative idealism in that they aimed to represent the cost of true economic 
capital based on high quality data and they worried constantly about the ‘robust’ 
and ‘hard’ nature of their risk analysis. This calculative idealism was challenged 
in the process of allocating out the Group’s capital to business units. A whole 
team of risk capital controllers was consumed before it became clear that 
calculative idealism had to be combined with political shrewdness. Frasers’ very 
own organizational culture imposed a constant consensus-seeking behaviour on 
decision-makers. Hence, in the process of risk capital allocations, risk people’s 
calculative idealism was toned down to the extent that the next economic capital
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team was willing to compromise their preferred technique for the sake of reaching 
a compromise between the competing risk-retum interests within the group. 
Nevertheless, by involving ‘experts’, the language of these negotiations remained 
technical. Different Economic Capital allocation methodologies wrestled with 
each other, representing the different risk-retum interests of business units- until a 
final compromise was achieved. The quasi-technical process of decision making 
by compromise (Burchell et al., 1980) gave risk capital allocations sufficient 
credibility to become integral to strategic planning and performance management 
at Frasers.
The existence of different calculative cultures, based on the evidence 
presented here, is detectable in the attitude of senior risk officers to the outputs of 
risk management models in use. Apparently, senior risk officers develop ‘personal 
philosophies’ about the ‘manageability’ of risks by quantitative models. While 
there appears to be much consensus on the manageability of certain risks (e.g. 
market risks), the issue of non-quantifiable risks and that of internal capital 
allocation are contestable. BWT’s senior risk officers, who had doubts about the 
use of quantitative models in these contested locales, chose to define their area of 
competence broadly (encompassing risks outside the quantifiable risk 
framework). Conversely, senior risk officers at Frasers, who had more confidence 
in the reliability of the risk models, were able to make them work in the contested 
locale of capital allocations and performance measurement. However, by doing so 
they confined their area of influence to that of measurable risks. This underlines 
the role of managerial discretion ( at least in part) in the selection and use of ERM 
systems.
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6.5. C o n c l u s i o n
In the financial services sector ERM is thought to embody a set of risk 
practices that increasingly appear clustered together, even though they encompass 
such wide-ranging techniques as Vale-at-Risk and Economic Capital models, as 
well as qualitative methods for non-financial risks. The normative-practitioner 
literature suggests that, taken together, these risk management approaches 
increasingly constitute ‘best practice’ that more and more organizations aspire to 
implement (e.g. Lam, 2000; Gilbert, 2004).
This chapter reiterated the argument that innovations in ERM techniques 
increasingly cluster around four themes: risk quantification, risk aggregation, risk- 
based performance measurement and the management of non-quantifiable risks. 
Each of these themes represent different ambitions and objectives that risk 
officers might pursue, giving rise to four risk management ideal types. These all 
have enterprise-wide ambitions, and can be viewed as the building blocks that 
constitute the ‘risk management mix’ in a given organization: Risk Silo 
Management, Integrated Risk Management, Risk and Value Management and 
Strategic Risk Management.
Taking a field perspective (as in previous chapters), the chapter further 
investigated the risk practices of the two banks, BWT and Frasers. Each bank 
appeared to possess a risk management mix that was specific to them. However, 
the underlying currents that caused these patterns may be instructive in other 
cases too.
Power (2003a) postulated that two prominent institutional notions drive 
the rise of Enterprise Risk Management: the shareholder value imperative and the 
risk-based control imperative. These represent different approaches to corporate 
governance. The first emphasises the role of ERM practices in the measurement 
of shareholder value, and in the advancement of managerial practices that are 
designed explicitly to promote shareholder value via performance measurement. 
The notion of risk-based internal control emphasises the role of ERM practices 
that are designed around the strategic objectives of the firm and further the 
achievement of these via internal (formal and informal) controls.
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These undercurrents are detectable in the case studies. It appears that 
BWT’s ERM was more of a reflection of the risk-based internal control 
imperative. It can also be argued that Frasers’ ERM mix primarily corresponded 
to a strong shareholder value management concern. Thus the cases might be 
suggestive of two alternative patterns of ERM taking shape in financial 
institutions.
The shareholder value imperative appears to drive a particular model of 
ERM characterised by a risk management mix in which Risk and Value 
Management is a salient element (‘value-based ERM*). This model of ERM is 
contingent on a vision of uniting and controlling risk and return objectives in a 
common framework. Although calculations might be tempered by political 
consensus-seeking behaviour (i.e. the resolution of the risk-retum trade-off is 
achieved by compromise), this model presumes a great deal of calculative 
idealism on the part of adherents. It requires the quantification of both the risk 
silos and the risk capital need of business entities. Hence risk management’s remit 
is defined in terms of the quantifiable risks, and its concern with non-financial 
risks extends beyond the risk silos only as far as risk quantification is possible. 
The strategic significance of this risk management model is derived from its close 
integration with strategic planning and performance management, but as a control 
function, it is fundamentally diagnostic.
V alue-based ERM Strategic ERM
Salient elem ent in 
the risk management mix
Risk and Value Management Strategic Risk Management
Span o f  risk control Quantifiable risks (risk silos) Quantifiable as w ell as non-quantifiable 
risks (risk silos and beyond)
Resolution o f  conflicting  
risk-retum objectives
B y quasi- cybernetic control - 
Trade-off set by compromise in the 
Risk and Value Management framework
By selective crack-down - 
attention sw ings orchestrated applying 
Strategic Risk Management
Top m anagement’s use 
o f  risk controls
Diagnostic use o f  the entire 
risk management mix
Interactive use o f  
Strategic Risk Management
The strategic significance 
o f  risk management
Derived from the integration o f  
risk management with planning and 
performance management
Derived from influencing 
top-level decision making
Calculative culture Calculative idealism Calculative pragmatism
Case study example Frasers BW T
Table 2. Contrasting the two models of ERM
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On the other hand, the risk-based control imperative can be associated 
with a different model of risk management: one with a risk management mix in 
which Strategic Risk Management is prominent (‘strategic ERAT). This model is 
contingent on a vision that risk and return need not be controlled in a common 
framework, because the organizational actors who take risk are different from 
those who try to minimise it. There is an intrinsic tension between them, which 
can (at best) be controlled by selective crack-down on competing agendas. In this 
model risk people are not expected to get in the way of risk-takers when 
expansion is desirable. Risk officers see their role in orchestrating timely attention 
swings when the tide of risk is about to turn back on the organization. Taking a 
great deal of calculative pragmatism, risk officers quantify risks, but exercise 
control in a flexible manner, allowing the renegotiation of lower-level risk limits, 
when the interest of the business requires. This approach requires risk officers to 
possess considerable knowledge of the businesses whose risk-taking they monitor. 
Senior risk officers are keen to acquire business insight in order to voice their 
opinion on risk issues that are beyond the quantifiable risk framework. They 
derive strategic significance from influencing high-level strategic decision 
making, by responding to the concrete concerns of top management at any given 
time. In this model Strategic Risk Management is used interactively (by top 
management), in the formal context of the risk management committee where the 
senior risk officers set the agenda. Table 2. contrasts the two models of ERM.
Apart from emphasising the influence of institutional pressures, the cases 
also highlight that there is scope for managerial discretion in the workings of 
ERM systems. First, the role of senior risk officers was evident in the politics of 
risk management. At Frasers senor risk officers had to orchestrate the process of 
capital allocations with political sensitivity and tact. At BWT senior risk officers 
amassed both agenda setting and informal power in order to become influential in 
the discussions of strategic issues.
Second, it was, to some extent, a matter of managerial choice whether the 
risk-based internal control or the shareholder value imperative shone through the 
ERM models we described. Apparently, senior risk officers developed ‘personal 
philosophies’ about the ‘manageability’ of risks by quantitative models. While 
there appeared to be much consensus on the manageability of certain risks (e.g. 
market risks), the issue of strategic risks and that of internal capital allocation
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were contestable. Senior risk officers at Frasers, who had more confidence in the 
reliability of the risk models (c.f. ‘calculative idealists’), were able to make them 
work in the contested locales of capital allocations and performance 
measurement. This task was legitimised in the organisation by a strong value- 
based management culture, which was driven by the shareholder value 
imperative.
However, BWT’s senior risk officers who had doubts about the use of 
quantitative models in these contested locales (c.f. ‘calculative pragmatism’) 
chose to define their area of competence broadly, encompassing risks outside the 
quantifiable risk framework. To them the risk-based internal control imperative 
gave institutional support as it is driven by the idea that controls ought to aim at 
the strategic objectives of the firm.
The chapter also emphasised that ERM is not unique in the sense that it 
appears to be an assembly of risk management ideal types. A common pattern in 
control system innovations might be that they appear to constitute a hotchpotch of 
practices that take distinct patterns. Later applications invariably seem to assume 
a ‘strategic’ role. The linking of initially confined, highly specialised or 
‘technical’ practices to strategy is a phenomenon that appears to characterise 
numerous management innovations (c.f. Strategic Management Accounting, 
ABC/M, ‘Type 3’ Balanced Scorecard, Strategic Risk Management).
It is remarkable that, given the empirical evidence, few ABC and BSC 
implementations are strategic. In contrast, the ERM mixes (in the case of BWT 
and Fraser Bank) did possess some ‘strategic’ significance.
This study furthers the view that, in order to realise the strategic potential 
of assemblies, advocates need to demonstrate both political aptness and 
institutional appropriateness. Interpreting the cases of BWT and Fraser Bank from 
a symbolic-organizational perspective suggests that, given contemporary 
corporate governance trends, both the ‘value-based’ and the ‘strategic’ models of 
ERM have institutional backing. Having illuminated some of the politics of risk 
control, the study suggests that strategic ERM advocates need to possess informal 
and formal (e.g. agenda setting) power, while value-based ERM advocates need to 
get the politics of capital allocations right, in order to realise the strategic potential 
of the ERM mix.
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The distinction between the ‘value-based’ and the ‘strategic’ models of 
ERM is somewhat artificial. It is proposed to highlight the alternative patterns of 
strategic significance that ERM in action (in the cases described) appears to 
possess. It is hoped that the distinction might also be useful in generating further 
research questions. The final concluding chapter will attempt to outline some 
questions for further research.
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C h a p t e r  7
C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h
‘In real life, unlike in Shakespeare, the sw eetn ess  o f  the rose 
depends upon the name it bears. Things are not only what they are.
They are, in very important respects, what they seem  to be.’
Hubert H. Humphrey
This thesis was motivated by the belief that organizationally grounded 
accounts of enterprise risk management would usefully inform the risk 
management discourse, and would also enhance our understanding of the 
workings of management controls in situ.
The study set out to make sense of enterprise risk management and to 
investigate what form(s) ERM takes in organisations. The following questions 
were addressed: What roles does the management of risk come to serve within 
organisations? How does it relate to existing strategic planning and control 
systems? Is risk management complementary to the existing practices of financial 
management and control, or is it in competition with those for managerial 
attention and use?
The aims of the research were twofold. Based on extensive fieldwork with 
two stock exchange listed large banking organisations, it probes the roles that 
ERM has come to play in them. It also set out to explain the observed practices of 
ERM.
7.1. U nderstanding the roles of ERM
Digging below the surface of the loosely defined enterprise-wide risk 
practices, there appear to be variations in the specific conceptualisations and uses 
of risk management in individual organizations. The study offers the following 
explanations.
By relating the normative-practitioner literature on ERM to the observed 
risk management practices in the case study companies, the study has proposed 
the explanatory construct of the ‘risk management mix. ’ It has been argued that in 
a given organisation various risk management practices form a constellation, the
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risk management mix, that corresponds to the particularities of the institution and 
its context. As for the content of the risk management mix, four ideal types of risk 
management were identified. These were 1. Risk Silo Management, 2. Integrated 
Risk Management, 3. Risk and Value Management, and 4. Strategic Risk 
Management. Although all of these were observable in both case study banks, 
Chapter 6 showed that the focus and ultimate use of their risk management mix 
differed markedly.
Secondly, six tests were proposed for the assessment of the organizational 
significance of ERM in action. The first test probed if the risk management 
function had formal status through structural arrangements that would give it 
visibility and parity with other organizational actors. Given that influential 
calculative languages frame debates and decision making, and can facilitate or 
impede organizational change, an important second milestone of the 
organizational significance of risk management was the nature and use of its 
language. This second test considers if risk people had an independent voice that 
was specific to themselves, and if they could translate risk analytics into a 
language that other organizational actors understood. The influence of ERM on 
strategic planning, performance measurement (control) and key strategic 
decisions was queried by the next three tests. Further, to see if ERM was 
repeatedly and regularly consulted by decision makers, an additional test was 
proposed based on Simons’ (1990, 1991) distinction between salient and 
frequently used interactive and less influential and latent diagnostic control 
systems. Applying the proposed six tests of organizational significance, Chapter 3 
probed to what extent the risk management departments at the case study firms 
have been successful in achieving a strategic role.
Thirdly, the study called upon institutional organizational theory (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) in that it argued that risk 
management’s visibility and use by top management was partly attributable to its 
perceived institutional appropriateness - its ability to legitimise the organization. 
Chapter 4 argued that the observed patterns of risk management use within the 
same organization changed according to the dictates of institutional pressures 
(coming from regulators, investors and rating agencies) over a period of boom, 
bust and recovery. It has also been argued that the perceived institutional 
appropriateness of risk management can shift under different circumstances
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within the same organisation, being higher when capital adequacy concerns rise 
(leading to interactive risk control use), but ebbing away as the more conventional 
accounting representations of performance take over in the post-crisis period 
(resulting in diagnostic risk control use). Taking a step back from the two cases, 
Chapter 6 related the entire risk management mix of the organisations to two 
distinct corporate governance agendas, the shareholder value imperative and the 
risk-based internal control agenda.
Finally, the notion of complex organizational controls was investigated in 
an attempt to explain the patterns of control over the conflicting risk and return 
objectives at the two banks. Chapter 5 developed the argument that the inclusion 
of risk controls into a broader organizational control landscape raises questions 
about the simultaneous application of risk and profit control systems, which, 
given the risk-retum trade-off, can convey confusing and even contradicting 
signals. The chapter described the espoused and apparently in-use theories of 
controlling the complex risk-retum situation. Having compared and contrasted the 
ways in which the case study firms exercised control over conflicting risk and 
return objectives, the different practices observed were conceptualised as ‘control 
by selective crack-down’ in BWT’s case and ‘quasi-cybernetic control’ at Fraser 
Bank.
7.2. T h r e e  t y p e s  o f  r i s k  o f f i c e r s , f o u r  t y p e s  o f  ERM, t w o
PATTERNS OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
Three types of risk managers have emerged at both organizations. The 
differentiation of the risk function mirrored the varying aspirations of risk 
officers. It also mirrored four risk management ideal types that pose different 
challenges to the risk management staff in banks. Accordingly, the functional 
differentiation of risk people was indicated by the different technologies they 
applied and the different roles they fulfilled.
The first group ('risk silo specialists') consisted of those who were engaged 
in Risk Silo Management, the measurement and assessment of different risk types. 
Grappling with the challenges of data collection and risk quantification, they 
produced voluminous reports on adherence to risk limits. However, they struggled 
to grab regular attention of top management -  their role was, at best, diagnostic
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(Simons, 1990). This is because the risks that habitually concerned the Board 
tended to be of a more elusive, strategic or regulatory nature, and hence, stayed 
outside the reach of risk silo specialists.
The production of the quantitative risk estimates allowed risk managers to 
address the problem of risk aggregation. Another group of risk managers emerged 
("risk capital specialists’), who were concerned with Integrated Risk 
Management. Based on a common denominator for risk (economic capital), risk 
aggregation allowed risk capital specialists to assess the risk profile of the 
institution, set limits, and do the same for individual business units. This opened 
up the route for the integration of return and risk concerns in a single framework, 
Risk and Value Management. Furthering the theme of risk-based performance 
measurement, this requires aspiring institutions to arrive at risk-based (economic) 
capital allocations to their responsibility centres. In practice economic capital 
allocation incorporated much judgement, intuition and organisational politics, and 
was taken up by the risk capital specialists of Fraser Bank only. Here a strong 
value based management ethos paved the way for risk capital specialists to align 
internal definitions of capital with external expectations. It was through the 
provision of economic capital charges that ERM became an integral part of the 
strategic planning and performance measurement process. This required the 
alignment of planning and control principles between top management, strategy 
and planning staff, and the risk people. However, risk capital specialists had to be 
prepared to live in an uneasy symbiosis with the strategy people who supported 
them in their efforts to redefine definitions of capital allocations but on the other 
hand denied them top-level visibility.
Securing access to and visibility by the Board has enabled senior risk 
officers to exercise informal influence on some strategic concerns. However, their 
influence on major strategic decisions has been limited. Their favoured role is that 
of the devil’s advocate - challenging and questioning existing beliefs in order to 
prepare the organization to fend off emerging adversities. This required them to 
put non-quantifiable risk issues on the agenda of top management (e.g. non­
recurring operational risks, reputational, legal and strategic risks). Only at BWT 
had senior risk officers the agenda setting power to do so. It was through the 
provision of information about non-quantifiable risks that senior risk officers 
furthered the ideal of Strategic Risk Management. However, the sources of
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information they called upon were in the line management, which they accessed 
informally -  the form of CRO power appeared to be informal
The case study analysis has pointed towards two diverging patterns o f  
organizational significance on the part of the risk management functions 
observed. In one case (demonstrated by Frasers) risk management becomes 
integral to the formal planning and performance measurement process, while 
remains neutral in the discussions of key strategic decisions that emerge outside 
the planning cycle. In the second case (demonstrated by BWT), risk management 
is incidental as far as the formal planning and control cycle is concerned, however 
senior risk officers acquire agenda-setting power to influence the discussion of 
key strategic uncertainties and participate in top management-level decision 
making.
Thus the organizational significance of risk management appears to hinge 
upon the organizational significance o f the risk manager. It is a characteristic of 
the current development of ERM that there are multiple possibilities for its 
practice in organizations. It seemed that the organizationally significant risk 
officers responded to different corporate governance pressures and fostered 
different calculative cultures.
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7.3. E x t e r n a l  in f l u e n c e s  o n  in t e r n a l  E R M  p r a c t ic e s
The choice of listed banking organizations for study allows us to consider 
a host of stakeholder pressures on the observed ERM practices. In particular, 
regulatory, shareholder, rating agency, and internal managerial influences were 
shown to influence ERM in action.
First, the preoccupation of risk managers’ with bank capital adequacy was 
argued to be a response to pressures from the regulatory and the credit rating 
agency community. By gradually aligning the requirements for minimum capital 
adequacy with the measured risk profile of the banks, regulators are challenging 
risk silo specialists to render more and more risks to measurement. So much so, 
that current requirements for internal credit and operational risk models stretch 
the data and measurement capabilities of even the ‘most advanced’ banks. A 
burgeoning regulatory and practitioner literature has institutionalised the concern 
of adherents with risk measurement.
In response to rating agency expectations of capital adequacy, another 
type of risk managers risk capital specialists aspire to fine-tune bank capital to a 
required solvency standard that would allow banks to maintain a target credit 
rating. Risk capital specialists thus respond to what amounts to a quasi-regulatory 
pressure from external agencies that have a powerful influence on the cost of 
funding of financial institutions. Their concern with risk aggregation has been 
inscribed in normative texts that promote economic capital as their flagship 
technology.
Further, the observed risk capital specialists and senior risk officers were 
shown to have wider objectives, to get involved with strategic planning and 
performance measurement, and with the board-level discussions of key strategic 
uncertainties, respectively. These ambitions were linked to a discourse on risk- 
based performance measurement and the management o f non-quantifiable risks in 
the practitioner literature. The first was further related to the rise of the 
shareholder value imperative, and the second to the risk-based internal control 
agenda in contemporary corporate governance that endorses ERM as a strategic 
control system.
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7.4. M a k in g  s e n s e  o f  E R M  in  a c t i o n  -  p a t t e r n s  f o u n d
In brief, BWT possessed an ERM function that corresponded to the 
corporate governance concern of risk-based internal control. Here the remit of 
ERM included ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ risks that were not quantifiable -  the 
salient element in the risk management mix was Strategic Risk Management. 
Senior risk officers assumed a role in high level strategic decision making and 
exercised influence on decisions that were outside the remit of financial risk 
management. In particular, their ambition was to restrain excessive risk-taking 
resulting from expansionist business strategies. Under this ERM practice the 
conflict between risk and return initiatives was controlled by selective crack-down 
on one agenda at a time. Senior risk officers’ recognition of the need for 
orchestrating timely attention swings between risk and return objectives made 
their role critical in the emergence of this control pattern. Apart from the risk- 
based control imperative, this type of ERM was associated with a pragmatic, non­
religious, experimental approach to risk measures {calculative pragmatism), the 
agenda setting power and informal influence of senior risk officers, and the 
strategic spurs and halts of an entrepreneurial, opportunistic organization.
Fraser Bank was driven by a strong shareholder value imperative. Here 
risk managers become involved in the strategic planning and performance 
measurement process, and the salient element in the risk management mix was 
Risk and Value Management. ERM’s input to the planning process was the 
quantitative assessment of the risk profile of alternative business units and 
strategies that allowed the organization to optimise the competing risk and return 
objectives. Critical to the integration of risk management and planning, risk 
people here recognised and tactfully managed the micropolitics of risk profile 
attribution, contributing to an alternative approach to the control over the risk- 
retum trade-off, resulting in a quasi-cybernetic control practice. Promising a 
more even growth, the resolution of the risk and return trade-off within a VBM 
framework was in line with the rather conservative, consensus-seeking and 
cautious strategies of the institution. Here risk people placed the emphasis on the 
robustness and accuracy of the risk models applied {calculative idealism). 
However, this resulted in the remit of ERM becoming confined to financial and
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quantifiable risks, and senior risk officers did not get close to the discussion of 
non-quantifiable strategic risks.
From these accounts ERM appears to be an assembly of risk management 
ideal types, constituting what the ‘risk management mix’ that varied across the 
organisations. By linking the observed patterns of organisational significance (and 
the differences in the two risk management mixes) to organisational 
characteristics as well as wider institutional pressures, the implications for the 
further development of enterprise risk management were traced out. It has been 
argued that the cases might be indicative of alternative tracks in the development 
of enterprise risk management and might also be indicative of similar patterns in 
other organisations.
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7.5. R e f l e c t io n s  o n  t h e  r e su l t s  a nd  d ir e c t io n s  f o r  f u r t h e r
RESEARCH
Taking a step back from the above, in an attempt to give an altogether 
more rounded interpretation, the implications of the study will be considered from 
two different theoretical perspectives. In particular, this section will look at the 
results first from a contingency viewpoint, then from an institutional perspective. 
It will also trace out further questions for research.
7.5.1. ERM  AS AN OUTCOME (THE CONTINGENCY VIEW)
A number of factors were brought to bear relevance on the roles of ERM 
in action. Firm specific characteristics, such as the strategic (growth) path 
followed by the institutions, the presence or absence of value-based management, 
as well as their calculative cultures (calculative idealism vs. calculative 
pragmatism) were implicated in the analysis. However, these relationships remain 
at the level of identifying associations. It is a characteristic weakness of the 
contingency approach that it stops short of causal explanations.
Nevertheless, finding factors that appear to systematically vary with the 
observable practices is important. As Weick (1995) argues, theory is a continuum 
rather than dichotomy, and theorising is the process of approximation, the road to 
what eventually become established as ‘theories’. The process of theorising 
consists of abstracting and selecting factors that are deemed explanatory (while 
omitting and discarding others are equally important steps), relating them to each 
other, explaining, and synthesizing. The attempts at summarising the empirics in 
tables (e.g. the characteristics of the three types of risk officers; the comparison of 
‘value-based’ and ‘strategic’ ERM), arranged according to a number of 
contingencies, thus represent the first tentative steps in the theorizing process. 
Size and strategy, two of the most frequently investigated contingency variables, 
have not been featured prominently in the study. The reason is that size did not 
seem to differentiate between the two banks, given the similarity of their market
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capitalisation.291 Strategy as an explanatory factor is treated with caution in this 
study. The theoretical framework did not suppose that organisational actors are 
rational and deliberative with respect to strategy making. It did not presume the 
existence of deliberate strategies, which could be regarded as contingencies in the 
analysis (as is the case in contingency research frameworks such as Simons, 1990, 
1991, Gosselin, 1997). Still, a difference in the apparent (c.f. ‘emergent’) 
strategies of the organisations was indicated (e.g. an innovative first-mover 
approach vs. a cautious, steady growth pattern). However, this distinction was 
merely painted as part of the backdrop against which the observed control 
practices crystallised, and no causal links have been suggested (i.e. whether these 
strategic patterns were causes or consequences of the observed control patterns).
The distinctions between the three types of risk officers and the ‘value- 
based’ and the ‘strategic’ models of ERM are both artificial. They were proposed 
to make sense of the various risk management aspirations held by different actors 
that previously had been looked at as a homogeneous sets of ERM practices and 
risk officers. Furthermore, these distinctions can be useful in generating further 
empirical research questions. Three such questions are outlined.
The first question would aim to verify if the distinctions between the four 
different risk types, three types of risk officers and the two diverging risk models 
are valid. A survey o f a larger sample of financial institutions could be used to 
explore the risk management mix in different organizations and to see what 
patterns they take and what the driving factors of the emerging clusters are. It is 
likely that other variables that were not exposed in the present study will surface. 
In particular, size could be a significant differentiating factor. For example, the 
small Swiss canton-banks are reportedly concerned with Risk Silo Management, 
but so far have not taken interest in the Economic Capital framework that would 
bring Integrated Risk Management or Risk and Value Management in the risk 
management mix. Therefore it should not surprise us if we found no risk capital 
specialists in such small banks, or if the risk management function was not even
291 It was noted that BW T’s business portfolio included an insurance company, while Fraser 
Bank had disposed o f  its insurance business before this study commenced. This mismatch did 
introduce a difference in the content o f the case study analysis. In particular, the insurance 
industry crisis in 2002 caused major problems in BWT. The upheaval gave opportunities for 
different control groups within the organisation to become implicated, and the resulting 
dynamics o f  control system complementarities and rivalry (between risk and accounting 
controls) was explicated in Chapter 4.
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formalised, but a mere addition to some long-existing other function (e.g. credit 
management).
The second question seeks to investigate if a special case of risk 
management would still comply with the distinction between the value-based and 
the strategic models. It is suggested that that the treatment o f  operational risk in 
the risk management models could be further explored. Operational risk is a 
particular risk issue that poses different challenges to the postulated risk 
management models. Given the current Basel II framework, under the definition 
of operational risk one finds both quantifiable and non-quantifiable risks. 
Financial institutions need to apply a rather loose regulatory definition to devise a 
set of operational risks that are relevant to them. With the amount of flexibility 
offered in Basel II, it is likely that organizations will cherry-pick issues for 
inclusion into the remit of the operational risk controller. Based on the distinction 
between the two risk management models (‘value-based’ vs. ‘strategic’), one 
would expect that with time the management of operational risk will take different 
routes, depending on which ERM model it conforms to. The following hypotheses 
can be postulated:
The value-based model of enterprise risk management corresponds to firm 
contexts where the influence of the shareholder value imperative prevails. Here 
business units and products would be expected to earn economic returns over the 
charge they receive for their risk content, including operational risk. This 
reasoning would call for the quantification of operational risk, to the extent that 
Economic Capital can be allocated to it. Given its concern with capital allocation, 
this model would be likely to favour top-down approaches to the management of 
operational risk. In short, it is expected that among the numerous methodologies 
around, quantitative, top-down approaches to operational risk are to evolve within 
the context of the value-based model of ERM.
The strategic model of risk management is likely to define operational risk 
in a much wider sense, including many issues that lie outside the quantifiable risk 
framework. Given risk officers’ concern with the timely identification of possible 
faults in the workings of business units, bottom-up approaches can be expected. 
The quantification of operational risk here could become secondary to the 
understanding of the sources of it. Instead of charging business units for the 
operational risk they take, risk officers would seek to check the soundness of the
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processes in place. Less quantitative, bottom-up, process-based approaches to 
operational risk are expected to surface here.
Thirdly, further research into the dynamics o f the risk management models 
is warranted. Longitudinal studies of risk management models are necessary to 
confirm the validity of the variables that drive different risk management models. 
They would be useful in deciding to what extent the models proposed as 
alternatives are mutually exclusive. Given the seeds of Value-Based Management 
already sown in BWT, it is possible that another management team or a turn in the 
institutional pressures may bring a paradigm change in the future. Equally, should 
the VBM project fail to deliver the expectations attached to it, the value-based 
model of risk management may get discredited in Frasers. This could result in yet 
another overhaul of the risk management function and a redefinition of its role. 
Talking of such shifts is highly speculative, even though it is likely that any 
particular risk management mix or model would be a dynamic phenomenon and 
subject to change. However, from a contingency perspective one would argue that 
the incidents that shape the patterns in the development of risk management 
practices are systemic, rather than erratic, and can therefore be explained by 
careful studies of the underlying currents.
7.5.2. ERM  AS A SOURCE OF INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY (THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL-SYMBOLIC VIEW)
Strategic Risk Management appeared to be the salient component in 
BWT’s risk management mix, and it was the key source of the strategic 
significance of the senior risk officers. In this organization Risk and Value 
Management was a frustrated initiative on the part of risk capital controllers, who 
nevertheless produced an Integrated Risk Management framework.
From an institutionalist perspective ERM was less of a new form of 
strategic control in the organization, than a demonstration of BWT’s adoption o f 
institutionally appropriate risk management techniques to the outside world. This 
legitimising property of applying ‘best practice’ Integrated Risk Management 
techniques came to be especially important at the time of Division X’s crisis when 
rating agencies and investors cast doubt about BWT’s capital strength and ability 
to contain risk. Here a process of intra-firm institutionalisation took place. In a 
hostile environment (Khandwalla, 1977), the management of BWT imposed its
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accounting and risk control mechanisms on the division. Apart from gathering 
banking-style information for decision making, they also impressed upon external 
observers that legitimate control practices were in place. We have seen that both 
in the accounting and in the risk control areas a process of making Division X’s 
practices similar to those of BWT took place. From an institutional perspective, 
this is not surprising: it has been observed that in conglomerates subsidiaries are 
compelled to adopt accounting practices, performance evaluations etc. that are 
compatible with the policies of the parent corporation (Coser, et al., 1982). Why? 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that homogenisation increases the legitimacy 
of the organization. Increased legitimacy stems from institutional appropriateness, 
which means compliance with prevailing institutionalised rules and norms, 
whether they are set by a parent company, regulators or emerge as a result of 
industry practices. While the accounting (cost) controls gained legitimacy from 
their very own commonness (Hopwood, 1983), the risk controls gained legitimacy 
from their claimed innovativeness.
What this case added to a new institutionalist appreciation was its 
emphasis placed on the politics o f multiple control. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) 
confirm that their colleagues have paid little attention to how incumbents 
maintain their dominant positions or respond to threats, especially during periods 
of crisis and instability. This study showed risk and accounting controls not 
merely as striving for institutional appropriateness, but also described them as 
competing for top managerial attention, visibility and strategic significance.
The study brought out a dilemma that bancassurance firms face in the 
wake of recent developments in the banking and insurance regulatory 
environments. Given the current direction of international banking regulation, 
banking supervisors reward the firm-wide implementation of risk controls (The 
Basel Committee, 2001; Morrison, 2002). However, as Chapter 4 has shown, such 
firm-wide risk management attempts may well run into difficulties in the 
insurance part of bancassurance groups. Here, where accounting controls measure 
capital adequacy and ensure regulatory compliance, the risk controls lose their 
institutional appropriateness. The case study showed how the risk controls 
challenged accounting controls in the insurance unit without success. The control 
systems ended up confined to where they possessed institutional appropriateness. 
Due to the conflicting definitions of regulatory appropriateness in the banking and
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the insurance world, bancassurance groups have to live with a balance of controls, 
which frustrates the ideal of firm-wide risk management. This warrants a 
reconsideration of regulatory expectations about the role of risk management in 
bancassurance groups, leaving scope for policy-oriented research in this area.
Moving on to an institutionalist interpretation of the observed patterns of 
strategic significance displayed by the risk functions, the role of corporate 
governance pressures warrants a pause. The shareholder value imperative and the 
risk-based internal control agenda have created new definitions for institutionally 
appropriate ERM practices, which, given the difference of emphasis between the 
two corporate governance notions, might diverge.
On one hand the shareholder value imperative gave rise to a distinct 
literature on risk-based performance measurement, and the ideal type of Risk and 
Value Management. It was related to the observed risk management mix 
described as ‘value-based.’ On the other hand it is the risk-based internal control 
agenda that brought about a separate strand in the risk management literature 
promoting the ideal type of Strategic Risk Management, which displays a 
concern with the management of non-quantifiable risk issues. This line of 
corporate governance thinking was related to the observed risk management mix 
described as ‘strategic.’
However, it is an admitted weakness of the thesis is that the above links 
are rather tentative. A rigorous analysis of the relationship between actual risk 
management practices and the promotion of corporate governance agendas in the 
wider institutional context must be the subject of further research in the area.
7.5.3. ERM AND THE MAN A GEMENT CONTROL LITERA TURE 
Perhaps most ambitiously, the research aimed to build bridges between 
organisationally grounded management control studies and the subject of risk 
management. Although applying highly analytical techniques that are alien to 
conventional management control approaches, enterprise risk management 
belongs to an increasing number of management innovations that aim to 
‘improve’ strategic control in organizations. Thus ERM echoes the ambitions of 
recent innovations such as Value Based Management, the Balanced Scorecard and 
Activity Management.
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The research also suggests that ERM is not unique among management 
control innovations in the sense that it appears to be an assembly of risk 
management ideal types. It appears to be a common feature of recent control 
system innovations that they are constituted by an assembly of practices. Various 
normative techniques are being advocated in different combinations under the 
umbrella of the very same management control concept. Distinct conceptual 
clusters have emerged in the Activity Management assembly (Gosselin, 1997) and 
in the evolution of the Balanced Scorecard (Speckbacher et al. 2003). Thus the 
proposed co-existence of four ideal types of risk management is conceptually 
similar to the existence of three levels of Activity Management and the distinction 
between three types of Balanced Scorecard.
Later variants within the same assembly seem to assume a ‘strategic’ role. 
The eventual aspiration to link initially confined, highly specialised or ‘technical’ 
practices to strategy is a phenomenon that appears to characterise the 
development of not only ERM, but other management innovations too (c.f. 
ABC/M, ‘Type 3’ Balanced Scorecard, Strategic Management Accounting).
The clustering of techniques within the same assembly is not merely 
conceptual, it appears in actual organisational settings too. In practice it appears 
that assemblies of management control innovations offer practitioners 
opportunities for selective implementation, revision and switching between the 
different sub-groups of techniques within the same assembly (Gosselin, 1997). It 
is remarkable that given the empirical evidence, few ABC and BSC 
implementations are strategic. In contrast, the ERM mixes (in the case of BWT 
and Fraser Bank) did possess ‘strategic’ significance. This study furthered the 
view that in order to realise the strategic potential of assemblies, advocates 
needed to demonstrate not only technical competence and institutional 
appropriateness, but also a great deal of political aptness. The organisational 
significance of management control practices appears to hinge upon the 
organizational significance of the management control practitioner.
7.5.4. LIMITA TIONS OF THE STUDY
The study of two organisations enabled the researcher to get close to the 
field where risk managers operate. The small sample offers the possibility of 
acquiring a familiarity with the actors and events that appeared to be relevant to
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the understanding of ERM in action. Thus it is hoped that the study was able to 
bring out the specificity of the particular contexts in which the observed risk 
managers functioned. However, the small sample size means that a trade-off had 
to be made. In order to reach to the depths of the cases, the researcher 
compromised on the breadth of the research project. A study of other 
organisations is warranted before one can draw out the implications of the 
presented research results for a more general understanding of ERM in the 
financial services sector.
It is worth noting that there have been much debate in the organizational 
literature if at all ‘rich stories' can produce ‘good theoretical insights on their 
own.’292 This study sides with the position voiced by Ahrens and Dent (1998) who 
argue that 'the answer depends in part on one’s definition and understanding o f 
the term "theory”. Too easily, we feel, are rich stories rejected as "non- 
theoretical”, because people forget that theory can be speculative,’293 However, 
past methodological debates caution against the power of rich stories, some even 
claim that the power of deep studies is an illusion. As Eisenhardt (1991) warns,
‘contextually rich stories lure people into thinking that they know more than they 
do.'294 Thus the explanations conveyed in this study are only some of a possibly 
large number of interpretations, and reflect the particular reading of the 
researcher.
Another potential weakness of the study is that the theoretical framework 
deliberately underplayed the institutional aspects of risk management in action. 
Apart from pointing out some tentative linkages between the observed internal 
practices and their apparent external sources, the focus of the study was on the 
roles of ERM within the confines of the organisations observed. Miller and 
O’Leary (1990) acknowledge that fo r  certain purposes intra-corporate models 
can be very fruitful.' However, they argue that ‘ to achieve a fu ll picture o f 
innovation we need to identify the ways in which diverse types o f events -  
institutional, technical, political, moral -  are linked together to provide the 
conditions which make certain types o f innovation possible.'296 As far as the
292 Ahrens and Dent, 1998, p.7.
293 Ibid.
294 Eisenhardt, 1991, p. 626.
295 Miller and O ’Leary (1990), p. 481.
296 Ibid.
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constellation of the diverse external sources of ERM practices is concerned, the 
study probably leaves much to be desired. In particular, we need more 
understanding of the processes of the conceptual invention (Miller and O’Leary, 
1990) of enterprise risk management and its varied practices. These take place in 
and outside the confines of the individual organisations, in a number of political, 
regulatory and professional arenas. The study merely indicates that regulatory, 
rating agency and corporate governance pressures appear to influence the fate of 
ERM initiatives in organisational settings. It also suggests that powerful concepts 
originating in academia (such as the notion of cybernetic control) have a strong 
hold over practitioners, even thought they may be unaware of those. However, 
further research is needed on these wider constituencies and actors, as well as on 
the dynamics, discourses and interactions that take place among them. Only then 
can we get closer to understanding the linkages between ERM and the social 
processes that furnish its development.
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A p p e n d ix  1 
F r a s e r  Ba n k  - T im e l in e
01.01.2000 01.01.2001 01.01.2002 01.01.2003 01.01.2004
•  Arrival o f  new C hief Executive
•  Advocacy and implementation o f VBM
• Group-wide efficiency review
• Acquisition o f  a mortgage lender
• The ‘tw o-year battle’ o f economic capital 
allocations between the Economic Capital 
team and a large business unit
•  Economic Capital team members leave, apart 
from one who is appointed as Assistant 
Director in the Strategy and Planning 
function
• New appointments 
in Group Risk: 
Director o f Risk 
Reporting, Risk 
Director (CRO), 
new Head o f 
Economic Capital
• December: First 
research interview 
with bank (Director 
o f Risk Reporting)
•  Reorganization in 
Group Risk
• Mission reiterated in 
terms o f  support to 
VBM framework.
•  Spring: Interviews 
in Group Risk
• Resignation o f 
Director o f Risk 
Reporting
• April: Departure o f 
previous Head o f 
Economic Capital





•  Summer-autumn: 
Interviews in Group 
Strategy and 
Planning
•  Autumn-W inter: 
Interviews in Group 




•  June: Last 
interviews in Group 




•  Research feedback
245
A p p e n d ix  2
B W T  - T im e l in e
01.01.199 0 1 .01.2000 0 1 .01.2001 01 .01.2002 01.01.2003
Acquisition'oK^ 
Division X
March: Equity markets 
peak 
BW T G roup’s 
investment banking 
arm acquires a 
London-based 
investment bank 
BW T G roup’s market 
capitalization 
reported to have 
quadrupled over last 
4 years.
Loan debacles 




No change in 
Division X 
investment strategy 
The introduction o f 
the ‘Strategic Risk 
M anagem ent’ 
function at BWT.
March: BW T 
reports profit for 
2001





(M SCI Europe 
Ins index) fall by 
60%
BW T capital 
injection to 
Division X 
The collapse o f 
BW T share price 
Financial Times 
reports ‘A real 
crisis for 
insurers’
C hief Executive 





the Group by 
head o f  ERC 
team
BW T’s second 
capital injection 
to Division X 
December: Risk
March: Contact 
made with Director, 
CFO Division in 
London who invites 




Head o f ERC team 
in London 





M arch:BW T reports 
‘record loss’ for 
2002
Commentators urge 
sale o f Division X 
Summer:
1st quarter results -
improvements
Autumn:
2nd quarter results -  
return to profitability
August-September: 



















































A p p e n d ix  3 
L is t  o f  in t e r v ie w s
List of interview s a t  B W T
Interviewee’s functional position Date
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
Head of Strategy & Projects 
Director, CFO Division 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
Head of Operational Risk Controlling 
Head of Operational Risk Controlling 
Market Risk Controlling: Team members 
Head of ALM/Market Risk Controlling 
Head of Market Risk Controlling 
Head of Credit Risk Controlling 
ERC and Capital Management 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
Director, CFO Division 
Head of Strategy & Control 
Head of Credit Portfolio Management 
Chief Risk Officer 
Head of Asset Liability Management, Division X 
Head of Financial Risk Control, Division X 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
ERC and Capital Management 
Director of Group Risk Reporting 
Director, CFO Division 
Head of Financial Risk Control, Division X 
Head of Corporate Development, Division X 
Head of Asset Liability Management, Division X 
Head Strategy and Projects 
Chief Risk Officer 
Head of Credit Risk Controlling 
Head of Operational Risk Controlling 
Head of Market Risk Controlling 
Director of Legal & Compliance 
Head of Regulatory Reporting 
Group Chief Risk Officer 
Director of Group Risk Reporting 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
Chief Risk Officer, Division X 
Head of Financial Management, Division X 
Head of Management of Closed Blocks, Division X 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 
Director of Group Risk Reporting 
Chief Risk Officer 
Head of Strategy & Projects 
Head of Operational Risk Controlling
26 May 2002 
01 June 2002 





09 October 2002 
09 October 2002
09 October 2002
10 October 2002 
10 October 2002 
10 October 2002
10 October 2002
11 October 2002 
11 October 2002 
14 October 2002 
14 October 2002 
14 October 2002
09 December 2002  
09 December 2002  
09 December 2002
09 December 2002
10 December 2002  
10 December 2002 
10 December 2002
10 December 2002
11 December 2002 





13 December 2002  
13 December 2002 
13 December 2002 
13 December 2002 
13 December 2002 
13 December 2002  
01 September 2003 
01 September 2003
01 September 2003


































Head of Credit Risk Controlling 
Head of Strategy & Control 
Chief Risk Officer, Division X 
Group Chief Risk Officer 
Director, CFO Division 
Director, Group Financial Accounting 
Head of Credit Portfolio Management 
Chief Credit Officer 
Head of Economic Risk Capital 




04 September 2003 
04 September 2003
04 September 2003
05 September 2003 
05 September 2003 
28 September 2004 
28 September 2004
L ist of interview s at  Fr a ser  B a n k
Interviewee’s functional position Date
Risk Management Team meeting 
Director of Risk Reporting 
Head of Economic Capital (previous)
Head of Economic Capital (previous) 
Director of Risk Reporting 
Director of Risk Reporting 
Assistant Director 3, Group Strategy and Planning 
Assistant Director 2, Group Strategy and Planning 
Director of Risk Reporting 
Assistant Director 2, Group Strategy and Planning 
Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning 
Head of Economic Capital 
Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning 
Head of Economic Capital 
Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 
Head of Economic Capital 
Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 
Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 
Director, Group Risk Analysis and Policy 
Head of Economic Capital 
Assistant Director, Group Strategy and Planning
19 October 2001 
20 December 2001 
06 February 2002 
15 April 2002 
10 May 2002
18 June 2002 




24 September 2002 
21 October 2002
05 November 2002
05 November 2002 
22 November 2002 
22 November 2002 
27 November 2002
06 December 2002
19 June 2003 
19 June 2003 
19 June 2003
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